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Abstract
The three essays of my PhD thesis study theoretical issues of Information Design and their
applications in Political Economy and Finance. Those essays aim to understand that in
various economic and political situations, how an informed party can design information
structure that another party faces and thus shape that party’s action for the informed
party’s own interests. By working on those issues, those essays aim to provide more insights
on how information sender’s incentives shape different levels of information quality, and
how various variables of interest, including social welfare, are affected.
The first chapter studies in international disputes, how a government can get conces-
sions from another government by encouraging its own people to protest against the foreign
government. By choosing different levels of propaganda, a government not only affects the
probability of protests happening but also the informativeness of protests. This chapter
sheds more light on a government’s optimal nation-building strategy, and also which kinds
of countries can benefit most from stirring anti-foreign protests.
The second chapter studies the optimal information design problem in a financial
market. A security issuer designs a signal to persuade an investment bank to underwrite,
taking as given that there is a secondary market. This chapter shows that the existence
of demand shock would lead to worsening of information quality in the primary market.
The third chapter studies that in a moral-hazard environment, how a principal can
optimally design the information environment that the agent faces. This chapter shows
how a principal can optimally combining providing information and pecuniary incentives
to incentivise an agent to exert effort. It also generates some testable predictions about
how the quality of equilibrium information structure is affected by factors such as cost of
effort and noisiness of production technology.
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Chapter 1
Propaganda, Patriotic Protest,
and Diplomatic Persuasion
“ During the first day and a half of the crisis, many of our colleagues, especially those in the
Chancery and at some of the Consulates, were in significant danger. Though U.S. Marines protected
the Chancery from direct assault, officers on the spot engaged in a full-scale destruction of classified
materials that might fall into the hands of demonstrators should the Embassy be overrun. In
hindsight, it appears the danger was never that close, but several Chinese did jump the compound
wall and had to be confronted by Marines in full battle gear before they were persuaded to jump back
over the wall. Except for Shanghai, with its own Marine guard contingent, the other Consulates
were protected only by Chinese security guards. In Chengdu those guards were of virtually no help.
Demonstrators climbed the compound wall, set fire to the Consul’s residence, and smashed their
way through the outer door of the Consulate. They were using a bike rack to try to crash into
the interior - while screaming that they were going to exact vengeance - when city security forces
finally arrived and routed them. Our colleagues were understandably terrified through this ordeal.
They were frantically calling the Embassy and local contacts, and getting increasingly agitated by
the slow, almost grudging response of the Chengdu authorities.”
—Paul Blackburn, Foreign Service Officer, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Train-
ing 1
1.1 Introduction
When diplomatic disputes loom, governments often instil hostility in their own citizens
to encourage protests against other countries. In May 1999, the US bombed the Chinese
embassy in Yugoslavia, leading to the death of three journalists and twenty injuries.2 After
internal discussions following the attack, the Chinese leadership decided to take measures
against the US, including encouraging protests: the Chinese leadership gave a speech on
1Blackburn, Paul. “Dealing with a PR Disaster-The U.S. Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Bel-
grade”. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training: Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. Re-
trieved 8 May 2013. https://adst.org/2013/05/dealing-with-a-pr-disaster-the-u-s-bombing-of-the-chinese-
embassy-in-belgrade/
2Whether this was the intentional behaviour of the US is subject to heavy debate. The US side claim-
s this was not intentional and due to outdated information over the position of the Chinese embassy.
However, this did not convince the Chinese side, and it is widely believed in China that there was some
conspiracy or intentional provocation. Mizokami, Kyle. “In 1999, America Destroyed China’s Em-
bassy in Belgrade (And Many Chinese Think It Was on Purpose)”. The National Interest, January 21,
2017. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/1999-america-destroyed-chinas-embassy-belgrade-many-
chinese-19124
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national TV to condemn the US,3 while the official Chinese media claimed that the Chinese
people’s anger was justified. This was seen as an effort to steer citizens into protesting, in
marked contrast to the Chinese government’s policy of quenching any public protest.
The US officials were perfectly aware of the Chinese government’s efforts to incite
protests. However, they also realized that the bombing did generate popular anger in the
Chinese population,4 and this may disrupt the US-China relationship. Eventually, US
president Bill Clinton made a public apology and various commitments to investigate the
event and improve the Sino-US relationship. After these public concessions, the Chinese
government moved to subdue the protests successfully.5
This is far from an isolated example: in many other diplomatic disputes, there is intense
hostility among the public of one or both sides6 which leads to people protesting against the
foreign opponent.7 This chapter tries to understand the logic of governments making use
of their citizens’ activism in international disputes by answering the following questions:
First, why does a government encourage protests against a foreign opponent, given that
protests can be very costly?8 Second, through which mechanisms can a government benefit
from encouraging protests? Last, which kind of regimes can benefit most from these
mechanisms?
To study these questions, I consider the following model: Two countries—Country 1
(Home country) and Country 2 (Foreign country)—seek to resolve an international dispute.
Country 1 is the ‘aggrieved’ country, and its people may go to the streets to protest against
Country 2. Country 1’s government can choose the level of propaganda, which will affect
Country 1’s people’s utility of participating in a protest. In Country 2 there is no internal
politics, and its government can only choose to either concede or not.
In Country 1, its people is composed of two factions: the General Public (G) and the
Nationalist (N). Both will be more likely to protest if there is a higher level of hostility.
The opponent will only concede if the general public is protesting. However, the opponent
cannot observe the identities of the protesters. Thus, the opponent is willing to concede as
long as it is sufficiently likely that the general public will participate in that protest. This
implies that a protest has to be sufficiently informative for the opponent to concede when
3Then Vice-President Hu said in a speech that ”Chinese government firmly supports and protects any
demonstration that is held according to law”. “Vice-President Hu gave a speech over the bombing of
China embassy on 9th May (Chinese)”, Sina News, 25th May 2003. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-05-
25/14421097103.shtml
4In Weiss (2013), the author interviewed some senior level US diplomat. That diplomat claims “This
thing got out of control. The government and the Foreign Ministry did not realize how determined and
angry these people were ... at the United States, but also, as it went on, partially directed at the Chinese
government”.
5See Weiss (2013) and Weiss (2014) for more details.
6To name a few, the recent dispute over the name of Macedonia; Japan-South Korea’s dispute over the
issue of “comfort woman”; and various territorial disputes.
7Again, in the previous example of Macedonia naming dispute, large-scale protests broke out on both
sides. In South-Korea, widespread protests over the issue of “comfort women” persist years after both
governments reaching binding-agreement over this issue.
8Protests can lead to significant disruptions to society, reducing investors’ confidence and sometimes
creating threats to the regime.
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seeing one. In the case of the US bombing the Chinese embassy, the US conceded over
those protests because, although those protests were mobilised and manipulated, they still
constituted strong signals of the general public’s anger. After receiving concessions, it was
much easier for the Chinese government to claim victory and calm down angry protesters.
Since the foreign opponent is willing to concede even with some doubt, there is space
for the home government to manipulate protests for its own benefit. By choosing a higher
level of hostility through propaganda and management of private media and activists,
the home government can incite more protests, leading to more concessions if protests
are sufficiently informative. However higher hostility means the general public is more
likely to protest, which can be costly. I call the event of the general public protesting a
crisis: placating the angry public is costly, even after some foreign concession. The home
government, thus, chooses its optimal hostility balancing the benefit of more concessions
versus the cost of more crises, with the additional constraint that protests are indeed
sufficiently informative.
Two key parameters that shape the home government’s choice of propaganda are the
degrees of responsiveness to hostility of the different groups. I find the optimal level of
propaganda for the home government can be non-monotonic over these degrees of respon-
siveness. I also find the optimal level of hostility can have a discontinuous jump over
the relative benefit of hostility for the home government: if getting a concession is in-
termediately important, a small change in the relative benefit/cost ratio may generate
a disproportionate increase in propaganda and thus protests. Therefore, big changes in
propaganda are not necessarily associated with big changes in the value of receiving con-
cessions or cost of facing protests. This means that occurrences of protest and strong
hostility are most volatile over issues that are intermediately important for a government.
We then look at how the home government’s equilibrium utility changes with different
parameters of the model. We show that the home government would like to promote
restrained patriotism among the general public: here restrained patriotism means an inter-
mediate degree of responsiveness towards higher propaganda.9 A more responsive general
public means it is easier to convince the opponent with a low level of hostility. A more
responsive nationalist, however, means it is harder to convince the opponent, so that the
home government needs a higher level of hostility. Some responsiveness to hostility from
the general public and not too much responsiveness from the nationalistare then necessary
to avoid the need of generating high levels of costly hostility.
I then show that if the home government faces ex-post temptations to either promote
fake protests or suppress protests, then countries with an intermediate level of media
freedom and a high level of political fragility benefit the most from this mechanism.10 If it is
easy for the home government to generate some ‘fake protests’ ex-post, then to maintain the
9Under some parameter conditions, the home government would also prefer that the nationalist has an
intermediate level of degree of responsiveness.
10This result holds under some parameter restrictions.
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informativeness of protest, the home government has to choose extreme levels of hostility
ex-ante. If ex-post a government can suppress a protest with some probability, then the
foreign opponent will have less incentive to give concessions.11 For the foreign opponent
to concede after a protest, it requires the protest to be more informative. Therefore, both
the ability to generate fake protests and the ability to suppress a protest without receiving
concession could actually hurt the home government. This can explain why China often
benefits from encouraging protests: China is a country with an intermediate level of media
freedom and some political fragility, so a protest is a hard but still manipulable signal for
China to seek a concession from a foreign government. Finally, I consider various further
extensions to the baseline model.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: part 2 reviews the related literature; part
3 describes the model’s setup and the equilibrium concept; part 4 solves the model and
then characterizes comparative static analysis; part 5 explores which kinds of regimes can
benefit most from encouraging protests; part 6 considers some further extensions to the
original model; part 7 concludes. All formal proofs are in the Appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
1.2.1 Bargaining and Strategic Information Transmission
It has long been noticed that in bargaining situations, being irrational or ‘crazy’ could
actually be an effective tactic to obtain better outcomes. Schelling (1960) argued that
being inflexible or irrational can help one side commit to only accepting a good offer.
Since the seminal work of Schelling (1960), there is a huge stream of literature discussing
the particular ways that one side can benefit from commitment tactics (Crawford, 1982;
Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990; Muthoo, 1996; Abreu and Gul, 2000; Kambe, 1999 ). That
could be one reason why governments wants to promote hostility in diplomatic crises. By
creating a demanding or even fanatical domestic audience behind the government, the
government can credibly commit to only accepting a good offer. By promoting a high
level of hostility among its people, the government will not accept a bad offer for fear of
backlash from a domestic audience of zealots. That can be incorporated in a standard
two-person zero-sum bargaining game with complete information.
However, this is far from the whole picture: far from playing a zero-sum game where
one side’s loss is always the other side’s gain, in various crises both sides share a common
interest to avoid costly conflicts breaking out. Either a hot war or an economic/diplomatic
conflict could be detrimental to both sides and burn the potential surplus that comes from
cooperation. Therefore, if one side is sure enough that the public from the other side is
angry, it often has the incentive to make concessions and avoid conflict. The information
11This is consistent with the historical evidence that in the bombing crisis the American government
believed the situation was under control, when they saw more signs of the Chinese government suppressing
the level of protests.
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that the public is angry is thus socially valuable.
Nevertheless, private incentives may hamper this socially-valuable information being
transmitted. Receiving concessions is usually a good thing for a government, either due
to actual gain or gain of prestige, while making concessions is usually costly. Hence the
home government may have an incentive to bluff and exaggerate the probability of crises.
This may lead to the foreign government being less sure whether the home public is angry.
In the extreme case information transmission may completely break down, and thus the
other side will always refuse to make a concession.
This is the now classical problem of cheap talk that socially valuable information is
lost due to conflict of interests (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Battaglini, 2002; Green and
Stokey, 2007; Lipnowski and Ravid, 2017). It has been shown that a sender can achieve a
better outcome for himself if he can persuade by committing to a pre-determined disclosure
plan or an experiment (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2014;
Alonso and Caˆmara, 2016, 2018; Bergemann and Morris, 2016). However, the level of
commitment power required for the sender to persuade may be unrealistic here: there is
no legally mandated commitment or ex-post verifiable independent experiment enabling
the government to commit to a disclosure plan.
Given that persuasion is better for the sender, can he generate similar effects as if
he is persuading the receiver? This model provides a specific way this can be done:
increasing hostility through propaganda will increase the probabilities of protest for both
the nationalist and the general public. However, both groups will respond at different
speeds when hostility is higher. The foreign government is only concerned about the
protest of the general public but cannot identify who is protesting. Therefore, when
changing hostility, the home government changes the informativeness of protest as a signal
of general public’s action.
This chapter is thus related to the literature on signal-jamming and obfuscation (Holm-
stro¨m, 1999; Ellison and Ellison, 2009). This chapter is also related to the burgeoning
literature about how the commitment assumption in Bayesian Persuasion can be relaxed
or micro-founded (Best and Quigley, 2017; Margaria and Smolin, 2017).
1.2.2 War and Audience Cost
Since the pioneering work of Putnam (1988), there has been a vast strand of literature
studying the interaction between domestic politics and international diplomacy. Putnam
(1988) coined the concept of two-level game to describe the interconnection between in-
ternational diplomacy and domestic politics. Domestic politics and diplomacy are usually
closely entangled, and governments/leaders take both domestic and diplomatic decisions
to maximise their own benefits.
Fearon(1994) popularized the concept of audience cost and ignited the long literature
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about audience cost and its various implications. Making credible statements about one
country’s resolution over crises is extremely difficult, and audience cost provides a par-
ticular way how this can be done. By making the threat to enter a war known to the
public, the government increases its cost to back down, and this increases the credibility
of the threat. Despite various studies that apply this concept (Eyerman and Hart, 1996;
Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff, 2002; Schultz and Weingast, 2003), there are fewer
studies discussing the micro-foundations of these concepts (Smith, 1998; Schultz, 1999;
Slantchev, 2006). If leaders bluff for the national interests, it is not clear why domestic
voters would like to punish leaders for backing down from their threats. This chapter pro-
vides a simple preference channel to explain why audience cost can work: by increasing
hostility or salience of the current dispute through propaganda, the government makes the
domestic audience more extreme and thus it would be harder for the government to back
down without receiving some concessions, for fear of domestic backlash.
Another question related to this concept is which countries have high levels of audience
cost and are thus more able to commit. Fearon (1994) argued that because leaders in
democratic countries face stronger audience cost than leaders in nondemocratic countries,
they will be at better positions to commit. Weiss (2013) argued that there can also be
big audience costs in non-democratic countries. One important mechanism is through
allowing anti-foreign protests. By allowing those risky protests, governments show their
resolve and also domestic vulnerability. Weiss (2014) provided detailed discussion and
case studies of how non-democratic countries can generate audience cost in the context
of China. This chapter is also related to this stream of literature. In my model, protest
is a noisy signal that conveys some information and may potentially prompt the foreign
government to make concessions.
The differences between my chapter and previous conceptual and formal models are
as follows.
First, this chapter focuses on ex-ante manipulation of protests instead of ex-post. In
many cases, the government has to decide whether to encourage or hamper protests before
knowing whether some particular dispute will become an uncontrollable diplomatic crisis.
Second, this chapter also provides predictions about the optimal strategy of govern-
ments’ nation-building policy: the government would try to promote some form of re-
strained patriotism. It wants its people to be responsive, but not too responsive, over
international controversies. That is consistent with governments’ actions in real life, for
example, the Chinese government’s constant call for ‘loving the country rationally’.
Third, this chapter provides predictions about which kind of countries can benefit from
stirring domestic anti-foreign protests. This chapter emphasizes the importance of media
freedom and political fragility in determining the profitability of encouraging protests.
This provides additional testable predictions and could help us better understand why we
see many anti-foreign protests in some particular countries.
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Last but not least, this chapter emphasises the benefit rather than the cost of obfus-
cation for protests to persuade the foreign governments to concede. Previous studies such
as Weiss (2014) have emphasised the value of credibility for protests to convince the oppo-
nents to concede. In this chapter I show the value of at least partial obfuscation: in many
cases, there is no need to perfectly convince a foreign government to make it concede.
Often it is willing to concede as long as a protest is informative enough about general
population’s widespread anger. A not perfectly precise but still informative enough signal
can still guarantee concession and makes the probability of getting concession higher than
the case of fully-revealing information.
1.3 Model Setup
1.3.1 Players, Actions, States and Payoff Functions
Player Set:
There are two countries, Country 1 and Country 2. This model includes the bargaining
problem between Country 1 and Country 2 and the internal politics of Country 1.12
There are four players in the game:
tH,F,N,Gu
H is the home government of Country 1; N is the nationalist group of Country 1 and G is
the general public of Country 1; F is the foreign government (the government of Country 2).
Action Spaces:
The action spaces of all the players are as follows:
AH  Ψ  r0, ψ¯s, AF  tC,NCu, AN  AG  tP,NP u.
The home government chooses the level of hostility from a closed and bounded interval,
r0, ψ¯s; the foreign government chooses whether to concede or not; the nationalist and the
general public each decides whether to protest or not.
Country 1 :
$'''&
'''%
H Ñ r0, ψ¯s
N Ñ tP,NP u
GÑ tP,NP u
Country 2 : F Ñ tC,NCu
Home government chooses ψ from a compact interval, r0, ψ¯s. ψ is the level of hostility
the home government chooses. It captures a government’s various methods of generating
12For simplicity, we do not consider the internal politics of Country 2, so foreign government represents
a coherent Country 2.
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higher hostility among its people towards a foreign opponent: 1) direct propaganda in
government-controlled media; 2) censorship over independent media’s coverage; 3) man-
agement over activities of the nationalist groups. This chapter will just call it propaganda;
however, ψ basically models the various methods the home government can use to mobilize
anti-foreign protests. In this chapter I will use hostility and propaganda interchangeably.
Here I model the foreign government’s action as a discrete choice of whether to concede
or not. This reflects the observation that in many cases, diplomatic responses are in
discrete levels: instead of choosing from a continuous action space, the opponent usually
has different ’steps’ of potential responses. Also, many issues’ indivisibility can further
justify this assumption. 13
Figure 1.1: Players, Country Affiliations and Actions
State Space:
The state space, Θ, is a one-dimensional compact set. θ can be thought of as the latent
common ‘grievance’ that country 1’s people feel over some dispute. The higher is θ, the
more annoying this event is to both the nationalist and the general public. I further assume
θ is uniformly distributed among r0, θ¯s and is statistically independent of any choice of ψ
by the home government.
Pay-off Functions
In general, for any player i, i  H,F,N,G, its utility function uipθ, aH , aF , aN , aGq depends
on the realization of the state, and the profile of all player’s actions. I assume players’
payoff functions are as follows:
Payoffs of Nationalist and General Public
13In theory, side payments can be possible. However, due to various reasons side payments or transfers
cannot always solve this problem. For example, this can be due to the limited attention span or expertise
in understanding diplomatic pacts from the public.
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For i  N,G,
uipθ, ψ, aiq 
$&
% rwipψqθ  cs, if ai  P0, if ai  NP
I assume that wipψq  w0   w1iψ, and w1N ¡ w1G ¡ 0. Also I assume that w0θ¯ ¡ c.
Payoffs of Home Government and Foreign Government
For H and F, their payoff functions only depend on the action of general public, aG, and
the action of foreign government, aF .
Moreover, we assume the home government’s payoff function has the following prop-
erties:
uHp, Cq ¡ uHp, NCq
uHpNP, q ¡ uHpP, q
Those assumptions essentially mean that for the home government: 1) getting conces-
sions is good; 2) general public protesting is costly.
We assume the foreign government’s pay-off function have the following properties:
uF pP,NCq   uF pP,Cq
uF pNP,NCq ¡ uF pNP,Cq
uF pNP, q ¡ uF pP, q
Those assumptions essentially mean that: 1) home country’s general public protesting
is also costly to the foreign government; 2) giving concessions is costly, but the foreign
government still prefers giving concessions if the general public in the home country is
protesting.
Tie-breaking Rules
First, we assume that when the foreign government is indifferent between conceding or
not, it will concede with probability 1. Following Kamenica and Gentzkow(2011), we are
looking at the sender-optimal subgame perfect equilibrium.
Second, we assume that when either the nationalist or the general public is indifferent
between protesting or not, it will protest with probability 1. That assumption is an
innocuous one since for continuous distributions of θ, being at the indifference points are
probability-zero events.
Last, without loss of generality, we assume that when the home government is indif-
ferent between choosing a lower level of ψ or a higher level of ψ, he will choose the lower
one with probability 1.14
14It can be shown that in this model the home government’s optimal level of ψ is in general unique. The
home government is only indifferent between more than one optimal level of hostility in rare cases when:
1) under the optimal level of hostility the informativeness constraint is binding; 2) the threshold of doubt
equals the benefit/cost ratio.
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Discussion
I will call the situation of general public protesting as a crisis, because general public
protesting is always costly to both governments, and may get out of control if the foreign
opponent does not concede.
There are several assumptions that are worth further discussion.
First, I have assumed that the two groups’ payoff functions depend on whether they
go to protest, but not on the future policy outcome. The event generates anger for both
groups, and both groups benefit from expressing anger in the form of protesting in the
street. Participating in a protest is still costly, so both groups are still rational in the sense
that they will weigh the benefit and cost of going to the street.
So the two groups are not ’strategic’ in the sense that they are not choosing whether to
protest in a forward-looking way, i.e., protesting to induce the home government to take
some particular actions. Instead, they are protesting for ‘expressive’ reasons. It has been
long noticed in the sociology literature and the political science literature that protest
can be ‘instrumental’ and/or ’expressive’. Passarelli and Tabellini(2017) consider a model
in which protests are expressive. Protesters protest to express their emotions over the
‘unfair’ treatment they received. Here, similar to Passarelli and Tabellini(2017), protests
are expressive. Two groups protest to react to the unfair treatment their country has
received during the crisis, or the humiliation their country has received that needs proper
compensation.
Second, I assume that both governments care about the action of the general public
and the action of the foreign government. It is obvious that both governments are affected
by the decision of the foreign government. It is also obvious that the home government
cares about whether the public will go to the street. Here we assume the foreign govern-
ment cares about the public’s protest decision, not because we believe that the foreign
government cares about the well-being of country 1’s public, but as a reduced-form rep-
resentation. One reason could be that foreign government dislikes the direct consequence
of general public protesting, such as Country 1’s general public boycotting Country 2’s
goods. Another reason is more aligned with the audience cost literature: the foreign gov-
ernment cares about the probability of escalation from the home government, and the
home government’s probability of escalation depends on whether the general public goes
to the street. Intuitively, with angry public protesting on the street, the home government
is usually facing mounting pressure to be ‘tough’ and escalate the crisis, if no concession
is offered from the other side.
Third, I assume that both the home government and the foreign government do not
care about the protest of nationalists intrinsically. Moreover, in the baseline model, θ
and ψ do not enter directly into the utility functions of both governments. We show in
later sessions that the conclusions are robust if we relax the first assumption. Intuitively,
nationalists are people who care very strongly about national interest and may have very
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extreme views over diplomatic disputes. Suppose the great majority does not support this
kind of extreme views, then nationalists are a thin minority which will not pose serious
threats over the home government and will not force the home government into escalation.
Also, the nationalists cannot bring huge direct costs to the foreign government due to its
limited size. The opponent only cares about the protest behaviour of country 1’s people
either because they could generate huge direct costs, or they may pressure country 1’s
government into costly escalation. Therefore, given that only the general public can force
the home government into a costly crisis or directly harm the foreign government, the
foreign government will only care about the action of the general public but ignore any
protest by the nationalists.
The assumption of θ and ψ not entering the payoff functions of both governments
can be partially relaxed. Essentially, for θ to not affect the payoff functions for both
governments, θ needs to only affect both governments indirectly: both governments will
not be affected by the angry public as long as they stay at home and do not protest. For
the ψ to not directly enter the payoff functions of both government, we are essentially
assuming: 1) choosing ψ is costless;15 2) ψ will only affect the distribution of states, but
not both governments’ payoffs under each state.
1.3.2 Timeline and Information Structure
The timeline of the baseline model is as follows:
Period 1: The home government chooses the level of hostility, ψ; the level of ψ is
common knowledge to all the players.
Period 2: nature chooses the level of θ. θ is private knowledge to the nationalist
and the general public. The nationalist and the general public then decide simultaneously
whether to protest or not. The actions of the nationalist and the general public are
observable to themselves and the home government, but not to the foreign government.
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Period 3: The foreign government can only observe a binary signal, s, s P tP,NP u,
which is generated in such a way:
s 
$&
% P, if aN  P _ aG  PNP, otherwise
15We have assumed that for the home government, choosing any level of ψ P

0, ψ¯

has zero cost. This is
equivalent to choose ψ P r0, 8q, and choosing any level ψ P

0, ψ¯

has zero cost but choosing any ψ ¡ ψ¯
is infinitely costly:
Cpψq 
#
0, if ψ P

0, ψ¯

 8, if ψ P
 
ψ¯, 8

.
16It is not essential to assume that θ is unobservable to the home government. What is essential here is
that the foreign government cannot observe θ. However, it seems to be a reasonable assumption that even
home government may have substantial difficulty to perfectly observe people’s latent grievance.
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Period 1:
H publically
chooses ψ
Period 2:
θ realized
and revealed
only to
N and G;
N and G decides
whether to protest
simultaneously;
their actions are
observable to N,G,H,
but not F
Period 3:
signal s
is observed by
F
Period 4:
F decides
whether to concede
Period 5:
the state and
the pay-offs
of all players
are realized
Figure 1.2: Timeline of the Baseline Model
This means the foreign government can only observe whether there is a protest but not
who is protesting.
Period 4: The foreign government decides whether to concede or not after observing
the realisation of signal s.
Period 5: the state and the pay-offs of all players are realised and publicly revealed.
Here we assume the latent grievance, θ, is unobservable to the home government.
Given the timeline of the model, whether θ is observable to the home government is incon-
sequential because the home government have to choose ψ before θ is realized. However,
in an alternative setting where the home government chooses ψ after θ is realized, whether
θ is observable to him will make a great difference.
It seems to be a reasonable assumption that even the home government may have sub-
stantial difficulty to observe its people’s latent grievance. Therefore, the home government
may face a great level of uncertainty about θ and here a simplifying assumption is that
θ is completely unobservable to the home government. An interesting future extension
would be considering the case that the home government may have some noisy private
information about θ.
Another assumption we have made here is that the home government chooses ψ before
θ is realised. This assumption comes from the observation that the government cannot
perfectly predict and control what will happen as the beginning of a potential crisis.
When the home government are trying to affect the probability of protests, by either
direct propaganda or act towards nationalist leniently, they do not know perfectly how
its people will react towards its effort. It is precisely this property of protests being ex-
ante uncontrollable and unpredictable that give the opponent incentive to concede and the
home government room to manoeuvre the protests. Moreover, given that θ is unobservable
to the home government, whether the home government chooses ψ before or after θ will
not affect the equilibrium of this model.
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Here ψ is essentially modelling the ways to ex-ante manage protests. Later we will
discuss ways for the government to ex-post manage protests, such as suppressing a protest
or generating some fake protests.
We also assume that θ is unobservable to the foreign government. For the government
of Country 2, observing how the people in Country 1 feels about some diplomatic crisis
before making the decision is extremely difficult. Observing or inferring what people
have in mind is extremely difficult, and it would be even more difficult to observe a rival
country’s people’s real feeling. There is only some limited amount of media information
and some secret intelligence reports that the foreign country can rely on, and the home
country has strong incentives to misrepresent the information the foreign government can
receive. Therefore, it is possible that the foreign government to get some noisy signal over
θ, but it is still safe to assume at least some unobservability of θ.
Another crucial assumption here is that the foreign government cannot distinguish
between protests of only nationalist and protests of everyone (including both nationalist
and the public). The only thing it can observe is whether there are some people on the
street protesting. In reality, the foreign government probably can have some noisy signal
over some characteristics of a protest, like the number of people appearing in the street.
However, this is usually a very noisy signal, and the home government still has the incentive
to misrepresent that signal. Therefore, this is a simplifying assumption that captures the
fact that foreign government cannot perfectly observe who is protesting on the street.
Later we will look at the case when the government can get some noisy and non-revealing
signal over the identity of the protesters. That would also allow us to generate additional
prediction over what level of media freedom would allow a regime to benefit most from
manipulating protests.
1.3.3 Solution Concept
The equilibrium concept used in this chapter is standard weak Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium.
Definition 1.1. The profile of (a,µ) is weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE as
follows) if:
1) µ is consistent: it is determined by Bayes’ Rule according to a whenever possible;
1.1) In Period 4, µpψ, sq is foreign government’s posterior belief that the general public is
protesting, given the level of ψ and realization of s. µpψ, sq is determined by Bayes’
Rule whenever possible, according to the signal-generating process and the strategies
of the home government, the nationalist and the general public.
2) a is sequentially rational:
2.1) In period 4, givenpaH , aN , aG, µpψ, sqq, aF is the optimal response of the foreign
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government;
2.2) In Period 2, given the choice of ψ by the home government in Period 0 and the
realisation of θ in period 1, for i  N,G, ai is the optimal response of group i given
atN,Gu{i and aF ;
2.3) In Period 1, the home government chooses the optimal level of ψ, given paN , aG, aF , µq.
1.4 Equilibrium and Its Properties
In this section, we will solve the equilibrium of the baseline model and characterise its
properties. The baseline model is solved by backwards induction. We will then discuss
the comparative static analysis.
1.4.1 The Foreign Government’s Optimal Strategy
The foreign government wants to concede if and only if the general public is protesting.
Therefore, he will only concede if his posterior of general public protesting, µpψ, sq, is
higher than some threshold of doubt, µ¯. 17
When he observes no protest, he knows that the general public is not protesting for
sure. Therefore he will not concede in that case.
When he observes a protest, he understands that this can either be a protest where
both groups (the Nationalist and the General Public) participate or a protest of only the
nationalist. He only wants to concede if the general public protests, but he cannot observe
who is protesting. Therefore, he will only concede if the posterior that the general public
is protesting is high enough:
µpψ, s  P q  ProbpaG  P |ψ, s  P q

ProbpaG  P |ψq
ProbpaG  P |ψq   ProbpaG  NP, aN  P |ψq
¥ µ¯
We define a protest to be informative enough if µpψ, s  P q ¥ µ¯. This is the case
that protest is sufficiently informative about the general public’s action so the foreign
government will concede when a protest happens.
1.4.2 The Nationalist and the General Public’s Optimal Strategy
For both the nationalist and the general public, their costs of protesting are constant but
benefits of going to the street are higher if θ is higher: the benefit of going to streets,
17The threshold of doubt for the foreign government, µ¯ P p0, 1q, is defined as the level of µ such that
the foreign government is indifferent between conceding or not conceding. That means µ¯ruF pP,Cq 
uF pP,NCqs  p1 µ¯qruF pNP,NCq  uF pNP,Cqs.
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Figure 1.3: Nationalist and General Public’s Best Responses
which is the grievance, wipψqθ, is increasing in θ. Therefore, for both groups, their best
responses are cut-off strategies.
For group i, i  N,G, it will protest if and only if pw0   w1iψqθ  c ¥ 0. This means
there exist a cut-off level, θˆipψq, such that it will protest if and only if θ ¥ θˆipψq.
Figure 3 describes the best response of both groups given the level of hostility, ψ.
Because we have assume that the nationalist is more responsive to higher ψ, it is obvious
that the nationalist has a lower cut-off level than the general public. That also means
the we can divides the whole line of θ into three parts: 1) θ P

θˆG, θ¯

. When θ is high,
both groups will protest. 2) θ P

θˆN , θˆG
	
. When θ is at an intermediate level, only the
Nationalist will protest. 3)θ P

0, θˆN
	
. When θ is low, no one will protest.
Define the ex-ante probability of protesting 18 for group i asHipψq  ProbpPlayer i protestsq
 Probpθ ¥ θˆiq. Because of the assumptions of our model, HN pψq ¥ HGpψq: the nation-
alist will be more likely to protest. Given we have defined crisis as the general public
protesting, HGpψq is also the probaility of crises. Moreover, given that the foreign govern-
ment will observes a protest whenever the nationalist protests, HN pψq is also the probaility
of the foreign government observing a protest. We know from the model’s set up that high-
er hostility, ψ, will increase the benefit of protesting for both groups at any given θ. Figure
4 shows that this would reduce the cutoff levels of both groups and make them more likely
to protest.
Now we can also characterise how the foreign government’s posterior when observing
a protest, µpψ, s  P q, changes when ψ changes:
µpψ, s  P q  ProbpaGP |ψqProbpaGP |ψq ProbpaGNP,aNP |ψq 
HGpψq
HN pψq
Figure 5 shows that foreign government posterior is actually U-shaped over ψ. That
18Here ex-ante probability of protest means the interim ex-ante expected probability of protest. That
means the probability of protesting after ψ is chosen but before θ is realized.
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Figure 1.4: Nationalist and General Public’s Best Responses
means for a high µ¯, a protest will only be informative enough if it is either very low or
very high.
Figure 1.5: Foreign Government’s posterior when observing protest, as function of ψ
The intuition of this U-shaped curve is as follows: when the ψ is low so there is not
much manipulation of protests, the opponent knows that the nationalist and the public
are both unlikely to be on the street, and their difference over probabilities of protesting
is low. Thus when the opponent observes a protest, he knows with high probability both
groups are protesting. When ψ is very high, the opponent knows the nationalist is almost
always protesting on the street. However, since ψ is very high, the general public is also
very likely to be protesting, so in this case, the difference over protest probabilities are
also low. In the case that ψ is at intermediate level, HN pψq is much larger than HGpψq.
There would be many protests of only the nationalist but the general public is unlikely to
protest, and this would make foreign government less sure that the general public supports
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a protest. 19
1.4.3 The Home Government
The home government’s choice of ψ will affect the home government’s pay-off through:
1) the actions (to protest or not) of both groups (the nationalist and the general public);
2)the strategy of the foreign receiver.
First, it can be shown that the home government will never choose a level of ψ such
that the µpψ, P q   µ¯. The intuition is simple: the home government will only increase
ψ to increase its probability of getting concessions, and the cost of doing so is a higher
probability of crises. When ψ is at a level such that µpψ, P q   µ¯, the opponent will not
make a concession, and positive ψ will only generate cost but no benefit. Thus the home
government can deviate and choose ψ  0 instead, which secures concession when there is
a protest and generates a lower probability of crises.
This simplifies the home government’s problem substantially: we only need to consider
the home government’s optimal decision assuming that the foreign government will concede
after observing a protest. Then to make sure it is indeed incentive compatible for the
foreign government to concede, we just need to put a constraint that the level of ψ chosen
by the home government makes it optimal for the opponent to concede. We will call it
the informativeness constraint.
The home government’s optimal propaganda problem is equivalent to: 20
max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
HGpψquHpP,Cq   rHN pψq HGpψqsuHpNP,Cq   r1HN pψqsuHpNP,NCq
s.t. µpψ, P q 
HGpψq
HN pψq
¥ µ¯
Now let us define two parameters of the home government’s payoff function:
Definition 1.2.
• tH  uHpNP,Cq  uHpNP,NCq
• τH  uHpP,Cq  uHpNP,Cq
19Mathematically, the reason of µpψ, s  P q being U-shaped comes from the elasticity of HN pψq, H
1
N pψq
HN pψq ,
single-crossing the elasticity of HGpψq, H
1
Gpψq
HGpψq . Roughly speaking, when ψ is small, HN pψq is growing much
faster than HGpψq, and the levels of HN pψq and HGpψq are both small. Thus H 1N pψq is substantially larger
than H 1Gpψq, while the difference between HN pψq and HGpψq is small. When ψ becomes large, HN pψq
and HGpψq are both growing very slowly so H 1N pψq is very near to H 1Gpψq, while the difference between
HN pψq and HGpψq are also small but still in larger magnitude.
20The objective function is continuous. The set of ψ that satisfies the constraint is non-empty and is
a finite union of disjoint compact intervals. Therefore, the optimal solution and optimal value to this
question both exist.
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tH can be thought of as the benefit of higher propaganda: a higher level of propaganda
increases the probability of protest from only nationalist. When protests of only the
nationalist happen, there is no crisis, but the foreign opponent will still concede. From
our assumption, getting concession without a crisis happening is beneficial to the home
government.
τH can be thought of as the cost of higher propaganda: higher propaganda also in-
creases the probability of general public protesting. This is costly because having the
general public protesting on the streets is costly. Therefore, the ratio of tH over τH , tHτH ,
can be thought of as a measure of the relative benefit of propaganda.
We will first characterise the objective function and the informativeness constraint:
Lemma 1.1. • The objective function is quasi-concave on the interval r0, ψ¯s. Its max-
imal point on this region, ψI , is a weakly increasing function over the relative bene-
fit/cost ratio, tHτH .
• The posterior belief that the general public is protesting when there is a protest,
µpψ, P q, is a quasi-convex function over ψ. It is first decreasing and then increasing
over ψ.
• define ψˆ  argminψPr0, 8qµpψ, P q and assume ψ¯ ¡ ψˆ. If µ¯ P pµpψˆ, P q, µpψ¯, P qq,
there exist two levels of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯q and ψˆRpµ¯q, 0   ψˆLpµ¯q   ψˆRpµ¯q   ψ¯, such that
µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯. Moreover, for any ψ P r0, ψ¯s, µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯ iff ψ P
r0, ψˆLpµ¯qs Y rψˆRpµ¯q, ψ¯s
The analytical forms of ψˆLpµ¯q and ψˆRpµ¯q can be found in the appendix. So there exists
a unique ideal point of ψ , ψI , that maximises the objective function. The informativeness
constraint is U-shaped over ψ. If the threshold of doubt µ¯ is high, then a protest is only
informative if ψ is very high or very low. Therefore, the solution to the home government’s
optimisation problem, ψ, depends on whether the informativeness constraint is violated
at ψI .
Now we are ready to characterise the optimal feasible level of ψ:
Proposition 1.1. Assume ψ¯ ¡ w0?w1Nw1G
b
w0c˜
w0
.21 Then:
1) If tHτH ¤
w1G
w1N
, then ψ=ψI  0 for any µ¯ P p0, 1q;
2) If tHτH ¥
w1G
w1N
pw0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2, then
• If µ¯ P  0, µpψ¯, P q, then ψ=ψI  ψ¯
• If µ¯ P  µpψ¯, P q, 1, then there exists ψˆLpµ¯q, such that:
– µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µ¯
– ψ  ψˆLpµ¯q
21The other case leads to similar results. The complete results can be find in the Appendix.
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3) If tHτH P p
w1G
w1N
, w1Gw1N p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2q, then there exists a cut-off level µ1 P p0, 1q, such that:
• If µ¯ P p0, µ1s , then ψ=ψI
• If µ¯ P  µ1, µpψ¯, P q, then there exist ψˆLpµ¯q and ψˆRpµ¯q, such that:
– µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯
–
ψ 
$&
% ψˆL, if
tH
τH
¤ µ¯
ψˆR, if tHτH ¡ µ¯
• If µ¯ P  µpψ¯, P q, 1, then there exists ψˆLpµ¯q, such that:
– µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µ¯
– ψ  ψˆLpµ¯q
Figure 6 and 7 illustrate the intuition of Proposition 1.1 under the case that ψ¯ is large
and tHτH is at intermediate levels.
22 Proposition 1.1 says, when the threshold of doubt is
so low enough such µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯ for any ψ P r0, µ¯s, then the informativeness of the signal
is not a concern for the home government. The optimal level of ψ equals to the home
government’s ideal point of ψ.
Figure 1.6: Optimal propaganda, when µ¯ is at low or middle levels
When the threshold of doubt is higher, then protest is only informative enough if
ψ ¤ ψˆLpµ¯q or ψ ¥ ψˆRpµ¯q. Now there are three cases: First, if µ¯ is in an intermediate
range, then the interval that a protest is not informative enough,

ψˆLpµ¯q, ψˆRpµ¯q
	
, is small.
The ideal point ψI lies out of this range and thus the optimal level ψ is the same as the
previous case. Second, if µ¯ is larger, then the interval that a protest is not informative
enough,

ψˆLpµ¯q, ψˆRpµ¯q
	
, is larger. Then the ideal point ψI lies out of this range and
cannot be chosen. Since the objective function is single-peaked,the constrained optimal
must be either ψˆLpµ¯q or ψˆRpµ¯q. The relative benefit of ψˆLpµ¯q over ψˆRpµ¯q would be a
lower probability of crises because of lower ψ. However, the relative cost would be a
22For other cases the intuition is the same.
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Figure 1.7: Optimal propaganda, when µ¯ becomes higher and higher
lower probability of a protest occurring and thus less concession. Which effect dominates
depends on the comparison between tHτH and µ¯. Last, when ψ
I is even higher, ψˆRpµ¯q is too
high so the levels of propaganda that make a protest informative enough are in the range
0, ψˆLpµ¯q

.
1.4.4 Comparative Static Analysis
Naturally, the next step would be looking at the comparative static analysis of the baseline
model. In this section, I aim to answer the following questions: (1) How does the optimal
level of ψ, ψ, change when the parameters23 of the model change? Moreover, how does ψ
transit from unconstrained optimal point (home government’s ideal point) to constrained
optimal point (ψˆLpµ¯q or ψˆLpµ¯q)? (2) How do the equilibrium probability of protest from
the general public, HGpψq, and the probability of protest from the nationalist, HN pψq,
change when the parameters change?
The complete comparative static analysis of ψ, HGpψq, and HN pψq over various
parameters can be found in the appendix. Some interest results can be found from the
comparative static analysis.
First, ψ may have non-monotonic transitions over some parameters. In some cases,
23Parameters of the model: w0; w1G and w1N ; c; θ¯; µ¯; uHpP,Cq  uHpNP,Cq and uHpNP,Cq 
uHpNP,NCq. We will look at last two parameters’ effects jointly thorough tHτH 
uH pNP,CquH pNP,NCq
uH pP,CquH pNP,Cq ,
because that is the only way those two parameters affect ψ.
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this is due to the non-monotonicity of the interior solution ψI itself. However, in many cas-
es, this non-monotonic transition comes from the transitions between the interior solution
ψI and the boundary solutions ψˆLpµ¯, P q and ψˆRpµ¯, P q.
Second, ψ may have discontinuous jump over the relative benefit of concession, tHτH , at
the point tHτH  µ¯. A very small change over
tH
τH
would lead to discrete jump from ψˆLpµ¯, P q
to ψˆRpµ¯, P q (or vice versa). This could possibly explain that when the fundamentals
of some dispute remain the same, with some small change of benefit/cost of the home
government, the home government will dramatically escalate or de-escalate the tension.
Moreover, this only happens when the relative benefit of driving up tensions, tHtH , is in
an intermediate range. This would predict that we would find nationalism tensions to
be most volatile when the dispute is intermediately important for the home government.
In matters that are either too important or too trivial, we would not expect to see big
shifts at the level of hostility unless there are some big changes on the fundamentals of
the dispute.
The comparative static analysis of HGpψq and HN pψq also have similar patterns.
Here we will look at one example, the comparative static analysis of optimal hostility,
ψ, over w1G, the degree of responsiveness for the general public.
Corollary 1.1. Assume tHτH   1 and µ¯ is large. There exists a level of w1G, w

1G, such
that
• ψ is increasing in w1G P p0, w1Gq
• ψ is decreasing in w1G P rw1G, w1N q
This corollary has an intuitive explanation: when w1G is low compared to w1N , as the
home government increases ψ, the nationalist will increase its probability of protest in a
much faster speed than the general public. In this case, the informativeness of the protest
is problematic and to keep informativeness, the home government cannot choose a level
of hostility that is too high.
However, when w1G is very high, as ψ increases, the nationalist will not increase its
probability of protest much faster than the general public. In this case, informativeness is
not a concern. However, as w1G becomes higher, costly crisis is more likely to occur and
thus choosing a high level of ψ becomes more and more costly.
1.4.5 Home Government’s Equilibrium Utility
In this part, we will look at how the home government’s equilibrium utility changes as
different parameters change. 24
24The model is a stylized model and is not designed to describe the total social welfare. An interesting
future research direction would be how social welfare, measured under different possible welfare functions,
changes as various parameters change.
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Figure 1.8: Comparative Static Analysis of ψ over w1G: when tHτH   1 and µ¯ is high, two
scenarios
I show that the home government’s equilibrium utility can be non-monotonic over var-
ious parameters. Especially, the home government’s equilibrium utility is single-peaked
over the general public’s responsiveness to hostility. Therefore, if a government can in the
long-run cultivate its people’s responsiveness to hostility through nation-building process,
it would try to foster restrained patriotism—intermediate level of responsiveness to inter-
national controversies. The intuition is simple: a government would hope its people to be
responsive enough to controversies, so it does not need to exert huge and very costly effort
to convince the foreign opponent to concede. However, if the people are already responsive
enough so informativeness of protest is not a concern for the foreign government, then a
more responsive general public means more crises for the home government, which is also
very costly. This prediction is consistent with what we observe in real life: for example,
in Chinese textbooks and official media, the government often emphasise the importance
of ‘loving the country rationally’. This is consistent with the prediction of our model.
Baseline Analysis
In this section, we will look at how the home government’s payoff depends on the various
parameters of the model. We will focus on two parameters, the general public’s degree of
responsiveness, w1G, and the nationalist’s degree of responsiveness, w1N . The complete
analysis over all the parameters in the model can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1.2. If tHτH ¤ µ¯, UHpψ
q is:
• increasing in w1N ;
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• decreasing in w1G;
If tHτH ¡ µ¯, UHpψ
q is:
• single-peaked over some interior level of w1G;
• Increasing or single-peaked over w1N ;
Therefore, when the relative benefit of hostility ( tHτH ) is higher than the threshold of
doubt (µ¯), the home government’s utility is single-peaked over general public’s responsive-
ness to hostility, w1G. This result is robust even if we consider more general convex cost
functions of propaganda. Essentially, this result comes from the two effects of w1G: first,
higher w1G means the public is more likely to go to the street, and this would make it
easier to convince the foreign government to concede. Second, higher w1G and a higher
probability of general public protesting also means that there will be more costly crises.
Thus having a responsive or irritable general public can be a double-edged sword: it will
bring costs to both the foreign government and home government.
Home Government’s equilibrium utility can also be non-monotonic over other param-
eters. For example, UHpψq is non-monotonic over w1N , nationalist’s responsiveness to
hostility, if ψ¯ is larger than ψˆR when w1N is small, but smaller than ψˆR when w1N is large.
This happens, for example, when w1G is small. Having a very active nationalist fraction as
noise-makers is not always a good thing; without an also active general public, the home
government would find it hard to convince the opponent to concede.
Nation-building and Restrained Patriotism
It has been widely known that the coherent nation states that dominate contemporary
international relations are very recent phenomena. According to Alesina and Reich (2013),
“in 1860 French was still a foreign language to half of all French children”. Also, “in 1860
at most 10% of the Italian population spoke what would become the Italian language”. In
the long run, a state can invest in systematic and gradual education and indoctrination
that affects its people’s language, beliefs, identity, and preference.
In the long run, a state has some considerable flexibility of choosing how its people will
respond to hostility and diplomatic issues. By emphasising the importance of things like
national pride and the importance of national interest, the government can affect how the
public values the importance of going to the street. If in the long run, some parameters
in the model can be changed by the home government, how would it change it?
Ideally, the home government will hope to make Cpψq  0 for any ψ. However this may
not be feasible: there is a limited amount of hostility promotion the government can do,
and any amount higher than that may be extremely costly or just impossible. Even with
complete deregulation over the nationalist’s activities, and putting all the available media
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resource on covering the issue in a provocative way, essentially the government needs the
people to be responsive enough over propaganda and go to the street.
If it is always at least somehow costly to generate ψ, what would be the optimal level
of w1G? From the previous analysis, we know that some intermediate range of w1G is
optimal. Therefore, a government may hope its people to have ‘restrained patriotism’.
The government hope its people to care about national interest and go to the street if
the event is serious, so there will be protests, and this can be used as hard evidence for
the sake of getting concessions. However, the government does not hope its people to
care too much over these issues. Otherwise, they are very sensitive and easy to be angry
and protesting, which is very costly for the home government. This is consistent with the
policies of governments in real life: for example, in Chinese textbooks and official media,
there are often discussions about ’loving China rationally’. 25
Similarly, the government may hope its nationalist to have intermediate responsiveness
to international controversies. Systematic education and indoctrination can potentially
also affect w1N , although probably in a less degree: people usually self-select into being
nationalists. However, other government policies and regulations can still affect w1N .
For example, the government can set various regulations over the activities of nationalist
groups.
1.5 Which Regimes Benefit Most from Encouraging Protest-
s? Role of Media and Political Fragility
In this section, we will try to answer the following questions: will every type of regime
benefit at the same degree from the ability to generate propaganda and protests? If not,
which kind of regimes would benefit most from this technology of generating hostility?
More specifically, this chapter looks at how media freedom and political fragility affect
regimes’ ability to benefit from the technology of generating hostility and protests.
More precisely, in this chapter media freedom is treated as the level of media capture
by the home government. With less media capture, the foreign government can get better
information about protests through the home country’s media platforms. This can be
rationalized in classical models of media capture, such as Besley and Prat (2006). Political
fragility here is modelled as the probability home government can successfully suppress a
protest even without receiving a concession.
To explore these questions, I make a few extensions to the baseline model.
First, I consider the possibility that the foreign government can have better informa-
tion than just observing whether there is a protest. The better the information the foreign
government has, the harder it would be for the home government to manipulate protest-
25Wang, Yankun and Ye Su.”Rational Emotion of Loving China is needed in the path Of Rejuvena-
tion of China (Chinese)”, People.cn. http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0818/c40531-28646272.html
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s to generate concessions. Related to the issue of media freedom, a freer media in the
home country would make it easier for the foreign government to have better knowledge
about a protest. This means stable democracies like the US or UK will be hard to obtain
concessions, because the foreign government can easily judge whether a protest is impor-
tant through the home country’s media. However, this does not mean that completely
totalitarian countries like North Korea would benefit most from encouraging anti-foreign
protests. On the contrary, it may be very hard for totalitarian countries like North Korea
to generate concessions.
Second, if the home government can probably suppress a protest even without receiv-
ing the concession of a foreign government, the foreign government would have smaller
incentive to make concessions. Protests from the general public can be costly for vari-
ous reasons, and governments usually have the incentive to suppress them or calm them
done. Therefore, if the foreign government believes the home government can successfully
suppress a protest with high probability, it would have less incentive to make concessions.
This would increase the threshold of doubt of the foreign government and make it harder
for the foreign government to make concessions. If this suppressing power becomes high
enough, the foreign government will never concede even it knows for sure that the general
public is protesting. If the probability of successfully suppressing a protest is positively
related to political fragility, a high level of political fragility of the home government is
needed for the foreign government to be willing to help.
Third, I consider the possibility of home government generating a ’fake’ protest if no
one is actually protesting. We show this ability to generate ’fake’ protests is not always a
blessing: if the foreign government always expects to see a protest, it would be very hard
to convince her to concede. Therefore, countries like North Korea where generating ’fake’
protests is easy, and no free media can be relied on to identify those protests, may have
severe problems convincing their opponents to concede.
From those extensions, we can better answer the questions previously asked: neither
stable democracies nor completely totalitarian regimes can benefit most from the tech-
nology of stirring anti-foreign protests. On the contrary, countries with intermediately
level of media freedom and at least some political fragility may benefit most from this
mechanism, especially those with strong nationalistic mood and historical grievance.
1.5.1 Additional Information for the Foreign Government
In the canonical model, we assumed a simple signal structure: the foreign government can
observe whether there is a protest happening, but not who is protesting. Now we will
relax this assumption.
We still assume the foreign government can observe whether there is a protest happen-
ing. Moreover, if there is a protest, it can now observe an additional signal, s, distributed
in the following way:
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We assume
fps|aG  P, aN  P q 
$&
%λH exppλHsq, ifs ¥ 00, ifs   0
fps|aG  NP, aN  P q 
$&
%λL exppλLsq, ifs ¥ 00, ifs   0
We assume 0   λH   λL, and thus Eps|aG  P, aN  P q ¡ Eps|aG  NP, aN  P q.
We can think of s as the number of people protesting in the street.
In expectation, if the general public is protesting, the number of people protesting on
the street should be higher than the number of people protesting when there are only
nationalists protesting. When no one is protesting, thus surely there are no people in
the street. When at least one group is protesting, then the higher the number of people
appearing in the street, the more likely the protest comes from the general public.
These assumptions essentially mean: when no one is protesting, the foreign government
is perfectly aware. When there is at least one group protesting, the higher is the realisation
of s, the surer the government will be that the general public is angry and protesting.
Then the posterior of the foreign government that the general public is protesting,
when observing a protest with signal realization s, is:
ProbpaN  P |ψ, P, sq 
HGpψqfps|aN  P, aG  P q
HGpψqfps|aN  P, aG  P q   rHN pψq HGpψqsfps|aN  P, aG  NP q

1
1  HN pψqHGpψqHGpψq
fps|aNP,aGNP q
fps|aNP,aGP q
Then the foreign government will only concede iff ProbpaN  P |ψ, P, sq ¥ µ¯ Therefore,
there exists a cutoff level sˆpψq such that
aF psq 
$&
% C, if s ¥ sˆpψqNC, if s   sˆpψq (1.1)
It can be shown easily that sˆpψq weakly decreases over HGpψqHN pψq . That just means that
the surer the foreign government thinks the general public is protesting, the more tolerate
it will be over a low level of s.
We can now characterize the optimal solution with noisy signal.
Lemma 1.2. 1) For any ψ, there exist a cut-off level s¯, such that F will only concede iff
s ¥ s¯.
¯spψq 
$&
% logprp
1µ¯
µ¯ qp
λH
λL
qp HGpψqHN pψqHGpψqqs
1
λLλH q, if pHN pψqHGpψqHGpψq q ¥ p
1µ¯
µ¯ qp
λH
λL
q
0, otherwise
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2) Home Government’s utility function:
• If pHN pψqHGpψqHGpψq q ¡ p
1µ¯
µ¯ qp
λH
λL
q,
UHpψq  HGpψqtBr
HGpψq
HN pψqHGpψq s
λH
λLλH Au   uHpNP,NCq,
in which
A  uHpNP,Cq  uHpNP,NCq,
and B  trp 1µ¯µ¯ qpλHλL qs
λH
λLλH rUHpP,CqUHpP,NCqs  rp
1µ¯
µ¯ qp
λH
λL
qs
λL
λLλH rUHpNP,Cq
UHpNP,NCqsu,
A,B ¡ 0
• If pHN pψqHGpψqHGpψq q ¤ p
1µ¯
µ¯ qp
λH
λL
q,
’UHpψq  HGpψquHpP,Cq rHN pψqHGpψqsuHpNP,Cq r1HN pψqsuHpNP,NCq.
It can be shown that UHpψq under any ψ such that pHN pψqHGpψqHGpψq q ¡ p
1µ¯
µ¯ qp
λH
λL
q will
be strictly dominated by UHpψq under ψ that pHN pψqHGpψqHGpψq q  p
1µ¯
µ¯ qp
λH
λL
q, which means
it is optimal for the home government to choose a level of ψ such that p HGpψqHN pψqHGpψqq is
so high that the number of people, s, is obsolete as a signal.
Corollary 1.2. 1) The optimal solution to the home government’s optimization problem
with noisy signal is also the solution to the following optimization problem:
max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
HGpψquHpP,Cq   rHN pψq HGpψqsuHpNP,Cq   r1HN pψqsuHpNP,NCq
s.t. µpψ, P q 
HGpψq
HN pψq
¥
1
1  λHλL
1µ¯
µ¯
2) Denote The optimal value to this optimization problem as uHpψq. Then uHpψq
is non-increasing over λLλH ;
3) lim λL
λH
Ñ8 ψ
  0.
So it turns out that at least in the case that the number of people protesting on the
strict is exponentially distributed, it is optimal for the home government to choose a level
of ψ such that s becomes useless: home government would make the fact there is someone
protesting so informative, so for any s, the opponent will always make concession.
Here the effect of a more precise signal is essentially increasing the threshold of doubt
of the opponent. More specifically, the higher is λLλH , the easier it would be to distinguish
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two types of protest from each other by looking at the number of people on the street.
Therefore, the foreign government would be more demanding and has a higher level of
threshold of doubt for it to concede whenever observing a protest.
A prediction from this section would be that free and informative media in the home
country would harm the home government’s ability to benefit from encouraging protests,
because it limits the ability for the home government to affect the inference problem of the
opponent. If we think that media freedom affects the quality of the signal, then countries
with free media like the UK would be hard to benefit from stirring anti-foreign protests.
Another prediction would be that if the home government is in a country with very
free and informative media, the optimal level of hostility it will choose will be very small.
This also means the probability of protest and the probability of crisis would also be small.
This implies that probabilities of disputes between stable democratic countries would be
small and this could be thought as a natural extension to the concept of ‘democratic
peace’: there are not only fewer wars and conflicts, but also fewer disputes and anti-
foreign protests between democratic countries. However, the reason for this phenomenon
comes from the fact that democratic countries usually have free media, instead of their
representative governments.
1.5.2 Ex-post Incentive and Ability to Suppress
We have shown in the last session that free media could hurt the home government’s ability
to manipulate protests. Does this mean totalitarian regimes like North Korea would be
the best country to use this approach?
The answer to this question is probably no. One reason could be North Korea can
easily crush every protest even without receiving a concession from the opponent, and
it will have every incentive to suppress it. The opponent will not be willing to giving
a concession, knowing that North Korea will not be forced to escalate, even if there is
a protest in North Korea and no concession is offered to calm protesters down. In this
session, we will formalise this intuition.
Many protests, even massive ones, are suppressed by governments. In our environment,
one fundamental reason for the opponent to concede is that if the protesters don’t see
concessions then the home government may be replaced or toppled, which is also bad for
the opponent. However, given that protests are threats to the regime’s survival, the regime
would have every incentive to suppress it if possible.
So assume that if the opponent chooses not to concede, the protest by only nationalist
is suppressed with probability 126, while the protest attended by the general public is
suppressed with probability q P r0, 1s. We assume that when the general public’s protest
is suppressed, it is equivalent to the general public not protesting for both governments.
26Any probability between r0, 1s will lead to exactly the same result.
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Figure 1.9: General Public Protests but No Concession is Made
We’ll look at the threshold of doubt, µ¯, as a function of q, and for notation simplicity
we defined µ¯ in the following way: µ¯ is defined as the number such that µ¯uF pP,Cq  
p1 µ¯quF pNP,Cq  µ¯p1 qquF pP,NCq   rµ¯q   p1 µ¯qsuF pNP,NCq, and now µ¯ can be
greater than 1. µ¯ being greater than 1 just means the foreign government will not concede
when observing a protest.
So we can show that:
Proposition 1.3. 1) µ¯  uF pNP,NCquF pP,NCqruF pP,Cqp1qquF pP,NCqquF pNP,NCqs ruF pNP,NCquF pP,NCqs ;
2) the threshold of doubt µ¯ is weakly increasing over q;
3) there exist a cut-level q¯ such that µ¯ ¡ 1 iff q ¡ q¯.
The logic is straightforward: if the home government is more likely to suppress the
protest anyway even without receiving a concession, then the foreign government’s benefit
of making concession is smaller. So the foreign government would have to be more certain
that the general public is protesting, for her to be willing to concede. In the extreme case
that the home government can suppress the protest by himself very easily even without the
opponent’s concession, the opponent will have no incentive to give concessions, even if he
is perfectly sure that the general public is protesting. Another prediction from this result
would be that if one government or regime has stabilised its control over the country, the
opponent should be more demanding regarding the level of evidence to grant a concession.
So if a regime is more totalitarian and more immune to street protesters, the threshold
of doubt for the foreign government would increase. This would reduce the utility of the
home government. Moreover, if the threshold of doubt is high enough, the optimal level
of hostility it will choose will be minimal.
1.5.3 Ex-post Ability to Bias the Signal
Another reason why North Korea would not be able to make use of this mechanism could
be that ex-post, it can always generate some ’fake’ protests, and the opponent cannot
distinguish between ’fake’ protests and real protests. But if North Korea is willing to
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generate fake protests ex-post, this will harm the informativeness of protest. In the extreme
case that it can always successfully generate fake protests and the opponent can never
distinguish the difference between the two, then the opponent will not make any concession
after observing a protest.
When facing nationalist protests, foreign governments are often suspicious whether the
home governments have designed fake protests by themselves just to get more concessions.
Ex-post, the home government does have the incentive to generate fake protests if there has
been no protest, because protests often bring concessions. For example, the government
can send their own people or hire people to go to the street to pretend they are genuinely
angry and protesting.
The new timeline is as follows:
Period 1: the home government chooses the level of hostility, ψ; the level of ψ is
common knowledge to all the players.
Period 2: the nature chooses the level of θ. θ is private knowledge to the nationalist
and the general public. The nationalist and the general public then decide simultaneously
whether to protest or not. The actions of the nationalist and the general public are
observable to themselves and the home government, but not to the foreign government.
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Period 3: a binary signal, s, s P tP,NP u is generated and observed to only players
in country 1. s is generated in such a way:
s 
$&
% P, if aN  P _ aG  PNP, otherwise
Home government can then take a decision bH P tT,NT u, whether to tamper with the
signal s.
Period 4: The signal s˜ is generated according to s and bH in the following way:
s˜ 
$''''''&
''''''%
P, ifs  P
P with prob p, ifs  NP ^ bH  T
NP with prob 1 p, if s  NP ^ bH  T
NP, ifs  NP ^ bH  NT
s˜ is revealed to every player and the foreign government then decides whether to concede
or not after observing the realization of signal s˜.
Period 5: the state and the pay-offs of all players are realised and publicly revealed.
Here we consider a case that after the nationalist and the public make the decision of
protesting or not, and before the foreign government observes the protest outcome, the
27It is not essential to assume that θ is observable to the home government. What is essential here is
that the home government can observe who is protesting.
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government can choose whether to arrange a fake protest. Suppose the foreign government
can distinguish between a real protest and a fake protest with probability 1  p. Then a
higher p would reduce the informativeness of protest as a signal.
Proposition 1.4 shows that sometimes, the home government’s payoff could be max-
imised at an intermediate level of p:
Proposition 1.4. :
1) If tHτH ¥ µ¯ & ψ¯ ¥
c˜
1µ¯w0
w1G
, UHpψq is increasing over p
2) If tHτH ¥ µ¯ & ψ¯  
c˜
1µ¯w0
w1G
, UHpψq is single-peaked at some interior level of p,
p
3) If tHτH   µ¯, UHpψ
q can be either (weakly) increasing over p, or single-peaked at
some interior level of p, p.
A higher p would allow the home government to generate more protests and thus more
concessions. However, a lower p would make protest less informative and requires the
home government to choose a higher level of hostility to make protests convincing to the
opponent. If this is higher than the maximal possible hostility, the home government
would be forced to choose a very low level of hostility.
Therefore, if p is very high, i.e., the ability to generate fake protest without being
identified is too high, the home government could actually benefit from decreasing p. This
happens when ψ¯  
c˜
1µ¯w0
w1G
, which is likely to be true if: 1) the threshold of doubt, µ¯, is
high; 2) the public’s responsiveness to hostility, w1G, is low; 3) People’s cost of protesting,
c, is high; 4) people’s initial weight on the dispute, w0, is low; the maximal possible
hostility, ψ¯, is low.
In totalitarian countries like North Korea, as we discussed in the last subsection, µ¯
could be very high due to its ability to suppress protests easily.
Moreover, for those protests to convince the foreign opponent to concede, they have
to be independent instead of state-sponsored. Participating in state-sponsored protests
usually will not bring any risk to individuals, but only potential benefits. However those
orchestrated protests will not put any pressure over the home government, and the home
government will not have the incentive to give concessions. Independent protests can
potentially force the home government to escalate, and thus could prompt the foreign
government to concede. However, those Independent protests can easily become anti-
regime and would bear very high risks for individuals in totalitarian countries. Therefore
we would expect people’s cost to participate in those independent protests, c, is high, and
their initial weight on this issue,w0 is low. In summary, people’s potential low willingness
to participate in those independent protests, and the inability to distinguish real versus
fake protests make totalitarian countries very hard to convince the opponent to give in
and concede.
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In later sections, this chapter will further discuss the difference between independent
and state-sponsored protests, especially the different roles they serve for governments.
Period 1:
H publically
chooses ψ
Period 2:
θ realized
and revealed
only to
N and G;
N and G decides
whether to protest
simultaneously;
their actions are
observable to N,G,H,
but not F
Period 3:
signal s
is observed
by H;
H decides
whether to
tamper with
it
Period 4:
s˜ is then
observed by
F;
F decides
whether to concede
Period 5:
the state and
the pay-offs
of all players
are realized
Figure 1.10: Timeline: when Home Government can generate fake protests
High media freedom may reduce p, as real rather than orchestrated protests may get
more coverage from independent media. Also, free media may want to reveal the fake
protest to get more readership for its services. This can be rationalized again by classical
media capture models such as Besley and Prat (2006)
So to make the signal to be informative enough and not completely useless, at least
some level of media freedom is needed to retain credibility.
1.5.4 Comparative Politics: Who Would Benefit Most from Encourag-
ing Protests?
After considering the previous extensions, now we can answer the previous question, i.e.,
which regimes benefit most from the technology of manipulating protests.
Stable democratic countries, such as the UK and the US, have high levels of media
freedom and the rule of law and thus may not be able to benefit much from this technology
of encouraging protests. Free media will leave not much space for the home government
to affect the opponent’s inference, and the cost of generating hostility may be too high.
Completely totalitarian regimes like North Korea may also not be able to benefit much
from this technology of encouraging protests. State control over the society is too strong
in totalitarian countries, so totalitarian regimes are unlikely to be forced into escalation.
Also, there is no free media at all, so the government can easily produce fake protests
ex-post and the opponent cannot distinguish between fake protests and real protests.
Countries with intermediate levels of media freedom and regimes that are not too
strong may be the best candidate to benefit from this technology. They have the necessary
levels of media freedom to keep the signal informative enough, and also they are to some
extent fragile to angry protesters. Among those countries, those with strong nationalism
mood and colonial history may be in even better positions to encourage protests to receive
concessions. People will be responsive to the government’s promotion of hostility, so it
is not too costly to generate protests that are informative enough. Good candidates
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for this set of countries include China, Turkey and so on. That can possibly explain
why the Chinese government can often generate concessions from foreign governments by
encouraging anti-foreign protests.
1.6 Further Extensions and Discussions
In this section, we will consider various further extensions to the canonical model. We show
that many conclusions of the baseline model are robust to changes to some assumptions
of the canonical model.
We also considered whether it is possible to apply the model we have developed in
the context of International Disputes to other situations. Our model can easily apply to
two scenarios: 1) foreign aid and domestic reform; 2) anti-terrorism aid and anti-terrorism
efforts. We explained in the incoming sessions why these two cases may fit well with
our model, and we show in both cases, the incentive to help actually generates adverse
incentive that makes the socially inefficient states happening more often.
1.6.1 Protest of Nationalists also Costly
In the baseline model, I made the assumption that both the home government and foreign
government do not care intrinsically about the protest of nationalists. That assumption
can be substantially relaxed. We show in this section that if the nationalist’s protest is also
costly, it is either the case that the protest of a nationalist is very costly that the results
are trivial, or the protest of the nationalist is not so costly, and hence all the previous
results remain qualitatively the same.
We first looked at the optimal response of the foreign government. We still assume
that uF paG  P, aN , ψ, aF  Cq ¥ uF paG  P, aN , ψ, aF  NCq, so regardless of the
action of the nationalist, the foreign government would prefer conceding if the general
public is protesting.
We can also safely assume that uF paG  NP, aN  NP,ψ, aF  Cq   uF paG 
NP, aN  NP,ψ, aF  NCq. This assumption means that if no one is protesting, the
foreign government won’t concede for sure.
Now consider two cases:
Case1 uF paG  NP, aN  P,ψ, aF  Cq ¥ uF paG  P, aN  P,ψ, aF  NCq
Case2 uF paG  NP, aN  P,ψ, aF  Cq   uF paG  P, aN  P,ψ, aF  NCq
In Case 1, the cost of a nationalist protest to the foreign government is also high, hence
regardless of who is protesting, the foreign government will always concede when there is
a protest. Then informativeness is never a problem, and the home government will always
choose its ideal level of propaganda, i.e., ψ  ψI .
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In Case 2, the cost of nationalist protest is low, then the foreign government will
not concede if she is sure only nationalists are protesting. In this case, when the for-
eign government observes a protest, it will concede if and only if it thinks the general
public participates in this protest with high probability. Otherwise, it will not concede.
Therefore, there still exists a threshold of doubt, µ¯, similar to the one in the canonical
model.
Assuming Case 2, we can now write down the optimal decision of the home government.
We can safely assume that a protest of nationalist is also costly for the home government:
for any aG, aH , aF , if aN  P , uHpaG, aN  P, aH  ψ, aF q   uHpaG, aN  NP, aH 
ψ, aF q.
Now the home government’s optimization problem:
max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
HGpψquHpaG  P, aN  P,Cq   rHN pψq HGpψqsuHpaG  NP, aN  P,Cq
  r1HN pψqsuHpaG  NP, aN  NP,NCq
s.t. µpψ, P q 
HGpψq
HN pψq
¥ µ¯
The objective function is equivalent to:
max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
HGpψqruHpaG  P, aN  P,Cq  uHpaG  NP, aN  P,Cqs
 HN pψqruHpaG  NP, aN  P,Cq  uHpaG  NP, aN  NP,NCqs
  uHpaG  NP, aN  NP,NCq
Define tH  uHpaG  NP, aN  P,Cq  uHpaG  NP, aN  NP,NCq and τH 
uHpaG  NP, aN  P,Cq  uHpaG  P, aN  P,Cq. Again, we can safely assume τH
is positive. tH can be either positive or negative. The difference, uHpaG  NP, aN 
P,Cq  uHpaG  NP, aN  NP,NCq, now depends on two factors: 1) the benefit of
concession 2) the cost of having nationalists protesting. As long as the cost of nationalist
protesting is smaller compared to the benefit of getting a concession, then tH is also
positive. Then all the previous results will carry through qualitatively.
If tH is negative, then the result is trivial. There is no benefit but only cost of increasing
hostility, and thus the optimal level of ψ would be zero. ψ  ψI  0.
So in summary, as long as the protest of nationalists is not so costly, our main results
carry through, even when a protest of nationalists does affect the payoff functions of home
government and foreign government intrinsically.
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1.6.2 Alternative Distributions of Crisis
In the canonical model, I assumed that the seriousness of the event, θ, is uniformly dis-
tributed. One possible concern could be that some important conclusions of the model
are specific to the assumption of uniform distribution.
Here we show that two important patterns that I showed before are to some extent
robust to the distribution of θ: first, I show here that the fact the informativeness of a
protest, HGpψqHN pψq , is first decreasing and then increasing is not specific to the assumption of
uniform distribution. Second, I also show that the objective function has a single optimal
solution under general assumptions.
Assume θ is distributed with a distribution, F pθq, with the following properties:
• F pθq is independent of ψ
• F pθq is non-degenerate continuous distribution. Denote fpθq as the pdf of the dis-
tribution
• F pθq is second-order continuously differentiable
Therefore, we have
HGpψq
HN pψq

Probpθ ¥ θˆGq
Probpθ ¥ θˆN q

Probpθ ¥ cw0 w1Gψ q
Probpθ ¥ cw0 w1Nψ q

1 F p cw0 w1Gψ q
1 F p cw0 w1Nψ q
U-shaped Informativeness Curve
BHGpψqHN pψq
Bψ
¥ 0 iff
fp cw0 w1Gψ q
cw1G
pw0 w1Gψq2
1 F p cw0 w1Gψ q
{
fp cw0 w1Nψ q
cw1N
pw0 w1Nψq2
1 F p cw0 w1Nψ q
¥ 0
iff

hp
c
w0   w1Gψ
q
cw1G
pw0   w1Gψq2

{

hp
c
w0   w1Nψ
q
cw1N
pw0   w1Nψq2

¥ 0
, in which hpθq  fpθq1F pθq is the hazard rate function.
HGpψq
HN pψq to be first decreasing and then increasing if and only if:
(Quasi-convexity condition ) there exist a ψˆ such that:
sgnp
BHGpψqHN pψq
Bψ
q 
$'''&
'''%
1, if ψ ¡ ψˆ
0, if ψ  ψˆ
1, if ψ   ψˆ
Two examples that satisfy this condition are Exponential Distribution and Weibull
Distribution (with some constraints on parameters).
More generally, here are some sufficient conditions for quasi-convexity condition to be
true:
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•
fp c
w0 w1Gψ
q cw1Gpw0 w1Gψq2
1F p c
w0 w1Gψ
q {
fp c
w0 w1Nψ
q cw1Npw0 w1Nψq2
1F p c
w0 w1Nψ
q is increasing over ψ
•
fp c
w0 w1Gψ
q cw1Gpw0 w1Gψq2
1F p c
w0 w1Gψ
q {
fp c
w0 w1Nψ
q cw1Npw0 w1Nψq2
1F p c
w0 w1Nψ
q |ψ0   1
•
fp c
w0 w1Gψ
q cw1Gpw0 w1Gψq2
1F p c
w0 w1Gψ
q {
fp c
w0 w1Nψ
q cw1Npw0 w1Nψq2
1F p c
w0 w1Nψ
q |ψψ¯ ¡ 1
The conditions above essentially require the hazard rate to be ‘flat’ enough and bounded.
Single-peaked Objective Function
For the objective function to be single-peaked, we need the propensity density function
to be flat enough and bounded. Intuitively, this requires the distribution to be not too
volatile, so the cw1Gpw0 w1Gψq2 {
cw1N
pw0 w1Nψq2 is dominating in determining
HGpψq
HN pψq . Again, ex-
ponential distribution can work as well, although it requires the parameter λ to be not
too small. With some constraints on parameters, Weibull distribution also satisfies this
condition.
1.6.3 Other Roles of Anti-Foreign Protests
We have shown that in countries where regimes’ control over information and society are
too strong, it would be hard for anti-foreign protests to generate concessions. However, we
still often observe those protests in autocracies, for example, anti-US demonstrations in
North Korea and Syria. Moreover, even in countries where anti-foreign or patriotic protests
can potentially generate concessions from foreign governments, those protests can serve
more roles than just bargaining chips for international disputes. In this subsection, we
will look at the other roles of anti-foreign protests.
One potential role of anti-foreign protests would be providing domestic legitimacy and
shifting domestic political focus. Many regimes’ political legitimacies are based on acting
as the defender of national interests. Therefore they may have the incentive to use those
protests to emphasise that they care about national interests. Also, those protests can shift
people’s focus from some domestic problems. Domestic legitimacy and shifting people’s
focus can be very important reasons for the home government to encourage protests, but
as long as those protests will generate pressure for the home government to escalate in
international disputes, most predictions of our model will still carry through.
Another role of anti-foreign protests would be for domestic mobilisation. Those foreign
rivals provide useful ’straw man’ that allow regimes to mobilise its domestic audience for
various reasons. Again, our model points out the international concerns a regime needs
to take into account when deciding whether to mobilise protests.
Moreover, as discussed before, anti-foreign protests can be independent, state-organized,
or a mixture of two with various weights. State-organized protests are usually pro-
government and under government controls, thus less threatening to the government. They
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could potentially boost government legitimacy or other domestic agendas but are unlikely
to convince foreign opponents to concede. On the contrary, independent protests can be
dangerous to regimes but are useful signals that could convince foreign governments the
necessity to concede to avoid costly escalation. Our model mainly applies to cases where
protests are independent. In cases where protests are mixtures of both, our model would
predict that the higher the level of regime participation, the harder it would be for those
protests to generate concessions from foreign governments.
1.6.4 Other Applications
Although this chapter considers a model of how the sender tries to affect the receiver’s
inference problem of the receiver under the setting of crisis diplomacy, some conclusion of
the model can be extended to other settings.
One possible environment this model may apply to is foreign aid and institutional
reform. There is vast literature on the effects of foreign aids on the receiving countries.
Especially, various studies have discussed how foreign aid can either promote or hamper
necessary domestic reforms.
This chapter can easily fit into this discussion: suppose in some underdeveloped coun-
try, some serious disasters may have significant impacts over itself and other countries,
so some developed country may have the incentive to provide foreign aid to help relieve
the disaster. However, providing foreign aid is costly. There may be some other disasters
that are also severe but not destabilising enough, so the donor would not want to provide
foreign aid for that issue. The problem is that the donor may find it hard to distinguish
different kinds of disasters perfectly. If the receiving country takes necessary institutional
reforms that reduce the possibilities of real disasters, then it will be harder for it to cred-
ibly convince the donor to provide foreign aids. Then one implication from the previous
model would be that the foreign aid would actually reduce the incentive to implement
crucial institutional reforms and may actually make the humanitarian crisis perpetual.
Another environment this model applies to would be anti-terrorism. Some country
fighting remote terrorist groups may have the incentive to support its local partner (can
be country or local groups) with aids, especially if the terrorism level has been very high
and destabilising the local community.
By providing aids, that country may stop the area from being further radicalized.
However, providing aid is very costly, and the country would not provide aid to some
non-destabilizing events. Again, the donor country may not perfectly observe the type
of terrorism the local group is facing. If the local group takes anti-terrorism efforts that
reduce the possibilities of destabilizing events, then it will be harder for it to credibly
convince the donor to provide anti-terrorism aids.Then one implication from the previous
model would be that the ex-post socially beneficial action of providing aid in the local area
may reduce the local group’s incentive to fight terrorism and thus actually destabilising
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the area.28
More generally, this chapter can be applied to a sender-receiver environment, where
the state can be endogenously affected by the sender. The receiver may want to take some
action that is preferred by the sender if the receiver is sure enough about some states
happening. However, the receiver cannot perfectly observe the states of the world, and
this gives the sender an incentive to change the state to affect the receiver’s inference
problem. Sometimes this could create an incentive for the sender to spend effort on
increasing the frequency of socially inefficient states.
1.7 Conclusion
We have considered a model exploring how a government can manipulate anti-foreign
protests of its people to get more concessions from foreign countries. By promoting a
high level of hostility through propaganda, the home government generates more protests
and thus more concessions. However, this comes with more crises, which are costly for
the home government. Moreover, the government has to choose a level of hostility that
keeps a protest informative enough about a real crisis. These factors jointly determine
the optimal and feasible level of hostility the home government would choose and also the
equilibrium probabilities of protests and crises.
I characterise the comparative static analysis and find some interesting patterns that
are consistent with real-life examples. I also show that due to the cost of propaganda,
governments may hope their people to be responsive but not too responsive over inter-
national disputes. Moreover, government’s ex-post ability to tamper with protest can
sometimes harm its ex-ante welfare. Therefore, regimes that are in some sense ‘weak’ can
be those that can benefit more from encouraging anti-foreign protests: in our context,
‘weak’ regimes means regimes with intermediate levels of media freedom and a high level
of fragility to political protests.
This chapter suggests some possible directions for future research: first, it would be
interesting to see what will happen in a repeated environment where reputations and
dynamic interactions kick in. Second, combining this chapter with models of political
competitions in a democratic environment may generate additional insights over how
protests will have effects over democratic countries’ domestic politics and international
affairs. Third, a crisis-bargaining model with domestic politics and protests on both sides
28One newspaper report described Pakistan’s incentive to keep terrorists active: ”Over the years succes-
sive governments - both military and civilian - have developed the fine art of using the begging bowl as an
extortion racket. Zia played the Soviets off against the US after the invasion of Afghanistan. The US wrote
the bigger cheque. Musharraf adroitly squeezed money out of Bush for his war on terror, capturing a few
al Qaeda operatives, whilst at the same time letting the Taliban off the hook (proving that the Pakistani
Army is the largest mercenary force in the world). Nor have civilian administrations been any better.
We have become particularly good of late of warning the international community of dire consequences of
militants getting hold of our nukes if they don,t pay up. Kerry-Lugar Zindabad!”. Fulton, George. ”Cry
Wolf”. The Express Tribune, August 18 2010. https://tribune.com.pk/story/40220/cry-wolf/
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may generate additional insights over whether promoting hostility can act as ’defence’ over
the opponent’s investment in hostility. That model may also help us understand better
why inefficient deadlocks like World War I may occur in equilibrium. Last, this chapter
focuses on protest as ’street diplomacy’ instead of formal diplomacy. A richer model may
be needed to explore the interaction between ‘street diplomacy’ and ‘formal diplomacy’.
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Chapter 2
Strategic Disclosure, Primary
Market Uncertainty, and Informed
Trading
“In today’s aggressive marketplace, listed companies can no longer rely on their numbers to
do the talking. If companies can’t communicate their achievements and strategy, mounting
research evidence suggests, they will be overlooked, their cost of capital will increase and
stock price will suffer.”
–Westbrook (2014)
2.1 Introduction
The design and transmission of information play a vital role in security offering in that it
shapes issuers’, intermediaries’ and investors’ expectations of the future, and thus pro-
foundly influences the resulting supply-demand equilibrium. One overarching friction
which plagues the well-being of the market participants is information asymmetry: usu-
ally, one party holds a payoff-relevant informational advantage over another. Issuers have
considerable discretion in the disclosure of information to advance their own interests.
Intermediaries, by underwriting and investing in the deals, acquire proprietary informa-
tion which helps them predict future performance but cannot be credibly communicated
to other investors. Moreover, they may gain from trading on their private information.
Accordingly, understanding such friction and evaluating feasible options for alleviating it
is of great importance.
The goal of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework to address
the following questions. First, how does information disclosure by the issuer potentially
affect a financial intermediary’s decision to retain and trade the issued securities? Sec-
ond, can strategic information disclosure help the issuer maximize proceeds from security
offering, mitigate adverse selection, and induce the investment bank to underwrite even
if some unfavourable market friction (e.g. weak demand) may initially deter the bank
from doing so? Third, what are the effects of the issuer’s fundamentals, the underwriter’s
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cost of capital, the primary market condition, and the secondary market liquidity on the
informativeness of the optimal disclosure policy?
In this chapter, we develop a tractable yet comprehensive model that links the issuer’s
information disclosure in the capital raising process to various primary and secondary
market activities by the underwriter and other investors. We model the optimal design of
disclosure policy by the issuer as a Bayesian persuasion game a` la Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011). In their paper, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) present a model where a sender
chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who then takes an action that affects the welfare of
both players. They solve for the sender-optimal signal by reframing the problem as max-
imizing the sender’s payoff over distributions of posterior beliefs subject to the Bayesian
plausibility condition that the average posteriors should be consistent with the prior. The
effectiveness of Bayesian persuasion is that it improves the sender’s expected payoff by
inducing the receiver to choose a better action. The maximal value is obtained by finding
the concave closure of the sender’s payoff function for any posterior held by the receiver.
In general, the Bayesian persuasion approach fits the process of security issuance very
well. The issuing party (sender) has to first draft a proposal which will be sent to a
potential underwriting bank (receiver). Routinely, the issuer possesses marked flexibility
in selecting what to disclose and how precise the disclosure is. In effect, issuers usually
exercise discretion in reporting forward-looking information which contributes to the valu-
ation of the proposed security. Such information includes but is not limited to forecasts of
future sales, earnings, and growth opportunities, which can be either purely qualitative, or
quantitative with varying precision – a range or a point estimate. Moreover, issuers often
choose to release unique marketing information about business models, corporate strategy,
and prospects of the industry to attract potential investors. In sum, the proposal-drafting
stage resembles the sender’s communication about the optimally designed signal system
to the receiver. After seeing the proposal, the investment bank further investigates the
realization of the signal through due diligence if it still cannot decide whether it should
underwrite. If the bank agrees to underwrite, it engages in information production with
the issuer to prepare the information memorandum (for debt) or prospectus (for equity),
which is then circulated to potential investors (other receivers). In this sense, the infor-
mation memorandum or prospectus reflects the informativeness of the issuer’s disclosure.
The underwriter then prices the security based on the collected information. This stage
corresponds to the mapping from the signal realization to the pricing of the security.
Specifically, we consider an issuer who designs an information disclosure system and re-
veals it to an investment bank to invite it to underwrite the deal. The issuer may represent
a borrower in a debt issue, an originator in securitization, or an entrepreneur in an equity
issue. The investment bank may serve as a lead bank in loan syndication, an arranger in
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the sale of asset-backed security (ABS), or an underwriter in equity and bond offering.1
If the investment bank decides to underwrite, it further helps communicate the signal to
potential investors, chooses its stake, and allocates the remaining securities to the par-
ticipant investors. We assume that the underwriter obtains proprietary information from
its underwriting activity and retention. Similar assumptions regarding the generation of
private information are commonly used in the literature on banking and blockholders (e.g.
Parlour and Plantin, 2008; Edmans and Manso, 2011), and well documented empirically
(e.g. Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Edmans, Fang and Zur, 2013). Nevertheless, the
acquisition of material information in our model is an inevitable but adverse consequence
of the underwriter’s involvement in the issue. As a result, the underwriting bank can profit
from insider trading when the secondary market opens. Following Maug (1998), Hennessy
and Zechner (2011), and Chemla and Hennessy (2014), who model the secondary markets
of equity, bond, and ABS respectively, the market structure is in the spirit of Kyle (1985)
where investors submit their market orders to a continuum of deep-pocketed risk-neutral
market makers who price the security competitively after observing aggregate demand.
If the participant investors anticipate that there is an adverse selection in the secondary
market, they will demand a discount in the issue price to offset their future losses, a fact
widely used in the literature (e.g. Holmstro¨m and Tirole, 1993; Maug, 1998; Edmans and
Manso, 2011).
In our baseline model, we consider a secondary market where the underwriter is banned
from selling the security short (alternatively, short sale is prohibitively costly for him). In
reality, it is almost impossible to sell certain assets such as loans short. Furthermore, short
sale of securities by underwriters has long been contended as highly controversial and is
viewed unfavourably by regulators as well as market participants. Moreover, the SEC has
made an effort to restrict the short sale of the ABS by securitization participants. For
instance, in a proposed rule of “Prohibition against Conflicts of Interests in Certain Secu-
ritizations” in September 2011, they prohibit a large group of interested parties including
underwriters from engaging in certain transactions, among which a particular one is short
sale. Moreover, investors are fiercely opposed to short-selling securities by underwriters,
and petitions from institutional investors to urge constraint on short sale in the City of
London in recent years are common occurrences. In other financial markets such as the
ones in China, short sale of any securities is strictly forbidden. This is why we primarily
focus on the case in which there is a short sale constraint for the underwriters.
Like in Aghion, Bolton and Tirole (2004), we assume that the underwriter’s capital
is scarce and he incurs an opportunity cost (i.e., cost of capital) proportional to his in-
vestment in the security. Consequently, even though the underwriter can free ride on the
adverse selection discount, in equilibrium the additional cost due to the retention depress-
1The investment bank can also be viewed as an extant blockholder in the firm who makes the decision
on whether to support and participate in a seasoned security offering. See more discussion on the corporate
governance implication of the blockholder on Page 55.
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es his stake to the level that is just enough for him to camouflage as liquidity traders and
gain from informed trading. Interestingly, a unique equilibrium of informed-sales arises
naturally in which the underwriter liquidates his holdings if his private information in-
dicates that the security will subsequently underperform, and he refrains from trading
otherwise. Our results speak to the issues associated with the rise of the originate-to-
distribute (OTD) lending model in debt markets (Bord and Santos, 2012). Because of the
development of active secondary markets, banks’ incentives to screen and monitor loans
have diminished (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig, 2010). Moreover, they tend to sell loans
that are of excessively poor quality (Purnanandam, 2010), and underperform their peers
by about 9% per year subsequent to the initial sales (Berndt and Gupta, 2009). To this
end, our model fully captures the resultant adverse selection problem from OTD.
Working backwards, we consider the optimal design of disclosure by the issuer. If she
does not disclose additional information, the underwriter will choose to retain a stake
only when the ex ante uncertainty about the security’s payoff is relatively high. Because
otherwise his private information has low value and his trading profits are not enough to
compensate for his opportunity cost of investment. As a result, underpricing occurs only
if the security is riskier. This is consistent with the evidence in Cai, Helwege and Warga
(2007) that find significant underpricing on speculative-grade debt offerings but no signif-
icant underpricing on investment-grade bond IPOs. Since the underpricing undermines
the issuer’s proceeds, she can do better by inducing posteriors beliefs which reduce the
uncertainty to the degree that the investment bank is just indifferent between no reten-
tion and a positive stake. In this case, the optimal disclosure is partially informative. A
sender-preferred equilibrium prescribes that the underwriter should not retain any share,
thus no discount will occur in equilibrium.
Next, we extend our model by introducing demand uncertainty (i.e., that demand may
fall short of supply) in the primary market. With a positive probability, the shares net
of the underwriter’s planned retention cannot be fully subscribed by the participant in-
vestors. In order to complete the deal, the underwriter has to acquire all the remaining
shares. Unlike before where the investment bank’s decision to underwrite is trivial, the
bank will shy away from the deal if his expected payoff is negative. This creates a hold-up
problem arising from the possibility of a demand shock. Intuitively, the bank will choose
to underwrite and hold a stake only if uncertainty about the cash flows from the securi-
ty is sufficiently high. Then, the underwriter is able to exploit his private information,
and his expected trading gain is enough to offset his expected loss from excessive reten-
tion. Therefore, the issuer’s optimal information design will be as follows. If the ex ante
uncertainty about the security is so high that the investment bank is always willing to un-
derwrite, the issuer will design a signal system inducing posteriors beliefs which reduce the
uncertainty to the level that makes the investment bank just indifferent between whether
or not to underwrite. This, in turn, reduces adverse selection and increases the issuer’s
expected revenue. However, if the ex ante uncertainty about the security is relatively low,
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the investment bank will not underwrite unless the signal changes his prior. The issuer’s
overriding interest in this scenario is to be able to sell the security and maximize her
expected payoff with strategic disclosure. Thanks to the Bayesian plausibility constraint
which requires that the average posteriors to be equal to the prior, Bayesian persuasion
by the issuer can induce the investment bank to underwrite with positive probability and
balances this with a worse belief that leaves the bank’s underwriting decision unchanged,
which improves the issuer’s expected payoff. The optimal disclosure is such that on the one
hand, it may induce the worst belief which leads to the investment bank’s withdrawal from
underwriting, but on the other hand, it may generate a signal that makes the investment
bank just willing to underwrite at the relevant beliefs. At the latter belief, the security’s
uncertainty is in fact increased, and the underwriter’s private information thus becomes
sufficiently valuable again, although on average the disclosure system still reduces the un-
certainty relative to that at the prior belief. Our model features an interesting mechanism
where increased payoff uncertainty can mitigate the hold-up problem brought about by
demand uncertainty. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating a possible way to
avoid security issuance failure due to weak demand, and by offering alternative insight into
the “pipeline risk” in Bruche, Malherbe and Meisenzahl (2018), where they document the
successful issuance of leveraged syndicated loans along with the costly excessive retention
by the underwriting banks. We argue that it may stem from the fact that the banks are
successfully persuaded by the borrowers albeit the presence of high demand uncertainty.
Our model yields novel empirical predictions that relate the informativeness of the
optimal disclosure to various aspects of the primary and secondary markets. We show that
the effects are not simply monotonic and depend on the ex ante uncertainty of the security’s
payoff. Specifically, when the ex ante payoff uncertainty is relatively high, both better
growth option of the firm/borrower and more secondary market liquidity lead to more
transparent disclosure. Conversely, greater issue size, larger cost of underwriting bank’s
capital, a higher probability of demand shock, and weaker demand are associated with less
informative disclosure. Better growth option and more liquidity allow the underwriter to
enjoy more profits by trading on his private information. Hence the optimal system only
needs to induce less uncertainty at posteriors that make the underwriter just break-even.
In contrast, larger issue size and cost of underwriting bank’s capital make it more costly
for the underwriter to hold a stake in order to gain from informed trading. Thus more
uncertainty should be introduced to make the underwriter’s private information more
valuable. Likewise, a higher probability of demand shock and weaker demand make it
more costly for the bank to underwrite, thus the optimal system should induce beliefs
with higher uncertainty so that his stake carries more trading value in the secondary
market. Our result is similar to the model of Pagano and Volpin (2012) which shows that
coarse information enhances primary market liquidity at the cost of reducing secondary
market liquidity. In contrast, the motivation for the revelation of coarse information in
our model is to solve the hold-up problem and promote an active primary market with
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the underwriter’s participation. Moreover, the issuer cannot control over the realizations
of the signal, thus the coarse information does not come with certainty.
The results for the security with ex ante relatively low payoff uncertainty in the pres-
ence of demand uncertainty is just the opposite: better growth option and more liquidity
dampen the informativeness of the disclosure, while greater issue size, larger cost of capital,
a higher probability of demand shock, and weaker improve the informativeness. Especial-
ly noteworthy is that in the latter cases although the overall uncertainty is reduced by
the optimal disclosure, to attract the bank to underwrite, the inherent uncertainty at the
posterior beliefs that make the bank just indifferent actually becomes larger than that
at the prior. The uncertainty at these posteriors should vary according to the intuition
discussed in the previous paragraph. But the informativeness hinges on how dispersed the
distribution of the posteriors is.
Finally, we extend our model by relaxing the assumption on the short sale constraint in
the secondary market. Without short-sale constraint, it is optimal for the underwriter not
to acquire any security in the primary market, but to exploit his private information by
selling the asset short in the secondary market. If there is no demand uncertainty, only a
fully informative disclosure can deter the underwriter from engaging in informed trading.
Nevertheless, when demand is uncertain, all of the results on optimal disclosure we have
obtained with short-selling constraint extends to the case without it. Compared with the
case where short sale is prohibited, the issuer only needs less transparent disclosure to
persuade the investment bank to underwrite when the uncertainty about the security’s
payoff is relatively low. But she has to design more transparent disclosure to alleviate
adverse selection when the payoff uncertainty is relatively high.
This chapter is related to several strands of the literature. First, our work contributes
to the theoretical literature that attempts to address the question of how the rapidly
evolving debt markets can go awry (e.g. Chemla and Hennessy, 2014; Pagano and Volpin,
2012; Parlour and Plantin, 2008). We model the adverse selection problem in the OTD
lending model, and show that strategic disclosure not only benefits the issuer but also
reduces this informational friction.
Second, our theoretical framework enriches the large literature on blockholders’ gov-
ernance by exit (e.g. Aghion, Bolton and Tirole, 2004; Edmans and Manso, 2011; Faure-
Grimaud and Gromb, 2004). Importantly, the applicability of our model naturally goes
beyond debt markets and extends to equity markets if we view the underwriter as an ex-
tant blockholder in a firm. Under this interpretation, we model the blockholder’s decision
to support and participate in a security offering (e.g. seasoned equity offering). As long
as he participates, the blockholder has an informational advantage over other dispersed
investors from holding and learning. As we have explained, he can exert governance by
exiting to push the firm to ex ante disclose more transparent information when the payoff
uncertainty of the security is relatively high.
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Third, this chapter adds to a growing body of literature on information design theory
(e.g. Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Alonso and Caˆmara, 2016; Bergemann and Morris,
2018; Rayo and Segal, 2010) as well as its application in corporate finance (e.g. Azarmsa,
2017; Azarmsa and Cong, 2018; Boleslavsky, Carlin and Cotton, 2017; Goldstein and
Leitner, 2018; Huang, 2016; Szydlowski, 2016). We extend the basic Bayesian persuasion
framework by including a second receiver (the participant investors) who indirectly affects
the welfare of both the sender and the first receiver.
Fourth, our theoretical analysis offers new insight into the empirical literature on the
effect of disclosure on liquidity (e.g. Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2014).
In contrast with the extant literature, we focus on how firms will design their disclosure in
security issuance when faced with varying market liquidity. Our model provides a rationale
for whether a liquid secondary market contributes to a better information environment of
the issuing firm. To our best knowledge, we are the first to consider the security issuer’s
optimal design of information disclosure in the presence of both the financing and the
trading frictions. We thus call for empirical investigations of the relationship between the
informativeness of disclosure (through the lens of the information memoranda and the
prospectuses) and the subsequent market activities as predicted in our model.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup of the model.
Section 3 solves for the secondary market trading equilibrium and the primary market
issue price given an active secondary market. Section 4 presents the core results of the
model with a secondary market that has short sale constraint. The equilibrium disclosure
policies are analyzed both with and without demand uncertainty in the primary market.
Section 5 changes the secondary market structure by removing the short sale ban and solve
for the optimal disclosure policies. Section 6 conducts welfare analysis for the investment
bank and the issuer under different primary market conditions and secondary market
structures. Section 7 concludes. All proofs not in the main body of the chapter are
deferred to the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
The model has four dates and no discounting. There are three types of players: an issuer,
an investment bank, and a group of investors, all of whom are risk-neutral.
2.2.1 The Issuer
The issuer (also called “she” or “firm”) wants to sell claims to cash flows from a productive
asset. Examples of such claims include bonds, (syndicated/securitized) loans, or equity
stocks. For brevity, we shall simply call them securities. We normalize the number of
securities to be issued to 1. The state ω is binary: it can be Good (G) or Bad (B) with
prior probability distribution Prω  Gs  µ0 and Prω  Bs  1  µ0 respectively. Cash
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flows v˜ from state B and state G are VH  VL  ∆V and VL respectively.
v˜
VL
VH
1 µ0
µ0
Figure 2.1: Cash Flows Distribution under the Prior
The issuer designs an experiment which we refer to as a disclosure system pi with binary
signal s P th, `u. The signal realization follows the conditional distribution: piG  Prs 
h|ω  Gs ¥ piB  Prs  h|ω  Bs, which also represents the precision of the system.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how the disclosure system maps each state to a signal. Using Bayes’
Rule, the posteriors µs upon observing s P th, `u are
µh  Prω  G|s  hs 
piGµ0
piGµ0   piBp1 µ0q
,
µ`  Prω  G|s  `s 
p1 piGqµ0
p1 piGqµ0   p1 piBqp1 µ0q
.
Moreover, Bayesian updating requires that the average posterior is consistent with the
prior, which gives the Bayesian plausibility condition:
Prs  hs  µh   Prs  `s  µ`  µ0.
Therefore, the information design problem for the issuer is equivalent to choosing a pair
of posteriors tµh, µ`u whose distribution must satisfy the above constraint.
True State Probability Generated Signal
G h
B `
1 piG
piB
piG
1 piB
Figure 2.2: The disclosure system pi
One important assumption in the Bayesian Persuasion framework a` la Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011) is the commitment assumption. Commitment assumption means that
whatever the outcome of the signal system, the sender has to truthfully report the outcome
without the ability to tamper with or hide the outcome. This is a reasonable modelling
assumption in our paper, as when the investment bank underwrites, due diligence requires
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independent third parties such as auditing firms to assess and scrutinize the firm’s financial
situation and other details. The firm owner/issuer will not be able to change the result of
the report. But by providing more or less details, he can affect the precision of signal.
Another potential concern of using Bayesian Persuasion framework here is that the
issuer may have private information about the state before even designing the experiment.
Then the choice of experiment itself may already reveal the state of the world. It is
possible that the issuer could have some private information about the state. However,
it is safe to argue that the issuer still faces substantial uncertainty about the state. For
example, a new firm that plans to go through Initial Public Offering may face substantial
uncertainty about its future growth prospectives and profitability. Even as a firm owner,
who is an insider of the firm, he may still have very limited information about the firm’s
future prospectives. A interesting future research direction would be considering a more
realistic model where the issuer has some imperfect private information about the state ω
before designing the signal. 2
2.2.2 Informativeness of the Disclosure System
Following Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014), we use the entropy measure to gauge the
uncertainty associated with a given belief. In our binary-state economy, if the belief that
the state is G conditional on observing s is µs, its entropy is Hpµsq  µs lnµs  p1 
µsq ln p1  µsq. Hence the belief achieves the highest uncertainty when µs  1{2, and the
closer it is to the endpoints of its support (i.e., 0 or 1), the less uncertain the belief is.
Moreover, the informativeness of a disclosure system pi is measured as the reduction in
entropy Lppiq  Hpµrq  Expi|µryrHpµsqs, where µr is a fixed reference belief independent
of the system pi, and the subscript xpi|µry indicates that the expectation is taken under
the distribution of posteriors (i.e., the probabilities of s  h and s  `) given the reference
prior µr.3
The fact that the above Lppiq function is convex in µs implies a simpler yet more
intuitive interpretation of the informativeness: the more dispersed the distribution of
posteriors, the more informative the disclosure system. Formally, consider two systems pi
and pi1 with possible signal realizations th, `u and th1, `1u, and induced posteriors tµh, µ`u
and tµh1 , µ`1u. Suppose that
0 ¤ µ` ¤ µ`1 ¤ µh1 ¤ µh ¤ 1
with either the second or fourth inequality (or both) holding strictly, then we claim that
system pi is more informative than system pi1 in the spirit of Blackwell (1951). Furthermore,
from the Bayesian updating formulas of the two posteriors, both a higher piG and a lower
2For example, Alonso and Caˆmara (2018) study the question that when a sender can benefit from
becoming privately informed before choosing an experiment.
3The introduction of this reference belief µr ensures that the disclosure informativeness does not vary
with the prior µ0.
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piB imply a more informative signal system. It is because such changes in the precision
parameters lead to a higher µh and a lower µ`, which are consistent with our definition of
the informativeness above. In this chapter we use “informativeness” and “transparency”
interchangeably to describe the quality of a disclosure system.
2.2.3 The Investment Bank and the Participant Investors
In addition to the issuer, there are two other types of players: an investment bank and a
group of participant investors. To issue the securities, the issuer has to find an investment
bank (also called “underwriter” or “he”) to help her underwrite the deal in the primary
market. The investment bank can be an underwriting bank in a public offering of bond or
equity, a lead bank in loan syndication, or an arranger in securitization. The issuer reveals
the disclosure system pi to the investment bank. The investment bank then engages in due
diligence to find out the realization of the signal s. After observing s the investment bank
makes a decision on whether to underwrite. If he agrees to underwrite, he further chooses
the fraction of securities β to retain. Instead, he can also withdraw from underwriting if he
finds it unfavourable, and thus the issue fails.4 We denote the action set of the investment
bank as follow
aIB P tpUnderwrite & Retain βq, pNot Underwritequ.
Following Aghion, Bolton and Tirole (2004), we assume that capital is scarce for the
investment bank and he incurs an opportunity cost (i.e., cost of capital) r ¡ 0 per unit of
investment.5 Moreover, there are a unit mass of participant investors who can also invest
in a risk-free asset with zero return. They will invest in the remaining p1  βq shares as
long as they are break-even.
2.2.4 Time Line
At T  0, nature determines the prior distribution of the states. The issuer designs a
signal system pi which will generate a signal s at T  1. She finds an investment bank
and reveals this experiment pi to him.
At T  1, signal s realizes. The investment bank first engages in due diligence to dis-
cover s and then decides if he will underwrite the issuance. If the investment bank chooses
to underwrite, he materializes and communicates the signal s to participant investors. He
4In practice when primary market demand for the security is weak and the underwriter is not willing
to retain additional shares, he may choose to delay (suspend) the issuance indefinitely, and only to close
the deal when the securities can be fully subscribed. For simplicity, we also regard this scenario as failure.
5We assume throughout this chapter that the investment bank will always incur this opportunity cost
of his capital expenditure in both the primary and the secondary markets. This helps to eliminate multiple
equilibria in the secondary market. Removal of such assumption in the secondary market does not affect
the equilibrium we will characterize. Moreover, r cannot be too large as otherwise the investment bank
will always find it unfavorable to underwrite. We characterize the exact requirements that r should satisfy
in order to ensure the existence of interior solutions of the model in the appendix.
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T  0 T  1 T  2 T  3
• Nature determines the
prior µ0.
• The issuer designs a
disclosure system pi which
will generate a signal s at
T  1.
• Signal s realizes, and is
revealed by the issuer to an
investment bank.
• The investment bank
decides whether or not to
underwrite after observing
the signal s. If not, the
game ends.
• If the investment bank
decides to underwrite, he
communicates this s to
participant investors. He
sells fraction p1 βq to
participant investors and
retains β, both at a price
P0.
• Secondary market opens.
• The investment bank
observes the state and
decides about his trading
strategy.
• The participant investors
experience liquidity shocks
with probability γ.
• The MM receive orders
from the investment bank
and the participant
investors, and set price P1.
• Payoff realizes and all
parties are paid.
Figure 2.3: Time line
sells p1 βq to the participant investors and acquires the remaining β, both at price P0.
At T  2, a secondary market opens. The market structure is like Kyle (1985). The
investment bank and the participant investors submit their market orders to a continuum
of deep-pocketed risk-neutral market makers (MM) who price the security competitively
after observing the total net order flow y. The market maker sets price P1  Esrv˜|ys. The
trading episode proceeds with three sub-stages:
1. The investment bank observes the true state ω and determines his trading strategy,
i.e., the amount of securities txIBu to trade.
2. Liquidity shocks happen with probability γ P p0, 1q. The participant investors submit
their aggregate market order txPIu, whereby
a. with probability γ a fraction φ P p0, 12q of the participant investors experience
liquidity shocks and have to liquidate their holdings;
b. with probability p1  γq, there is no liquidity shock and these participant in-
vestors don’t sell.
3. The MM receive the net order flow from the investment bank and the participant
investors y  xIB   xPI , and set P1.
At T  3, payoffs of the underlying securities are realized, and all parties get paid.
The time line is summarized in Figure 2.3.
2.2.5 Payoff Functions
We next define the expected payoff functions of the issuer, the investment bank, and the
participant investors at T  1 in the primary market. Consider the situation after the
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signal s has realized. The issuer’s expected payoff is
UEpaIB, P0q  1aIBtUnderwrite, βu P0.
1aIBtUnderwrite, βu is an indicator function which takes value 1 if aIB  tUnderwrite, βu (
the investment bank underwrites and acquires β), and 0 otherwise. Since the investment
bank will make his underwriting and retention decisions after observing s, it follows that
aIB will be a function of posterior belief µs. P0 is the price of the securities and the money
she will obtain in the primary market conditional on the investment bank choosing to
underwrite. We follow the Bayesian persuasion literature (e.g. Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011; Huang, 2016; Szydlowski, 2016) by assuming that information design incurs no cost,
and when the issuer is indifferent between two disclosure systems, she always selects the
one that is less informative.6
Back to T  0 when the issuer designs the disclosure system pi, she rationally antic-
ipates the best response by the investment bank conditional on induced posterior belief.
Her payoff given posterior µs is therefore
UEpµsq  a

IBpµsqP0pa

IBpµsq, µsq,
7
and her expected payoff under the disclosure system is
Epi rUEpµsqs  Epi raIBpµsqP0paIBpµsq, µsqs ,
aIBpµsq is investment bank’s optimal decision in the primary market (whether to un-
derwrite and fraction to retain if he agrees to underwrite ), given that posterior is µs,
and in the secondary market all the players will make optimal decisions. P0paIBpµsq, µsq
is the price that makes participant investor breaks even in expectation in the primary
market, given that posterior is µs, investment bank optimally chooses aIBpµsq, and in the
secondary market all the players will make optimal decisions. Here the subscript pi implies
that the expectation is taken under the distribution of signal realizations (posteriors).
The investment bank’s expected payoff after observing s depends on whether he be-
6This assumption ensures the tractability of our model as well as the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Alternatively, we can define the issuer’s expected payoff as
UEpaIB , P0, piq  1aIBtUnderwrite, βu P0  Cppiq,
where C represents a sunk cost of disclosure which varies with the informativeness of the disclosure system
pi as in Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014):
Cppiq  kLppiq  ktHpµrq  Expi|µryrHpµsqsu.
Note that k ¡ 0 is the cost of a one-unit reduction in entropy. Therefore, at T  0 when two disclosure
systems deliver the issuer the same expected proceeds, she prefers the one that is less informative and
thus less costly. When the unit cost k Ñ 0 , the optimal disclosure policies converge to the ones in this
chapter. Also, for small k our main intuitions still go through and thus our results are robust to costly
information disclosure.
7Based on our model setting and tie-breaking assumptions,aIBpµsq and P0paIBpµsq, µsq’s distrbutions
are degenerate and thus we do not need to take expectation here.
61
comes an underwriter as well as his retention β if he chooses to underwrite:
EUIBpaIB, µs, P0,Πq  1aIBtUnderwrite, βu  tβrpµs∆V   VLq  p1  rqP0s   EsrΠsu,
where βrpµs∆V  VLq p1  rqP0s is his net payoff from retaining β shares in the primary
market, and EsrΠs is his expected trading profits in the secondary if there is any at
T  2. Here the subscript s implies that we take the expectation under the distribution
of underlying states induced by signal s.
Finally, for the participant investors to acquire the remaining p1 βq shares, they will
demand a price P0 which makes them at least break even. Therefore the issuer will offer
a price such that their expected payoff is EUPIpβ, µsq  0.
2.3 Secondary Market Trading and Primary Market Dis-
count
In this section, we solve the weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (weak PBE)8of the game
by backward induction. Suppose that the investment bank chooses to underwrite at T  1.
Then at T  2, the disclosure system pi, the signal realization s, the share price P0 in the
primary market, and the investment bank’s retention β are all taken as given.
Now that the investment bank has observed the true underlying state at T  2, he
decides about the optimal market order xIB he should submit. We characterize the weak
PBE that generates highest expected profit for the investment bank, where the investment
bank does not trade in state G and sells p1 βqφ in state B as follows.
In state G, the true value of the security is VH . The investment bank has no incentive
to sell simply because the secondary market price cannot exceed the security’s intrinsic
value, i.e., P1 ¤ VH . It will only stay put or purchase positive amounts. We will discuss
those two cases separately.
Case I: the investment bank under state G chooses neither to buy or sell. In state B,
since the price is always at least as much as the security’s intrinsic value (i.e., P1 ¥ VL),
the investment bank can potentially benefit from sale. The maximal amount that can be
sold in order to at least partially conceal his private information is u. In this case the
aggregate order flow will be y  2u if participant investors are hit by liquidity shocks,
and y  u otherwise. Therefore, the MM cannot tell which state the economy is in
when the net order flow is u, and the investment bank enjoys informed trading profits
if the true state happens to be bad. It is straightforward to check that under appropriate
out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the investment bank under state G has no incentive to deviate
and the investment bank do not trade in state G and sell p1 βqφ in state B is part of an
weak PBE.
8Our results in this section are robust to the equilibrium definition used in this game. In the appendix,
we show the results using the weaker solution concept of maximizing investment bank’s ex-ante pay-off.
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Table 2.1: Secondary Market Trading and Pricing
State Liquidity Shocks v˜ Probability xPI xIB y P1
G Yes VH µsγ u 0 u µsγ∆Vµsγ p1µsqp1γq   VL
G No VH µsp1 γq 0 0 0 VH
B Yes VL p1 µsqγ u u 2u VL
B No VL p1 µsqp1 γq 0 u u µsγ∆Vµsγ p1µsqp1γq   VL
Note: u  p1 βqφ.
Case II: the investment bank under state G chooses to buy some positive amount. For
this to be a part of an equilibrium profile, the only possibility is that the investment bank
under state B sells some positive amount in equilibrium. It can be shown that this profile
will lead to same amount of expected income for the investment bank, but the expected
net profit would be lower because holding more stocks is costly for the investment bank.
Therefore, we can just focus on Case I if we are looking at the weak PBE that generates
the highest expected profit for the investment bank.
In sum, to best exploit his private information, the investment bank refrains from
trading in good state and liquidates p1  βqφ in bad state to maximize his expected
informed trading profits while not fully reveal his identity.
We tabulate the equilibrium in the secondary market in Table 2.1, and summarize in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. (Secondary market equilibrium):
1. The investment bank’s optimal trading strategy is to submit an order xIB  0 in
state G, and an order xIB  p1 βqφ in state B.
2. The MM’s posterior belief about the probability of state G is
µMM 
$'''&
'''%
1 if y  0,
µsγ
µsγ p1µsqp1γq if y  p1 βqφ,
0 if y  2p1 βqφ.
3. The MM set price
P1 
$'''&
'''%
VH if y  0,
µsγ∆V
µsγ p1µsqp1γq   VL if y  p1 βqφ,
VL if y  2p1 βqφ.
Having obtained the trading equilibrium, we now derive the primary market issue price
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taking into account the adverse selection in the secondary market. Recall from Table 2.1
that the investment bank’s trading strategy mixes case {State G, Liquidity Shocks} with
case {State B, No Liquidity Shocks}, and he only makes profits in the second case where
he manages to camouflage as liquidity traders. His informed-sale profits per share are
G  P1  VL 
µsγ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
The next proposition derives the investment bank’s total expected trading profits and the
primary market issue price when he observes signal s at T  1.
Proposition 2.2. (Expected trading profits, and Primary market underpricing):
1. The investment bank’s total expected trading profits are
EsrΠs  p1 βqφ EsrGs 
p1 βqφp1 µsqp1 γqµsγ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
2. Since the investment bank’s gain per share is just the participant investors’ loss per
share, in order for these investors to purchase at T  1,
P0  Esrv˜s ∆P
 pµs∆V   VLq 
EsrΠs
1 β
 pµs∆V   VLq 
p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
The fact that securities are issued with a discount due to adverse selection in the
secondary market has been commonly mentioned in the literature (e.g. Holmstro¨m and
Tirole, 1993; Maug, 1998; Edmans and Manso, 2011).
2.4 With Short Sale Constraint (SS)
As we will see, whether short sale by the underwriter is allowed in the secondary market
has somewhat different implications for the equilibrium in the primary market at T  1 as
well as the issuer’s choice of optimal disclosure policy at T  0. Note that whether there
is short sale constraint in the secondary market does not affect the equilibrium strategies
we have characterized in the previous section. We first consider the baseline model where
the investment bank cannot sell the security short. Then we proceed with the model in
which there is no short sale constraint.
The next lemma establishes the condition under which strategic trading by the invest-
ment bank is feasible when there is short sale constraint in the secondary market.
Lemma 2.1. (Minimal stake): When selling the security short is not allowed in the
secondary market, the investment bank can engage in strategic informed trading iff φ1 φ ¤
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β   1.
Suppose that part of the participant investors are hit by liquidity shocks. They will
liquidate a fraction of u  p1  βqφ shares in total. To gain informed trading profits,
the investment bank has to camouflage as liquidity traders. Because he cannot short sell,
to achieve this goal his holdings β should not be too samll, i.e., no less than p1  βqφ.
Also note that β should be strictly less than 1 because otherwise the market is completely
illiquid and there will be no liquidity traders.
2.4.1 No Demand Uncertainty (NDU)
In this section we first consider the benchmark model where there is no demand uncertainty
in the primary market, i.e., all the shares can be fully subscribed by the participant
investors even if the investment bank does not acquire any.
At T  1, from Lemma 2.1 we have already established that when β P r0, φ1 φq or β  1,
the investment bank cannot gain from trading on his private information, because either
his stake is not enough or the secondary market is completely illiquid. Thus the issue price
will not include the adverse selection discount. The following proposition characterizes the
price in the primary market for different levels of retention by the investment bank.
Proposition 2.3. (Primary market issue price): The issue price in the primary market
is
P0pβ, µsq 
$'&
'%
µs∆V   VL  p1µsqµsp1γqγφ∆Vµsγ p1µsqp1γq if β P r
φ
1 φ , 1q,
µs∆  VL if β P r0, φ1 φq or β  1.
Investment Bank’s Optimal Decision I
Absent any demand uncertainty, the investment bank can always stay break-even by choos-
ing to underwrite yet retaining no shares. Therefore, the investment bank’s decision to
underwrite is trivial in our benchmark model here.
At T  1 after signal s has realized and posterior belief µs has been formed, the invest-
ment bank decides on his stake β to maximize his expected payoff, denoted U1IBpβ, µsq:
max
βPr0,1s
$&
%
β  rpµs∆V   VLq  p1  rqP0pβ, µsqs
  1tβ¥p1βqφu  p1 βqφ  p1µsqµsp1γqγ∆Vµsγ p1µsqp1γq
,.
- .
The first term above represents the investment bank’s expected payoff in the primary
market which is the intrinsic value of the β shares net of his capital expenditure and
opportunity cost. The second term is his expected trading profits as we have shown in
Proposition 2.2 if he has acquired adequate stake in the primary market. Observe that
the above expected utility function U1IBpβ, µsq is in fact piece-wise linear in β. Hence
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its maximum must be attained at β  0, or 1, or φ1 φ , or β Ò 1 (i.e., β  1). The
investment bank’s optimal retention problem thus becomes
β  arg max
βPt0,1, φ1 φ ,1u
"
U1IBp0, µsq, U1IBp1, µsq, U1IBp
φ
1  φ, µsq, U
1
IBp1, µsq
*
.
The investment bank’s expected payoff U1IBpβ, µsq is calculated as follows:
(i). If β  0, there will be no informed trading in the secondary market and no price
discount in the primary market, U1IBp0, µsq  0.
(ii). If β  1, the secondary market is completely illiquid and the issue price has no
discount,
U1IBp1, µsq  pµs∆V   VLq  p1  rqP0p1, µsq  rpµs∆V   VLq.
(iii). If β  φ1 φ , informed trading is feasible and thus issue price must be discounted,
U1IBp
φ
1  φ, µsq 
φ
1  φ

pµs∆V   VLq  p1  rqP0p
φ
1  φ, µsq

 
1
1  φ 
p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
(iv). Finally, if β  1, there is (infinitesimal) informed trading profit yet still a relatively
sizable adverse selection discount,
U1IBp1, µsq  1  rpµs∆V   VLq  p1  rqP0p1, µsqs   0  
p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
 pµs∆V   VLq  p1  rqP0p1, µsq
 pµs∆V   VLq  p1  rq

pµs∆V   VLq 
p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq

.
To pin down the optimal retention by the investment bank in response to the observed
signal s, it suffices to show for different µs which of the above U1IB’s achieve the largest
value. The lemma below provides some important properties of the investment bank’s
expected payoff function if he chooses to retain β  φ1 φ .
Lemma 2.2. (Indifference cut-off posteriors I):
1. There exists a pair tµ, µu with 0   µ   12   µ   1 such that U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µq 
U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µq  0.
2. U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq ¡ 0 if µs P pµ, µq, and U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq   0 if µs P r0, µq or µs P pµ, 1s.
Therefore, at posteriors µs  µ and µ, the investment bank is indifferent between hold-
ing β  φ1 φ and β  0. Furthermore, the investment bank will only consider purchasing
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Figure 2.4: The investment bank’s payoff (i)
a fraction of the shares when uncertainty about the security is large (i.e., the posterior
belief µs lies in an intermediate range).
The following proposition characterizes the investment bank’s optimal strategy and
the relevant equilibrium payoffs under different posterior beliefs.
Proposition 2.4. (Investment bank’s optimal strategy and relevant payoffs I): The in-
vestment bank’s optimal stake is
β 
$&
%
φ
1 φ if µs P pµ, µq,
0 if µs P r0, µs Y rµ, 1s.
His equilibrium payoff is
Uˆ1IBpµsq 
$&
%
U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq if µs P pµ, µq,
0 if µs P r0, µs Y rµ, 1s.
In Figure 2.4 the blue line shows the payoff of the investment bank if he chooses to
retain β  φ1 φ , i.e., U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq. The red dashed line depicts his equilibrium payoff under
his optimal retention strategy, denoted by Uˆ1IBpµsq. In equilibrium when µs P r0, µsYrµ, 1s,
the investment bank does not retain any share, and his payoff is zero. Yet when µs P pµ, µq,
he chooses his retention β  φ1 φ and his payoff is U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq, which corresponds to the
hump-shaped part of the red dashed line. So in equilibrium both the investment bank’s
optimal stake and his expected payoff depend only on his belief µs.
The intuition of Proposition 2.4 is straightforward: when uncertainty about the se-
curity’s payoff is relatively small, the investment bank’s informed trading profits in the
secondary market is not enough to cover his cost of capital in the primary market, even
though he free rides on the discounted issue price. This results in zero retention by the
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bank. When the uncertainty about the security is relatively large, it is profitable for the
investment bank to acquire some shares in order to later trade on his private information
strategically. Yet such gain in the secondary market trades off against the opportunity
cost incurred from his primary market capital expenditure. In equilibrium the investment
bank optimally chooses his retention such that it is just enough for him to camouflage as
liquidity traders in the secondary market. This minimizes his total cost of capital while
maximizes his expected trading profits. Our result contrasts with the retention equilib-
rium in Leland and Pyle (1977) where a firm holds a large fraction of its shares to have
some skin in the game and signal to the market its quality when information asymmetry
problem is severe. In our model, the investment bank acquires a stake to later gain from
informed sales in the secondary market when the security’s cash flows are relatively more
uncertain. In this regard, such retention exacerbates the adverse selection problem.
Optimal Disclosure System I
Given the optimal retention scheme by the investment bank described in Proposition 2.4,
it follows naturally that the issuer’s expected revenue conditional on signal s at T  1
will be either the intrinsic value of the security if the bank does not acquire any share, or
the expected cash flows from the security net of an adverse selection discount if the bank
holds a positive stake φ1 φ . This gives the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5. (Issuer’s payoff after information design I): At T  1 the issuer’s
expected payoff conditional on signal s is:
U1Epµsq 
$'&
'%
µs∆V   VL  p1µsqµsp1γqγφ∆Vµsγ p1µsqp1γq if µs P pµ, µq,
µs∆V   VL if µs P r0, µs Y rµ, 1s.
Note that at the two posteriors µ and µ, the investment bank is actually indifferent
between retaining 0 and a positive stake φ1 φ . Following the convention of information
disclosure literature, we select the sender-preferred equilibrium in which the investment
bank does not acquire any share in the primary market when he is indifferent, and thus
there will be no discount. In reality, given the high cost of bank capital, we have reason
to believe that if the issuer is not opposed to it, investment banks are more prone to no
retention although a positive stake gives him the same expected payoff.
At T  0 the issuer designs the optimal disclosure policy to maximize her expected
proceeds from issuing the security. She has to choose the precision of her signal piG and
piB for the disclosure system pi. By Bayes’ rule, essentially her problem is equivalent to
the optimal choice of two posteriors µh and µ`.
Because we have assumed that demand never falls short of the supply in the primary
market, the investment bank does not have to worry about the risk of retaining more
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shares than his privately optimal level. Thus he will always underwrite, and his decision
problem is reduced to the choice of stake β. We can write the issuer’s payoff at T  1 as
U1Epβ, µsq  1aIBtUnderwrite, βu P0pβ, µsq.
Since we already know from Proposition 2.4 that the investment bank’s optimal retention
β depends on µs, the issuer’s expected proceeds will only depend on µs in equilibrium,
which we denote by U1Epµsq  U1Epβ, µsq  P0pβ, µsq. So the issuer solves the following
maximization problem:
Uˆ1Epµ0q  maxtµ`,µhu
EpirU1Epµsqs  maxtµ`,µhu
EpiraIBpµsqP0paIBpµsq, µsqs
s.t. Prs  hs  µh   Prs  `s  µ`  µ0,
Prs  hs   Prs  `s  1.
The issuer chooses the optimal disclosure system taking into account that the sub-
sequent players will choose their optimal behaviours. Especially, she is aware that in
this scenario, the investment bank will always underwrite and it will retain βpµsq 
arg maxβPr0,1s U1IBpβ, µsq amount of shares.
The first constraint is the Bayesian plausibility condition in which the expectation of
posteriors must equal the prior. The second constraint requires that the probabilities of
signal realizations should sum to one.
To solve this problem, we use the concavification technique in Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011). In particular, the issuer’s ex ante optimal design of disclosure system can be de-
rived by finding the concave closure of U1Epµsq, which we define as Uˆ1Epµsq. A graphic
representation is given in Figure 2.5. The black line depicts the issuer’s expected payoff
conditional on different posteriors. When the uncertainty is relatively large, the invest-
ment bank retains a stake and there is underpricing. Thus we observe a dent from the
graph when µs P pµ, µq. The blue dashed line illustrates Uˆ1Epµsq – the issuer’s maximized
expected payoff from the optimal disclosure system.
Intuitively, for any given prior µ0, it must be equal to some convex combination of
two posteriors µ` and µh induced by the optimal system due to the Bayesian plausibility
condition (i.e., µ0  λµ`   p1 λqµh for some λ P r0, 1s). So the issuer’s ex ante expected
payoff under the distribution of posteriors must be a convex combination of two expected
payoffs conditional on relevant signal realizations too (i.e., EpirU1Epµsqs  λU1Epµ`q   p1
λqU1Epµhq). Obviously, the optimal EpirU1Epµsqs is attained on the concave closure of
U1Epµsq. The optimal µ` and µh are obtained at the intersections of U1Epµsq and its
concave closure, which are to the left and right of µ0 respectively.9 λ and p1  λq are
the probabilities of posteriors µ` and µh. The proposition below characterizes the optimal
9In a completely uninformative system, µ`  µh  µ0.
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Figure 2.5: The issuer’s payoff (i)
disclosure policy employed by the issuer at T  0.
Proposition 2.6. (Optimal information design I): At T  0 the issuer’s optimal disclo-
sure policy is:
1. If µ0 P r0, µs Y rµ, 1s, the optimal disclosure system has piG  piB P p0, 1q, and is
therefore completely uninformative, yielding posteriors µ`  µh  µ0.
2. If µ0 P pµ, µq, the optimal disclosure system has piG 
µpµ0µq
µ0pµµq and piB 
p1µqpµ0µq
p1µ0qpµµq ,
yielding posteriors µ`  µ and µh  µ.
One caveat is worth some discussion here. When µ0 P pµ, µq, there are multiple
disclosure systems which gives the issuer the same expected payoff. In fact she can set
any arbitrary piG and piB, as long as they induce posteriors µ` P r0, µs and µh P rµ, 1s
subject to Prs  hs  µh   Prs  `s  µ`  µ0. But since we have assumed before that
if multiple disclosure policies give the issuer the same expected payoff, she selects the
one that is the least informative (and thus the least costly if we assume an infinitesimal
cost of reduction in entropy due to the disclosure that varies with the informativeness
of the system). Accordingly, Proposition 2.6 characterizes the least informative optimal
disclosure system at T  0.
From Figure 2.5 it is clear that if the issuer does not release information, underpricing
happens when uncertainty about the firm is relatively large. This is consistent with Cai,
Helwege and Warga (2007) that find significant underpricing on speculative-grade debt
IPOs but no significant underpricing on investment-grade bond IPOs. We take a further
step by showing that in fact issuer can strategically design her disclosure policy to curb
underpricing even if ex ante the uncertainty about the security is relatively large. This
is achieved by designing a system which decreases the uncertainty associated with the
security to the degree that the investment bank is just indifferent between holding either
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zero or a positive stake. Also, a security with its payoff uncertainty below some thresholds
will in turn have no discount. In practice, because of other possible frictions such as issuer’s
limited capability in reducing uncertainty, we will still observe some underpricing. Later
we will show that when there is demand uncertainty in the primary market, underpricing
always arises in equilibrium, but strategic disclosure can reduce it on average.
Since we have derived the optimal disclosure policy, it is natural to ask what factors
may potentially affect the informativeness of the optimal system. Moreover, how do firms
with different levels of uncertainty alter their optimal strategies in response to changes in
those factors? We address these important questions in Proposition 2.7.
Proposition 2.7. (Comparative statics I):
(1) BµBVL ¡ 0 and
Bµ
BVL   0.
(2) Define η  ∆VVL , then
Bµ
Bη   0 and
Bµ
Bη ¡ 0.
(3) BµBr ¡ 0 and
Bµ
Br   0.
(4) BµBφ   0 and
Bµ
Bφ ¡ 0.
Result (1) states that as VL increases, the lower-bound cut-off posterior µ, at which
the investment bank is indifferent between holding 0 and φ1 φ , becomes larger and the
similar upper-bound cut-off posterior µ becomes smaller. This implies that the range
pµ, µq shrinks inward. VL is the reservation value of the security, and can be viewed as a
proxy for the issue size. We first discuss the implications of the comparative statics if the
system is completely uninformative. In this case the posterior belief is simply the prior.
A larger VL makes it more costly for the underwriter to retain a stake. So at the cut-off
posterior beliefs, only marginally higher uncertainty will induce the underwriter to have
a positive retention and stay break-even. The enhanced uncertainty makes the bank’s
private information more valuable in the secondary market trading, hence offsetting the
additional cost brought about by the larger VL.
Turning to the optimal disclosure, a larger VL means that only firms that are relatively
more uncertain (i.e., µ0 P pµ, µq) will employ a system which induces a pair of posteriors
tµ, µu. Yet as VL becomes larger, the resulting optimal system will be less transparent
because of the inward-shrunken pµ, µq, (i.e., less dispersed distribution of posteriors).10
Therefore, for firms whose security payoffs are ex ante highly uncertain, larger issue size
allows them to use less transparent disclosure to curb underpricing in the primary market.
Result (2) concerns the effect of the firm’s growth option η on the optimal disclosure
policy used by the issuer. Better growth option is potentially beneficial to the underwriting
10Recall from our definition of informativeness in Section 2.2.2, an inward (outward) shrunken range of
posteriors pµ, µq indicates less (more) informativeness of the system.
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bank because it makes his informed trading more profitable. Consequently, at the cut-
off beliefs, even marginally lower uncertainty still ensures a non-negative payoff from his
retention and subsequent informed trading. As a result, the range pµ, µq expands, and the
issuer will use more transparent system as the growth option improves if the security’s ex
ante payoff uncertainty is high.
Result (3) shows that the greater cost of capital of the investment bank will push the
two cut-off posteriors inward. Similar to Result (1), at the cut-off beliefs, only marginally
higher uncertainty will compensate the underwriter’s increased cost of capital by making
his private information more valuable in the secondary market trading. Therefore, greater
cost of capital of the investment bank results in less transparent disclosure by the issuer
with high ex ante payoff uncertainty.
Finally, result (4) relates disclosure to market liquidity. A more liquid secondary
market pushes the two threshold posteriors outward. In effect, higher liquidity is beneficial
to the underwriter as it improves his trading profits. Hence at the margins, cut-off beliefs
with relatively lower uncertainty are sufficient to make the underwriter just break-even by
holding a stake. Also, the optimal disclosure reduces more uncertainty, rendering it more
transparent if the prior is associated with high uncertainty. Result (4) implies a benefit
of the market liquidity in that potentially a more liquid secondary market can push the
issuer to design a more transparent disclosure system when issuing securities although this
is not the complete story as we will see in the next section.
2.4.2 Demand Uncertainty (DU)
In this section, we extend the model by introducing the possibility of negative demand
shock in the primary market. When demand shock happens, the securities are under-
subscribed and the underwriting bank has to acquire additional shares to close the deal
if he chooses to underwrite the issue. Note that the demand shock does not affect our
secondary market equilibrium as well as the discounted issue price due to informed trading
discussed in Section 3. We thus proceed with our analysis from T  1 and then work
backward to determine the optimal disclosure policy at T  0.
Formally, we assume that if demand shock happens in the primary market, the demand
for the issuer’s security is only ψ which satisfies the following inequality:
0   ψ   1 φ1  φ.
Therefore, if the investment bank plans to retain a fraction β ¤ φ1 φ , the aggregate
demand for the security will fall short of the supply (i.e., β   ψ   1). We further assume
that if initially the investment bank has entered into an agreement to underwrite the issue,
he has to acquire all of the remaining p1  ψq shares. Also, recall from Lemma 2.1 that
with short sale constraint informed trading is feasible for the investment bank if and only
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if the fraction of his retention is at least φ1 φ yet strictly less than 1, and the pricing of
shares in the primary still follows Proposition 2.3.
More specifically, suppose that at T  1 after the investment bank has agreed to
underwrite and makes his initial retention plan βˆ,
a. with probability  P p0, 1q, the total demand of shares by the participant investors
is only ψ. So the investment bank has to acquire β  1  ψ. The issue price is
P0p1 ψ, µsq;
b. with probability p1 q, there is no demand shock. The investment bank’s ultimate
retention is β  βˆ and the issue price is P0pβˆ, µsq.11
Investment Bank’s Optimal Decision II
In this scenarior, even if the investment bank initially decides to retain only βˆ  0, the
possible demand shock may force him to acquire more than he plans and depress his
expected payoff below zero. Nevertheless, the investment bank has an exit option “Not
Underwrite” to stay break-even. So the decision to underwrite is no longer trivial, and
it depends crucially on the posteriors induced by the issuer’s disclosure. We denote the
investment bank’s payoff by U2IBpβˆ, µsq if he enters into the underwriting contract and
makes his initial retention plan βˆ.
Consider the situation in which the investment bank chooses to underwrite. He needs
to determine his initial retention plan βˆ to maximize his expected payoff before the demand
uncertainty is resolved. With probability , the demand shock happens and the investment
bank has to buy p1 ψq. His expected payoff is:
Ap1 ψ, µsq  p1 ψqrpµs∆V   VLq  p1  rqP0p1 ψ, µsqs  
ψp1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
With probability p1  q, the demand shock does not occur, and the underwriter’s payoff
is the same as in the no demand uncertainty case:
Bpβˆ, µsq  βˆ  rpµs∆V   VLq  p1  rqP0pβˆ, µsqs
 1tβˆ¥p1βˆqφu 
p1 βˆqp1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
Therefore, after observing signal s, the investment bank has to first decide whether he
will underwrite. If he underwrites, he further chooses a planned retention βˆ to maximize
his expected payoff. Formally, he chooses his optimal action aIB to solve the following
maximization problem
max
aIBPttNUu,tU,βˆuu
1aIBtU,βˆu  rAp1 ψ, µsq   p1 qBpβˆ, µsqs.
11To avoid confusion, we use β and βˆ respectively to distinguish between the issuers planned and ultimate
retention.
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To derive the investment bank’s optimal action, we first characterize the investment bank’s
optimal planned retention βˆ if he chooses to underwrite based on the observed signal in
the proposition below.
Proposition 2.8. (Investment bank’s optimal planned retention): If the investment bank
decides to underwrite, it is a dominant strategy for him to choose an initial retention
βˆ  φ1 φ before demand uncertainty is unraveled.
Proposition 2.8 implies that the investment bank’s planned retention is independent
of the issuer’s disclosure. Such planned purchase serves as an insurance scheme against
the demand uncertainty. The result can be understood in the following way. If demand
shock happens, the investment bank is forced to complete the deal by acquiring all the
remaining p1  ψq shares. In this case any ex ante planned retention βˆ ¤ 1  ψ will
not affect his expected payoff. Meanwhile, any initial stake that is larger than p1  ψq is
never optimal. As we have seen in Proposition 2.4, any stake β that is larger than φ1 φ
for the range of more uncertain beliefs pµ, µq is sub-optimal in that it incurs more cost of
capital while the informed trading profits become less owing to lower liquidity φp1  βq.
Therefore, acquiring a stake that is larger than p1ψq is even less desirable. When there is
no demand shock, a retention which is just enough for the investment bank to camouflage
as liquidity traders, i.e., φ1 φ , is optimal as we have shown before. Consequently, it is
optimal for the investment bank to choose an initial retention βˆ  φ1 φ . In order for the
investment bank to underwrite, his expected payoff should be at least zero. Compared
with the cut-off posteriors µ and µ before, it is obvious that the new thresholds satisfy
µ ¡ µ and µ   µ. It is because at the old posteriors the investment bank’s expected
payoff when demand shock happens, i.e., Apµsq, will be strictly negative as a result of the
higher-than-optimum retention p1ψq. Thus only a larger lower bound µ and a smaller
upper bound µ will suffice to make the investment bank just break-even by accepting to
underwrite.
Recall that U2IBpβˆ, µsq  Apµsq   p1  qBpβˆ, µsq is the investment bank’s expected
payoff conditional on posterior µs if he accepts to underwrite. Also, βˆ represents his
planned retention before demand uncertainty is resolved. We summarize our discussion
above in Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 2.3. (Indifference cut-off posteriors II):
1. There exists a pair tµ, µu with 0   µ   µ   12   µ   µ   1 such that
U2IBp
φ
1 φ , µ
q  U2IBp
φ
1 φ , µ
q  0.
2. U2IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq ¡ 0 if µs P pµ, µq, and U2IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq   0 if µs P r0, µq or µs P
pµ, 1s.
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Unlike before, if the investment bank’s expected payoff is negative conditional on the
observed signal s, he will choose not to underwrite. This happens when the induced pos-
terior µs lies in either r0, µq or pµ, 1s. In general, the bank will not always underwrite,
and he withdraws from underwriting when µs P r0, µq Y pµ, 1s. Proposition 2.9 summa-
rizes the investment bank’s best response to different posteriors induced by the issuer’s
disclosure system and his equilibrium payoff given his optimal action.
Proposition 2.9. (Investment bank’s optimal strategy and relevant payoffs II): The in-
vestment bank’s optimal action is
aIBpµsq 
$&
%
Underwrite and βˆ  φ1 φ if µs P rµ
, µs,
Not Underwrite if µs P r0, µq Y pµ, 1s.
His equilibrium payoff is
Uˆ2IBpµsq 
$&
%
U2IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq if µs P rµ
, µs,
0 if µs P r0, µq Y pµ, 1s.
Since βˆ in equilibrium depends on the posterior µs only, we can simply write the
investment bank’s expected payoff as Uˆ2IBpµsq, a function of µs too. In Figure 2.6, the
red dashed line depicts the investment bank’s expected payoff given his optimal action
aIB, while the yellow solid line is his expected payoff if he sticks to a planned retention
βˆ  φ1 φ regardless of his posterior. For comparison, we also draw the investment bank’s
expected payoff if he always retains φ1 φ shares when there is no demand uncertainty (i.e.,
the blue dashed line, which corresponds to the blue solid line in Figure 2.4). The yellow
line is beneath the blue dashed one in that the presence of possible demand shock extracts
a rent from the investment bank thus decreases its expected payoff in general. In this case
the two cut-off posteriors are less dispersed. Indeed, to induce the investment bank to
underwrite, higher uncertainty in the primary market is needed. Then the losses due to
unfortunate retention can be offset by larger trading profits from the underwriter’s private
information in the secondary market.
Accordingly, when the uncertainty in the primary market is relatively small (i.e.,
µs P r0, µq Y pµ, 1s), the investment bank’s private information is less valuable and
on average he expects to suffer a loss from accepting to underwrite. His optimal strategy
is to withdraw from underwriting the issue. Only when the uncertainty is relatively large
(i.e., µs P rµ, µs) can the investment bank’s expected loss from unfortunate retention be
compensated by his informed trading profits owing to more valuable private information.
In this case, he will agree to underwrite even though he may end up with more retention
than he originally plans.
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Figure 2.6: The investment bank’s payoff (ii)
Optimal Disclosure System II
Since we have solved for the optimal strategy of the investment bank, it is easy to derive the
issuer’s expected proceeds from security issuance conditional on different signal realizations
at T  1.
Proposition 2.10. (Issuer’s payoff after information design II):
1. When µs P r0, µqY pµ, 1s, the investment bank does not underwrite, and U2Epµsq 
0.
2. When µs P rµ, µs, U2Epµsq  U2Ep
φ
1 φ , µsq  P0p1 ψ, µsq   p1 qP0p
φ
1 φ , µsq
 µs∆V   VL 
p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
The second part of Proposition 2.10 implies that the issue prices are the same under
two different levels of retention by the investment bank, p1ψq and φ1 φ . This is because
as long as the bank acquires a stake of at least φ1 φ , the issue price will always have an
adverse selection discount. Yet such discount does not vary with the investment bank’s
retention in that each participant investor’s expected loss per share from trading in the
secondary market is independent of the investment bank’s ultimate stake β, a result that
has already been shown in Proposition 2.2. From Proposition 2.10 it is easy to see that
conditional on signal s, the issuer’s expected revenue U2Epβˆ, µsq depends on posterior µs
only, thus we denote it by U2Epµsq.
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Figure 2.7: The issuer’s payoff (ii)
At T  0, taking into account the optimal action that will be taken by the investment
bank at different posteriors, the issuer designs the disclosure system to maximize her
expected payoff. In particular, she chooses a distribution of posteriors to solve
Uˆ2Epµ0q  maxtµ`,µhu
EpirU2Epµsqs  maxtµ`,µhu
EpiraIBpµsqP0paIBpµsq, µsqs
s.t. Prs  hs  µh   Prs  `s  µ`  µ0,
Prs  hs   Prs  `s  1.
Again, The issuer chooses the optimal disclosure system taking into account that the
subsequent players will choose their optimal behaviours. Especially, she is aware that
in this scenario, the investment bank will only underwrite under some posteriors and its
optimal strategy is aIBpµsq  arg maxaIBPttU,βˆu, {NU}u 1taIBtU,βˆuu  U
2
IBpβˆ, µsq.
The first constraint is the Bayesian plausibility condition. The second constraint en-
sures that the sum of probabilities of high signal h and low signal ` equals 1. We solve this
constrained maximization problem by finding the concave closure of U2Epµsq. In Figure
2.7 the black solid line depicts the issuer’s expected payoff U2Epµsq as characterized in
Proposition 2.10. The blue dashed line is the concave closure of U2Epµsq, which is denoted
by Uˆ2Epµsq. Hence we can read off the optimal disclosure system directly from the graph.
Proposition 2.11. (Optimal information design II): At T  0, the issuer’s optimal dis-
closure policy is:
1. If µs P r0, µq, the optimal disclosure system has piB 
µ0p1µq
µp1µ0q and piG  1, yielding
posteriors µ`  0 and µh  µ.
2. If µs P pµ, µq, the optimal disclosure system has piG 
µpµ0µq
µ0pµµq and piB 
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p1µqpµ0µq
p1µ0qpµµq , yielding posteriors µ`  µ
 and µh  µ.
3. If µs P pµ, 1s, the optimal disclosure system has piB  µ0µ

µ0p1µq and piG  0, yielding
posteriors µ`  µ and µh  1.
4. If µ0  µ or µ, the optimal disclosure system has piG  piB P p0, 1q, and is therefore
completely uninformative, yielding posteriors µ`  µh  µ0.
Again, we have characterized the sender-preferred equilibrium. At the two cut-off pos-
teriors µ and µ, the investment bank is indifferent between declining and underwriting
with a planned retention φ1 φ . Yet the latter is strictly preferred by the issuer in that she
would otherwise fail to issue the security. So we assume that for the sake of the issuer’s
interest, the investment bank will underwrite when he is indifferent. Here the merit of
strategic disclosure lies in that even though an ex ante prior µ0 P p0, µq Y pµ, 1q im-
plies failure of issuance owing to the investment bank’s unwillingness to underwrite, the
optimal disclosure policy is still able to induce the investment bank to underwrite with
strictly positive probability. In this sense, strategic disclosure may solve the hold-up prob-
lem introduced by the demand shock in the primary market. The other advantage of this
disclosure policy manifests in that when uncertainty is higher µ0 P pµ, µq, the expected
issue-price discount is reduced compared with that under no informative disclosure, as is
clear from the wedge between the blue dashed line and the black line in Figure 2.7.
Moreover, although the optimal disclosure reduces payoff uncertainty on average, with
some particular signal realization, the uncertainty is actually enhanced. For instance, if the
prior µ0 P p0, µq, an h signal leads to a posterior belief of µ. Also, µ is more uncertain
than µ0 as it has higher entropy. When the signal realization is `, the disclosure is fully
revealing and the underlying state is B. The same logic applies to posterior µ induced
by signal ` as it has higher entropy than µ0 when µ0 P pµ, 1q. Also, an h signal indicates
that the state is G. Thanks to the Bayesian plausibility constraint, the strategic disclosure
by the issuer can induce the investment bank to underwrite with positive probability and
balances this with a worse belief that leaves the bank’s underwriting decision unchanged,
which generally improves the issuer’s expected payoff. The optimal disclosure is such
that, on the one hand, it induces the worst beliefs which lead to the investment bank’s
withdrawal from underwriting, and on the other hand, it generates signals that make
the investment bank just willing to underwrite at the other beliefs. At these beliefs that
the underwrite chooses to underwrite, the security’s uncertainty is in fact enhanced, and
the underwriter’s private information becomes sufficiently valuable, although on average
the disclosure system reduces the uncertainty compared with the situation at the prior
belief. In the meantime, the issuer’s expected proceeds from the issue is maximized. In
this regard, the optimal disclosure features a mechanism in which the increased payoff
uncertainty can offset the loss brought about by the demand uncertainty so that the
investment bank will change to the better action that is favored by the issuer.
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Nevertheless, a posterior of either µ or µ does not necessarily mean that the demand
risk is alleviated. In fact it is entirely possible that the investment bank will acquire more
than his planned retention eventually. Our result sheds some light on the empirically
documented “Pipeline Risk” (or “Unfortunate Retention”) in leveraged loan syndication
by Bruche, Malherbe and Meisenzahl (2018). We have shown that because of the issuer’s
disclosure policy, even in the presence of demand uncertainty a fully rational investment
bank will still agree to underwrite. But when demand shock happens, the investment bank
will suffer large losses as a result of excessive retention.
The next proposition provides some empirical predictions that relate the optimal dis-
closure to various aspects of the primary and secondary markets.
Proposition 2.12. (Comparative statics II):
(1) Bµ

B ¡ 0 and
Bµ
B   0.
(2) Bµ

Bψ   0 and
Bµ
Bψ ¡ 0.
(3) Bµ

BVL ¡ 0 and
Bµ
BVL   0.
(4) Recall that η  ∆VVL , then
Bµ
Bη   0 and
Bµ
Bη ¡ 0.
(5) Bµ

Br ¡ 0 and
Bµ
Br   0.
(6) Bµ

Bφ   0 and
Bµ
Bφ ¡ 0.
From result (1), it is easy to see that as the probability of demand shock in the
primary market becomes higher, the two cut-off posteriors shrink inward. So when the
prior belief about the security’s cash flow is relatively more uncertain (i.e., µ0 P pµ, µq),
higher likelihood of under-subscription results in less transparent disclosure designed by
the issuer. Indeed, since the demand shock is more likely to occur in the primary market,
in order for the investment bank to at least stay break-even from underwriting the issue,
the disclosure should bring in more uncertainty so that his stake carries more trading
value with his private information in the secondary market. Also, the additional informed
trading profits can offset his expected loss from “unfortunate retention” due to demand
shock. Anticipating this, the issuer will employ a relatively more opaque disclosure ex
ante.
However, when the uncertainty about the security’s payoff is relatively low (i.e., µ0 P
p0, µq or µ0 P pµ, 1q), larger  leads to more transparent disclosure. In this case, piB
is smaller, suggesting that the h signal is more indicative of the good state and the `
signal is more indicative of the bad state. As in this case, only a marginally higher payoff
uncertainty will be enough to compensate for the additional expected loss due to higher
probability of demand shock and make the unwilling bank to accept the deal again at the
high-uncertainty posterior belief.
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Result (2) contrasts with result (1) above: if demand shock happens, a stronger de-
mand (larger ψ), or equivalently, a smaller unfortunate retention (smaller p1  ψq) by
the underwriter, expands the two cut-off posteriors outward. Therefore, if demand shock
happens, this in turn reduces the additional cost of capital incurred from the investmen-
t bank’s unfortunate retention and increases his future trading profits thanks to more
liquidity traders. As a result, when the ex ante payoff uncertainty is relatively large, a
more transparent disclosure will be employed in equilibrium as in this case marginally less
uncertain cut-off posteriors are enough to make the investment bank indifferent between
whether or not to underwrite. Nevertheless, when ex ante uncertainty is relatively small,
a higher ψ result in less transparent disclosure. Both lower µ and higher µ bring about
less transparent disclosure systems for µ0 P p0, µq and µ0 P pµ, 1q respectively. In both
cases, due to Bayesian plausibility condition, the probabilities of full revelation will be
smaller, and the probabilities of the more uncertain posteriors will be higher, making the
systems less informative.
The dichotomy remains valid regarding result (3). Higher VL (issue size or reservation
value of the firm) expands the range of posterior beliefs pµ, µq. As VL grows, it is more
costly for the investment bank to underwrite and retain a positive stake. So when prior
belief about the uncertainty of the security’s payoff is relatively large, marginally more
uncertain cut-off posteriors (i.e., higher µ and lower µ) should be generated for the system
so that the investment bank will be just willing to underwrite. Yet when the ex ante
payoff uncertainty is relatively small, both higher µ and lower µ result in more transparent
disclosure systems for µ0 P p0, µq and µ0 P pµ, 1q respectively. So the probabilities of fully
revealing states will be higher, and the probabilities of the more uncertain posteriors will
be lower, rendering the systems more informative.
Result (4) asserts that higher growth option (η) gives rises to the expansion of pµ, µq.
When prior belief about uncertainty is relatively large, as growth option improves, the
investment bank will benefit more from his informed sales in the secondary market. Hence
the optimal disclosure will be more informative as now marginally less uncertain cut-
off posteriors are still able to induce the investment bank to underwrite. When the ex
ante payoff uncertainty is relatively small, better growth option leads to less informative
disclosure. The reasoning is similar to what we have discussed in result (3): less uncertain
cut-off posteriors give rise to higher probabilities of high-uncertainty posteriors and lower
probability of fully revealing signals. In addition, a less informative information disclosure
arises naturally in equilibrium.
With the same token, result (5) states that higher r makes the disclosure system less
informative when ex ante uncertainty is relatively high, but it leads to less informative
disclosure when the uncertainty is relatively low. Higher opportunity cost per unit of
investment by the bank makes him less willing to retain a positive stake at the old cut-off
posteriors. To induce him to underwrite and compensate his additional cost of capital,
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posteriors with higher uncertainty must be generated from the optimal system.
Likewise, the implications of result (6) depend on the prior µ0. When the ex ante payoff
uncertainty is relatively high, a more liquid secondary market leads to more transparent
disclosure. This is because better liquidity in the secondary market allows the underwriter
to gain more from trading on his private information. Therefore, a more transparent
system, although decreases the value of the investment bank’s private information, is still
able to make the investment bank just break-even by underwriting the deal. Yet when
uncertainty about the firm is relatively low, the disclosure becomes less transparent as
the secondary market liquidity increases. Recall that in order to change the investment
bank’s decision of not underwriting, the system should produce one particular signal which
increases the payoff uncertainty to the extent that the investment bank is just willing to
serve as an underwriter. As liquidity pumps up, the optimal disclosure only needs to
generate a marginally less uncertain high-uncertainty posterior (higher µ or lower µ)
such that the bank still wants to underwrite. As a result the disclosure becomes less
informative than before.
2.5 Without Short Sale Constraint (NSS)
In this section, we briefly layout the equilibria by relaxing the previous assumption that
the underwriter is not allowed to sell the security short in the secondary market. We also
assume that short sale does not incur any other cost to the underwriter. As before, we
divide into two scenarios: 1. the security can always be fully subscribed by the participant
investors even in the absence of underwriter retention; and 2. there is demand uncertainty
in the primary market. In face, in case 2, the results on the optimal disclosure we have
obtained with short-selling constraint extend to the scenario without the ban on short
sale.
2.5.1 No Demand Uncertainty (NDU)
We first consider the case in which there is neither demand uncertainty in the primary
market nor ban on short sale in the secondary market. Since the demand for the security
will never fall short of the supply, the investment bank is always willing to underwrite.
Proposition 2.13. (Investment bank’s optimal retention): It is optimal for the investment
bank to retain zero stake in the primary market regardless of the signal realization (i.e.,
βpµsq  0).
The intuition is fairly straightforward: recall from Part 1 of Proposition 2.2, the under-
writing bank’s informed trading profits are proportional to the fraction of liquidity traders
p1 βqφ. Hence such profits are maximized at β  0 when the liquidity in the secondary
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Figure 2.8: The investment bank’s payoff (iii)
market is maximized. Since now the underwriter can sell the security short, he no longer
has to hold a stake, but is still able to camouflage as liquidity traders. Meanwhile, zero
retention is optimal in the primary market in that any positive retention in the primary
market would incur an opportunity cost for the investment bank while his gain per share
from primary market underpricing is the same as his informed trading profit per share in
the secondary market. Hence the investment bank’s expected payoff is just his expected
trading profits from the secondary market:
Uˆ3IBpµsq  U
3
IBp0, µsq 
p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
Figure 2.8 depicts the investment bank’s expected payoff as a function of the posterior
belief µs. Also, given the investment bank’s zero retention and short-sale trading strategy,
from Part 2 of Proposition 2.2 the issuer’s expected proceeds conditional on signal s at
T  1 is
U3Epµsq  pµs∆V   VLq 
p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
To solve the optimal information design problem faced by the issuer at T  0, it suffices
to find the concave closure of U3Epµsq, which we denote by Uˆ3Epµsq. In Figure 2.9, the black
line represents U3Epµsq and the blue dashed line is its concave closure Uˆ3Epµsq. Since U3Epµsq
is concave on the support of µs, the optimal disclosure system is fully revealing.
Proposition 2.14. (Optimal information design III): At T  0, the issuer’s optimal
disclosure policy is completely informative, i.e., piG  1 and piB  0, yielding posteriors
µ`  0 and µh  1.
2.5.2 Demand Uncertainty (DU)
We next explore the scenario where there is demand uncertainty in the primary market.
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Figure 2.9: The issuer’s payoff (iii)
First suppose that the investment bank chooses to underwrite. Then if demand shock
does not happen, the investment bank’s optimal underwriting, retention and short selling
strategy coincides with what we have obtained in the previous subsection. Yet if demand
shock happens, the investment bank is forced to acquire a stake of p1 ψq. As he is able
to short sell in the secondary market, his planned retention should still be zero before
the demand uncertainty is unraveled. His expected payoff from underwriting with zero
planned retention is
U4IBp0, µsq  
"
p1 ψq  rpµs∆V   VLq  p1  rqP0p1 ψ, µsqs   ψ 
p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
*
 p1 q  p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
,
where P0p1 ψ, µsq is the issue price defined in Part 2 of Proposition 2.2. The first term
above represents the investment bank’s expected payoff if demand shock happens while
the second is his expected payoff if the demand shock does not occur, both at posterior
belief µs. The second term is always strictly positive while the first one can be negative
for some set of beliefs which are associated with low uncertainty.
Consequently, choosing to underwrite regardless of his posterior belief is not a best
response for the investment bank. This is because when the ex ante uncertainty about
the security’s payoff is relatively small, the expected profits from trading on his private
information are far from enough to cover the investment bank’s opportunity cost of unfor-
tunate retention. Although the bank can always enjoy a strictly positive payoff from short
selling when the demand shock does not occur, the investment bank’s expected payoff
before the resolution of the demand uncertainty under these low-uncertainty beliefs will
still be negative. As a result, the investment bank will shy away from underwriting the
deal.
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Lemma 2.4. (Indifference cut-off posteriors III):
1. There exists a pair tµ, µu with 0   µ   µ   12   µ   µ   1 such that
U4IBp0, µq  U4IBp0, µq  0.
2. U4IBp0, µsq ¡ 0 if µs P pµ, µq, and U˜IBp0, µsq   0 if µs P r0, µq or µs P pµ, 1s.
Proposition 2.15. (Investment bank’s optimal strategy and relevant payoffs III): The
investment bank’s optimal action is
aIBpµsq 
$&
%
Underwrite and βˆ  0 if µs P rµ, µs,
Not Underwrite if µs P r0, µq Y pµ, 1s.
His equilibrium payoff is
Uˆ4IBpµsq 
$&
%
U4IBp0, µsq if µs P rµ, µs,
0 if µs P r0, µq Y pµ, 1s.
In Figure 2.10, the green line depicts U4IBp0, µsq (i.e., the investment bank’s expected
payoff from underwriting with zero planned retention) while the red dashed line depicts
the investment bank’s expected payoff under his optimal underwriting and retention s-
trategy. For comparison, the yellow dashed line is the investment bank’s expected payoff
by underwriting and retaining φ1 φ when there is demand uncertainty yet short sale is not
allowed, the scenario that we have discussed in Section 4.2. An interesting observation is
that compared with before, even if the issuer does not disclosure additional information,
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there is a wider range of beliefs under which the investment bank is willing to underwrite.
This is because the feasibility of short sale by underwriter enables the investment bank to
enjoy positive expected payoffs under two sets of relatively less uncertainty beliefs pµ, µq
and pµ, µq. The removal of short sale constraint reduces the total cost of capital due
to primary market retention to zero, yet allows the underwriter to trade more intensively
on his private information. In turn the indifference cut-off posteriors only need to involve
less uncertainty.
Given the optimal strategy of the investment bank, the next proposition follows nat-
urally.
Proposition 2.16. (Issuer’s payoff after information design III):
1. When µs P r0, µqYpµ, 1s, the investment bank does not underwrite, and U4Epµsq 
0.
2. When µs P rµ, µs, U4Epµsq  U4Epβˆ  0, µsq  pµs∆V  VLq
p1µsqµsp1γqγφ∆V
µsγ p1µsqp1γq .
Concavification of U4Epµsq gives us the optimal disclosure system designed by the issuer
at T  0, as illustrated in Figure 2.11.
Proposition 2.17. (Optimal information design III): At T  0, the issuer’s optimal
disclosure policy is:
1. If µs P r0, µq, the optimal disclosure system has piB 
µ0p1µq
µp1µ0q and piG  1,
yielding posteriors µ`  0 and µh  µ.
2. If µs P pµ, µq, the optimal disclosure system has piG 
µpµ0µq
µ0pµµq and piB 
p1µqpµ0µq
p1µ0qpµµq , yielding posteriors µ`  µ
 and µh  µ.
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3. If µs P pµ, 1s, the optimal disclosure system has piB  µ0µ

µ0p1µq and piG  0,
yielding posteriors µ`  µ and µh  1.
4. If µ0  µ or µ, the optimal disclosure system has piG  piB P p0, 1q, and is
therefore completely uninformative, yielding posteriors µ`  µh  µ0.
Proposition 2.18. (Comparative statics III):
(1) Bµ

B ¡ 0 and
Bµ
B   0.
(2) Bµ

Bψ   0 and
Bµ
Bψ ¡ 0.
(3) Bµ

BVL ¡ 0 and
Bµ
BVL   0.
(4) Recall that η  ∆VVL , then
Bµ
Bη   0 and
Bµ
Bη ¡ 0.
(5) Bµ

Br ¡ 0 and
Bµ
Br   0.
(6) Bµ

Bφ   0 and
Bµ
Bφ ¡ 0.
Note that Proposition 2.17 and 2.18 are identical to what we have obtained in Propo-
sition 2.11 and 2.12. Therefore, all the intuitions go through.
2.6 Welfare Analysis
We have explored the four possible scenarios: 1. (No Short Sale, No Demand Uncertainty),
2. (No Short Sale, Demand Uncertainty), 3. (Short Sale, No Demand Uncertainty), and
4. (Short Sale, Demand Uncertainty). Now suppose that the economy is populated with a
continuum of mass 1 issuers with their types µ0 drawn from a uniform distribution U r0, 1s,
and each issuer invites an investment bank to underwrite.12
Let i P t1, 2, 3, 4u denote one of the above four scenarios. Recall that U iEpµ0q is a
type-µ0 issuer’s expected payoff and Uˆ iIBpµ0q is the relevant investment bank’s expected
payoff conditional on his prior (or equivalently if the issuer does not disclose additional
information). Moreover, Uˆ iEpµ0q is the type-µ0 issuer’s maximized expected payoff under
optimal disclosure system in scenario i.13 Since the optimal disclosure always makes the
investment bank just break-even at any of the posteriors induced by the signal generated
from the optimal system, the investment bank’s expected utility will be zero given the
issuer’s optimal disclosure strategy. Also, because the primary mark price P0 will always
12Alternatively, assume that a generic issuer has type µ0  U r0, 1s. Hence the welfare is just the issuer’s
expected payoff.
13Note that we have already characterized U iEpµ0q, U iIBpµ0q, and Uˆ iEpµ0q, each corresponds to the issuer’s
expected payoff at T  1 given the investment bank’s best response (the black solid line in Figure 2.5,
2.7, 2.9, and 2.11), the investment bank’s expected payoff at T  1 with his optimal underwriting and
retention decision (the red dashed line in Figure 2.4, 2.6, 2.8, and 2.10), and the issuer’s expected payoff
at T  0 under the optimal disclosure system (the blue dashed line in Figure 2.5, 2.7, 2.9, and 2.11).
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be set to the level such that the general investors only break even, the general investor’s
equilibrium utility is always zero.
Therefore, if the issuers do not disclose additional information at T  0, their welfare
in scenario i is
WEpiq 
» 1
0
U iEpµ0q dµ0,
and the investment banks’ welfare in scenario i is
WIBpiq 
» 1
0
Uˆ iIBpµ0q dµ0.
The issuers’ welfare with their optimal disclosure policies in scenario i is
WˆEpiq 
» 1
0
Uˆ iEpµ0q dµ0.
We first look at the investment banks’ welfare if the issuers do not disclose any infor-
mative signal. The ranking of their welfare in the four scenarios depends on the probability
of demand shocks .
Proposition 2.19. (Investment banks’ welfare): For any posterior µ P p0, 1q,
(1) When 0      φp1ψqp1 φq ,
µs0 1µ µ µ µ µ µ
WIBpSS,NDUq ¥WIBpSS,DUq ¥WIBpNSS,NDUq ¥WIBpNSS,DUq.
(2) When φp1ψqp1 φq      1,
µs0 1µ µ µ µ µ µ
WIBpSS,NDUq ¥WIBpNSS,NDUq ¥WIBpSS,DUq ¥WIBpNSS,DUq.
(3) When   φp1ψqp1 φq ,
µs0 1µ=µ µ µ µ=µ
WIBpSS,NDUq ¥WIBpNSS,NDUq WIBpSS,DUq ¥WIBpNSS,DUq.
The red, blue, and black cut-offs posteriors represent the threshold beliefs that make
the investment bank just break-even as an underwriter in scenarios (SS, DU), (NSS,NDU),
and (NSS, DU) respectively. Also, t0, 1u are relevant beliefs in scenario (SS,NDU). In
general, the more dispersed the cut-off posteriors, the better off the investment banks as a
whole. (NSS,DU) is the least desirable. This is because demand uncertainty gives rise to
possible unfortunate retention by the investment banks. Furthermore, the ban on short
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Figure 2.12: The Entrepreneur’s Expected Payoffs
sale forces the investment bank to retain a stake so that he can trade strategically. Yet his
stake incurs additional cost of bank capital. In contrast, (SS,NDU) renders the investment
banks the highest welfare in that they can always sell the security short to gain informed
trading profits in the secondary market while they do not have to acquire any stake in the
primary market. The comparison between the welfare of the remaining two scenarios is
more involved. When  is small (Case (1)), the investment banks’ welfare is still higher if
short sale is allowed compared to the scenario where there is no demand uncertainty but
short selling is banned. Yet when  is large (Case (2)), the investment banks are strictly
better off without demand uncertainty even if short sale is prohibited. The trade-off hinges
on whether the gain brought about by short sale is able to compensate for the loss due to
the demand shock.
Finally, we summarize the rankings of the issuers’ welfare in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.20. (Issuers’ Welfare): For any prior µ0 P t0, 1u, if the issuers do not
disclosure additional information, their welfare have the following ranking:
WEpNSS,NDUq ¡WEpSS,NDUq ¡WEpSS,DUq ¡WEpNSS,DUq.
Yet if they use Bayesian persuasion to maximize their expected proceeds,
WˆEpNSS,NDUq  WˆEpSS,NDUq ¡ WˆEpSS,DUq ¡ WˆEpNSS,DUq.
A graphical illustration of Proposition 2.20 is given in Figure 2.12. The proposition
asserts that if issuers do not reveal informative signals, they achieve the highest welfare
when there is no demand uncertainty in the primary market and short sale is not allowed
in the secondary market. A primary market without demand uncertainty along with a
short selling ban in the secondary market delivers the issuers the second highest welfare.
They are worse off if demand shocks may happen in the primary market and underwriters
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are allowed to sell the security short. Their welfare is the lowest if it is probable that
the security will be under-subscribed by participant investors in the primary market and
there is short sale constraint in the secondary market. From the perspective of the issuers,
they strictly prefer a primary market that has no demand uncertainty. Then the invest-
ment banks are always willing to underwrite, and the issuers can sell off their securities
with certainty. Absent any possibility of demand shocks, they prefer a secondary market
where underwriters are prohibited from short selling the securities. However, if demand is
uncertain, the option of short sale allows the investment banks to reduce the opportunity
cost associated with primary market retention and gain more from informed trading when
demand shocks do not happen. This induces more banks to underwrite and thus enables
more issuers to successfully issue their securities.
Under the issuers’ optimal persuasion mechanisms, most parts of the ranking remain
the same. They still dislike demand uncertainty in the primary market. However, with
strategic disclosure the issuers will be indifferent between whether or not there is short
sale constraint if there is no demand uncertainty. In both scenarios, the aim of the optimal
disclosure is to discourage the investment bank from trading on his private information
in the secondary market. To achieve this goal the optimal disclosure needs to be fully
informative if short sale is allowed in the secondary market while a partially informative
disclosure suffices to do the job if there is the short-sale ban.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents a Bayesian Persuasion model of security offering and trading taking
into account issuer’s strategic disclosure problem. We show that disclosure can be used
to boost the issuer’s expected revenue, mitigate underpricing resulting from underwrit-
er’s informed trading, and increase the likelihood of security issue even when demand is
weak and underwriters may shy away. On average, the optimal disclosure reduces the
uncertainty of the security’s payoff. Nevertheless, full transparency is not always opti-
mal. Signal realizations that introduce more uncertainty can potentially solve the hold-up
problem brought about by demand uncertainty. In general, the optimal information design
depends crucially on the ex ante level of payoff uncertainty. We provide new empirical
predictions which relate the informativeness of the optimal disclosure to the issue size
and the issuer’s growth option, the underwriter’s cost of capital, the uncertainty about
demand, and the secondary market liquidity. Moreover, the underwriter in our model
can be viewed as an existing blockholder in the firm who makes a decision on whether
to support and participate in a security issue (e.g. seasoned debt/equity offering). We
show that the blockholder, by participating, may exert governance by exit to push the
firm to disclose more transparent information. In sum, corporate finance application of
information design theory appears to be a promising topic to work on. Future work can be
done by extending our model with issuer’s moral hazard and signal manipulation as well
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as investors’ information acquisition. Empirical side, textually analysis of the information
memoranda and the prospectuses in both debt and equity issuance can be performed to
test the new empirical predictions generated from our model.
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Chapter 3
Information Design for Incentive
Contracting
3.1 Introduction
It is widely known that in a standard principal-agent environment with hidden action, a
principal can often provide pecuniary incentives to encourage an agent to exert effort and
implement particular effort levels.
In many cases, a principal can also affect another factor that changes the incentive of
an agent exerting effort: information. Information about the usefulness or effectiveness
of exerting effort can have important implications on the agent’s choice of effort. For
example, in a firm, the perspective of that firm, fundamental conditions of the economy,
or the ability of a worker can all change that worker’s incentive to work hard.
What if a principal can change the information environment that its agent faces, besides
providing pecuniary incentives? For example, a firm owner (the principal) can hire an
employee (the agent) to work in the firm and generate some output. The output generated
is a random variable and the agent’s hidden effort could increase the probability of high
output. Besides higher effort, another factor that can affect the distribution of outputs
is the level of fit between the worker and this firm.1 This information can be either
complementary with, substitute to, or independent of the agent’s effort. The firm owner
can first arrange an interview with the agent, which is a public experiment that generates
and reveals a noisy signal about the level of fit to both players. After the outcome of the
experiment, the owner could then offer the employee a contract that specifies his payment
based on the output generated.
In this chapter, I aim to explore the following questions: 1) under what conditions
can the principal benefit from providing information to the agent? 2) What are the
principal’s optimal information environment, and the effort level that is implemented
1For example, Alonso (2018) considers a model where the level of fit between the worker and the firm
determines the value of a match. This level of fit is unobservable to both players. Both sides enter an
interview that provides a noisy signal about this information.
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given this information environment? 3) Would this lead to any social welfare loss? By
answering those questions, we can have better understandings about how a principal could
optimally combine providing information and providing pecuniary incentives to incentivize
an agent and reduce its costs.
I build a model where the principal first designs a public direct experiment 2 about some
state of the world that could affect the effectiveness of the agent’s effort. After the result
of this experiment is revealed to both players, the principal can then provide a contract
to the agent that pays conditioning on the realization of output. Output can be low or
high, and the probability of output being high is a function of both the agent’s effort and
the state. The probability of high output is marginally increasing in higher effort or the
probability of state being good, and effort and state could be complements or substitutes.
3 Moreover, I assume both players are risk-neutral but there is limited-liability on the
agent’s side.
This game can be solved by backward induction: given any experiment and its outcome,
we can solve the level of effort the principal prefers to implement and the corresponding
optimal contract. Then, given the continuation value for the principal under each possible
experiment and its outcome, we can solve the optimal experiment.
I first show that the value of implementing high effort for the principal can be either
concave or convex over the common posterior belief about the state. Moreover, it is
concave if and only if output is log-supermodular in state and effort. This is a stronger
condition that state and effort being merely complementary and requires state and effort
to be complementary enough: the relative ratio of probabilities of high output from a high
effort versus low effort has to be higher when the state is good, compared to the case when
the state is bad.
I then look at the optimal experiments. I show that if the principal’s value of imple-
menting high effort is convex, i.e., state and effort being not highly complementary,4 a
full-revealing experiment is weakly optimal. The optimal experiment would be no infor-
mation being revealed instead, if the principal prefers to implement high effort regardless
of the state and the principal’s value of implementing high effort is concave. The more
interesting case occurs when it is profitable for the principal to implement high effort when
the state is good but not when the state is bad, and principal’s value of implementing high
effort is concave: the optimal experiment may be partial obfuscating, in the sense that bad
news will be fully-revealing but not good news. I characterised conditions for the princi-
pal’s experiment to be fully-revealing, providing no information, or partial obfuscating. I
then look at how the principal’s optimal experiment will change when various parameters
change.
2Direct experiment here means the signal space equals to the state space.
3In the baseline model, I assumed state and effort are complements. Later I also considered the scenario
that state and effort are substitutes.
4Here ‘not highly complementary’ means that output is log-submodular in state and effort.
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I also consider various extensions to the baseline model. First, restricting the signal
space to the state space, i.e., focusing on direct experiments, has no loss of generality.
Second, I show that making the principal offer a contract before the experiment outcome is
realized will make no difference. Third, contrary to what I previously assumed, I consider
the optimal experiment and contract when state and effort are actually substitutes. I
show that partial obfuscating is still possible, but in a different way: good news is now
fully-revealing, but not bad news. Last, I look at whether potential transparency policies
that require some kind of minimum informativeness of the experiment could improve
or harm social welfare. I show that more transparency can be welfare-decreasing and we
should be cautious before implementing policies that force more transparent or informative
experiments.
This chapter contributes to both the moral hazard literature (Mirrlees, 1976, 1999;
Holmstro¨m, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Rogerson, 1985) and the information design
literature (Aumann and Maschler, 1995; Rayo and Segal, 2010; Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011; Alonso and Caˆmara, 2016; Bergemann and Morris, 2016). This chapter aims to
combine both streams of literature by considering a framework where a principal can
induce an agent to exert unobservable effort by providing both pecuniary incentives and
information about the effectiveness of effort at the same time.
Cre´mer and Khalil (1992) study a principal-agent adverse-selection model where the
agent can gather information with cost about the state before deciding whether to accept
an offer. They show the principal will offer contracts that leave the agent no incentive to
gather its own information.
Boleslavsky and Kim (2018) consider a model where there are three players, a sender
who decides on the public experiment, an agent who chooses the distribution of the state
through her effort, and a receiver of the experiment. They provide a method to solve
the optimal signal under the environment where an experiment will also affect the effort
provision of the agent. Rodina (2017) studies how different information structures affect
the agent’s incentive to exert efforts due to career-concerns. Rodina and Farragut (2016)
build a model where a principal can design a signal about an agent’s productivity to
encourage the agent to make useful investments. Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) builds a
model where schools may choose less informative grading schemes for better placement of
their students.
This chapter is different from those papers above in the sense that it allows the principal
to provide not only information but also formal contracts that offer pecuniary incentives.
In many environments where principal-agent relationships are formal and institutionalized,
such as firms and public organisations, it is feasible for the principal to provide both formal
contracts relating agent’s payment to its performance, and also design a public experiment
such as some internal information disclosure rule, auditing system, or interview process.
Also, this chapter highlights how factors including the level of complementarity between
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information and effort affect the experiment chosen by the principal.
Pre´vet (2018) considers a model with a similar setting to this chapter, where a principal
chooses to design an informational disclosure system before offering the agent a contract,
and the agent faces limited liability constraints. 5 However, different from Pre´vet (2018),
this chapter focuses on how different degrees of complementarity/substitutability deter-
mines the optimal experiment and optimal contract. This feature allows us to generate
predictions on how the level of complementarity between effort and state can be importan-
t in determining both experiments and contract forms, and also the correlation between
them. Due to its specific assumption about the productivity of the agent under different
effort levels, the output generating process in Pre´vet (2018) can be thought as a specific
case of this chapter where state and effort are log-supermodular. 6 Also, in our model, the
constrained social optimal experiment can either require more informative or less infor-
mative than the equilibrium experiment, while in Pre´vet (2018) the social optimal signal
is generally more ‘vague’ than the equilibrium signal.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 2 describes the basic settings and
assumptions of the baseline model. Section 3 briefly discusses how we will solve the model
and introduce some simplifying notations. Section 4 solves the optimal contract given any
realization of the experiment. Section 5 solves the optimal experiment. Section 6 conducts
comparative static analysis. Section 7 considers some extensions of our baseline model.
All the formal proofs are in the Appendix.
3.2 Model Setting
3.2.1 Players, Payoffs, and Actions
There are two players, a principal (P) and an agent (A). The principal can generate some
output, y, with the help of the agent. The agent can exert some unobservable effort, e,
e P t0, 1u. The principal can provide a contract twpyqu, w P r0, 8q, that pays the agent
depending on the realization of output. The outside options of both players should the
agent reject the contract are normalized to 0.
The output y has two levels, yL and yH . Assume that 0   yL   yH . The distribution
5One important difference is that in Pre´vet (2018), the author consider a model with continuous state
space. Due to the continuous state space, the author introduces an upper bound on the amount (‘the
Budget’) that the principal can award to the agent. This is irrelevant to this chapter. This chapter works
on a binary state space but allows a more general output generating process ppe, θq. The main results of
this chapter look into how properties of ppe, θq will determine the optimal experiment and the optimal
contract.
6In Pre´vet (2018), the author assumes the productivity of the agent if he choose not to exert effort to
be p0, which is constant over the state of world. The agent’s productivity of exerting high effort, p, is a
random variable with support

p, p¯

. In our model, this can be roughly translated as log-supermodularity
between effort and state: for θ ¡ θ1, pp1, θ1qpp0, θq  pp1, θqpp0, θ1q  pp1, θ1qp0  pp1, θqp0 ¡ 0. Therefore,
in this sense Prevet (2018)’s conclusion about the optimal experiment is a specific case of this paper when
state and effort are complementary enough. However, to make a rigorous comparison, a possible future
extension would be to look at cases with compact state spaces.
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of output is affected by the effort of the agent, e, and a state variable, θ, θ P tG,Bu:
ppe, θq  Probpy  yH |e, θq. The prior probability that θ  G, µ0  Probpθ  Gq, is
common knowledge and µ0 P p0, 1q.
We assume that ppe, θq has the following properties:
• pp1, θq ¡ pp0, θq
• ppe,Gq ¡ ppe,Bq
• pp1, Gq  pp0, Gq ¡ pp1, Bq  pp0, Bq
Those assumptions just mean that: 1) higher effort increases the probability of high
outcome; 2) better state increases the probability of high outcome; 3) higher effort and
better state are complementary.
Denote the payoff function of the principal as V pe, θ, y, wq and the payoff function of the
agent as Upe, θ, y, wq. Assume both principal and agent are risk-neutral: V pe, θ, y, wq 
y  w and Upe, θ, y, wq  w  cpeq. cp0q  0 and cp1q  c ¡ 0. Assume that there is
limited liability for the agent: wH , wL ¥ w, and without loss of generality we will just
assume w  0.
Besides offering a contract, the principal can also costlessly design a direct public
experiment, tpips|θqusPtG,Bu. 7 The only restriction on tpips|θqu is Bayesian Plausibility:
expected posterior generated by any experiment must equal to its prior.
3.2.2 Timeline
Period 1:
θ realized
and
unobservable
for
both players
Period 2:
P
publicly
chooses
tpips|θqu
Period 3:
signal
realization
s is
generated
and observed
by
both players
Period 4:
P offers
a contract
twH , wLu
Period 5:
if accepted,
A chooses
effort e
Period 6:
output
realized
and
wage
paid
The timeline of the baseline model is as follows: 8
Period 1: state θ is realized but unobservable to both players.
Period 2: the principal publicly chooses a direct experiment tpips|θqu, s P tG,Bu.
Period 3: the realization of the experiment, s, is generated according to tpips|θqu and
the realization of θ. s is publicly observable to both players.
7Direct experiment here means the signal space, S, equals to the state space, Θ. Any other signal space
S that |S|  |Θ| would not change anything. Also, in later part of this chapter, I show that it is without
loss of generality to focus on signal space S such that |S|  |Θ|.
8Whether θ is determined before the principal designs the experiment is inconsequential, as long as θ
is not revealed to the Principal and the Agent.
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Period 4: the principal offers a contract twH , wLu to the agent. If the agent rejects
the contract, the game ends and both players get an outside payoff of 0.
Period 5: if the contract is accepted, the agent chooses effort e that is unobservable to
the Principal.
Period 6: output is realized and wage is paid to the agent according to the previously
agreed contract.
3.2.3 Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept used in this chapter is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
similar to Tirole and Fudenberg (1991). Intuitively, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is need-
ed here for its “no-signalling-what-you-don’t-know” property as in Tirole and Fudenberg
(1991). In this chapter, in equilibrium, the optimal contract is generally unique, while the
potential contract space is rich (R 2) and off-equilibrium contract space is thus also rich.
For weak PBE, There is no restriction on off-equilibrium beliefs. Therefore, the posterior
belief of the agent about the state being good when observing an off-equilibrium contract
being offer can be any number between 0 and 1.
However, this does not seem to be reasonable: in this model, the principal does not
have any private information, and his action should not bring any additional information
to the agent about the state being good or bad. Therefore, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
would be a more appropriate equilibrium concept here: because the principal does not have
additional information about the state, the agent’s belief should be the same when facing
any contract offered by the principal, no matter whether this contract is in equilibrium
path or off equilibrium path.
To formally define Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in this game, we need to first formally
define the Game. The formal definitions of the Game can be founded in the Appendix.
Following the traditions of the game theory literature, we will define a fictional player
called ’Nature’ (N). Nature is the player who chooses the realization of θ, realization of the
experiment, s, and the realization of output level. Nature has no payoff function. θ will
be nature’s private information and the principal’s action will not signal any information
about nature.
The Bayesian Game is roughly defined as follows:
Period 0: Nature chooses the realization of θ from the prior distribution ∆pΘq. Nature
privately observes θ. ∆pΘq is common knowledge.
Period 1: the principal publicly chooses a direct experiment tpips|θqu, s P tG,Bu.
Period 2: Nature randomly reports the state, according to the design of the experiment,
Probps  G|θq  pips|θq. s is publicly observable to both players.
Period 3: the principal offers a contract twH , wLu to the agent. If the agent rejects
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the contract, the game ends and both players get an outside payoff of 0.
Period 4: if the contract is accepted, the agents choose effort e that is unobservable to
the Principal.
Period 5: Nature chooses the output level, y, according to the output generating
process ppe, θq, the state θ, and the effort e. Wage is paid to the agent according to the
previously agreed contract and output level y.
Denote player i’s strategy as σi, his action at period t as ait, and his belief as µi.
Denote the continuation strategy of player i after history ht as σiphtq, and the continuation
strategies of all the other players after history ht as σiphtq. Denote the tuple of all players’
strategies and beliefs as pσ, µq.
Definition 3.1. For any pσ, µq, µ is reasonable if: 9
• µ is decided by σ according to Bayes’ Rule whenever possible;
• For any player j, j  i, its belief about player i at history ht, µjpθi|θj , htq, only
depends on previous history and player i’s action at period t, ait.
Definition 3.2. Any pσ, µq is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if:
• µ is reasonable given that σ;
• Given any history of the game ht, any non-nature player’s continuation strategy
σiphtq is optimal given µ and all the other players’ continuation strategies, σiphtq.
Given this equilibrium concept, our previous concern is solved: given any contract
the principal offers, the agent’s belief about the state being good is the same. Because
the state is Nature’s private information, the principal should not signal what he doesn’t
know. Therefore, given any contract the principal may offer, the agent’s belief about the
state remains the same.
3.2.4 Tie-breaking Rules
First, I assume that when the principal is indifferent between implementing high effort or
not, it will choose to implement high effort with probability 1.
Second, I assume that when the agent is indifferent between exerting high effort or low
effort, it will exert high effort with probability 1. I also assume that when the agent is
indifferent between accepting the principal’s contract or not, it will choose to accept the
principal’s contract with probability 1. Similar to Kamenica and Gentzkow(2011), I am
looking at the sender-optimal Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
9There is only private information for Nature and thus the requirement that posterior beliefs being
independent in Tirole and Fudenberg (1991) is not needed here.
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3.3 Solving the Model
The baseline model can be solved in two steps by backward induction: first, given the
experiment and realization of signal, we can solve the optimal contract the principal will
set; then, we can solve the optimal experiment.
Because here an experiment only affects both sides’ pay-offs through the posteriors
induced, we can just look at the distribution of posteriors instead of the experiment itself.
10 From now on, we will just look at the distribution of posteriors tτs, µsusPtG,Bu, in which
τs  Probpµ  µsq.
For notation simplicity, define the following notations:
• µs  Probpθ  G|sq
• ∆ppθq  pp1, θq  pp0, θq
• ∆∆p  ppp1, Gq  pp0, Gqq  ppp1, Bq  pp0, Bqq
• Eµppeq  pµqppe,Gq   p1 µqppe,Bq
• Eµ∆p  pµq∆ppGq   p1 µq∆ppBq
3.4 Optimal Contract
Given any posterior µs, the general optimal contract problem is as follows:
max
twH ,wL,eu
EµsppeqpyH  wHq   p1 EµsppeqqpyL  wLq
s.t.
EµsppeqwH   p1 EµsppeqqwL  cpeq ¥ 0 (IR)
e P argmax
e1
Eµsppe
1qwH   p1 Eµsppe1qqwL  cpe1q (IC)
wH , wL ¥ 0 (LLC)
We will use the standard approach of Grossman and Hart (1983) to solve this optimal
contract problem. Given any effort the principal would like to implement, we will first
solve the optimal contract that implements that effort level. Then we will compare the
values the principal can get under different effort levels, V pe  1, µq and V pe  0, µq.
Afterwards, we can solve the value function, V pµq  max tV pe  1, µq, V pe  0, µqu, and
also the optimal contract that implements it.
Given any posterior about the state, µ, if the Principal wants to implement high effort,
10See Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) for more details.
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Figure 3.1: High Performance Compensation decreases if state is more likely to be good
then its optimal contract problem is:
max
wH ,wL
Eµppe  1qpyH  wHq   p1 Eµppe  1qqpyL  wLq
s.t.
Eµppe  1qwH   p1 Eµppe  1qqwL  c ¥ 0 (IR)
Eµppe  1qwH   p1 Eµppe  1qqwL  c ¥ Eµppe  0qwH   p1 Eµppe  0qqwL (IC)
wH , wL ¥ 0 (LLC)
Under the optimal contract, only the Incentive Compatibility Constraint and the Lim-
ited liability Constraint of the low output case are binding. 11 Therefore, his optimal
contract under this case would be wHpe  1q  cEµ∆p , w

Lpe  1q  0.
What is important to our further analysis is that wHpe  1q is decreasing over µ. If the
state is more likely to be good, Eµ∆p is higher, which means that effort is more likely to
be effective. This will reduce the level of compensation needed for the agent to be willing
to exert effort.
Given any posterior about the state, µ, if the Principal wants to implement low effort,
11The Incentive Compatibility Constraint (IC) with the Limited Liability Constraints (LLC) together
imply that the Individual Rationality Constraint is slack. Then if either IC constraint or LLC constraint
of the low type is slack, the contract would never be optimal.
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then its optimal contract problem is:
max
wH ,wL
Eµppe  0qpyH  wHq   p1 Eµppe  0qqpyL  wLq
s.t.
Eµppe  0qwH   p1 Eµppe  0qqwL ¥ 0 (IR)
Eµppe  0qwH   p1 Eµppe  0qqwL ¥ Eµppe  1qwH   p1 Eµppe  1qqwL  c (IC)
wH , wL ¥ 0 (LLC)
The optimal contract if the Principal hopes to implement low effort is wHpe  0q 
wLpe  0q  0. By providing a constant wage of zero, the Principal implements low effort
in the least costly way.12
Lemma 3.1.
The optimal contract if the Principal would like to implement low effort is wHpe 
0q  wLpe  0q  0. The value of him implementing low effort is V pe  0, µq 
Eµppe  0q pyH  yLq   yL.
The optimal contract if the Principal would like to implement high effort is wHpe 
1q  cEµ∆p , w

Lpe  1q  0. The value of him implementing high effort is V pe 
1, µq  Eµppe  1q

yH  yL 
c
Eµ∆p
	
  yL.
The optimal value of the principal is V pµq  max tV pe  0, µq, V pe  1, µqu.
Before we solve the optimal experiment, we need to first establish some properties of
the value functions mentioned above.
We will first look at how the values of implementing low and high effort levels change
when µ changes.
Lemma 3.2.
• V pe  0, µq is linearly increasing in µ.
• V pe  1, µq is:
– If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq  pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then V pe  1, µq is linearly increasing in µ.
– If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then V pe  1, µq is increasing and strictly
concave in µ.
– If If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq   pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then V pe  1, µq is strictly convex in µ.
Moreover,
∗ If yH  yL ¥  crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqsppp1,Gqpp1,BqqpEµ∆pq2 |µ0, then V pe  1, µq is increasing
in µ;
12Because of the LLC constraints, IR constraint is slack. IC constraint is violated only when the difference
between wH and wL are too big. Last, it is optimal to set both LLC constraints to be binding, and this
would not violate IC constraint.
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Figure 3.2: V pe  1, µq concave: pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq
Figure 3.3: V pe  1, µq linear: pp1, Gqpp0, Bq  pp1, Bqpp0, Gq
∗ If yH  yL ¤  crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqsppp1,Gqpp1,BqqpEµ∆pq2 |µ1, then V pe  1, µq is decreasing
in µ;
∗ If  crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqsppp1,Gqpp1,BqqpEµ∆pq2 |µ1   yHyL   
crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqs
ppp1,Gqpp1,BqqpEµ∆pq2 |µ0
,
then V pe  1, µq is first decreasing and then increasing in µ.
• V pe  1, µq ¥ V pe  0, µq iff yH  yL ¥ cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 .
• V pµq is increasing in µ.
Lemma 3.2 shows that the log-supermodularity of ppe, θq will have important implica-
tions on the monotonicity and concavity/convexity of the V pe  1, µq, the value for the
Principal to implement high effort. By the definition of log-supermodularity, ppe, θq is
log-supermodular if and only if pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq.
As long as pp0, Bq ¡ 0, pp1, Gqpp0, Bq  pp1, Bqpp0, Gq ¡ 0 is equivalent to pp1,Gqpp0,Gq ¡
pp1,Bq
pp0,Bq , which means that being in a good state would make high effort exponentially more
effective. Notice that this condition is stronger than our assumption that higher state
being complementary to higher effort: pp1,Gqpp0,Gq ¡
pp1,Bq
pp0,Bq is equivalent to
pp1,Gqpp0,Gq
pp1,Bqpp0,Bq ¡
pp0,Gq
pp0,Bq ,
which is stricter than pp1,Gqpp0,Gqpp1,Bqpp0,Bq ¡ 1.
I find that the value of implementing high effort, V pe  1, µq can be decreasing over
µ: better news can sometimes reduce the value of implementing high effort. The intuition
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(a) V pe  1, µq increasing (b) V pe  1, µq decreasing
(c) V pe  1, µq first decreasing and then increas-
ing
Figure 3.4: V pe  1, µq convex: pp1, Gqpp0, Bq   pp1, Bqpp0, Gq,different scenarios
is as follows: when µ increases, Eµppe  1q, the effect of higher effort increases, but
Eµppe  0q also increases. Eµ∆p  Eµppe  1qEµppe  0q still increases over µ, but the
growth rate can be low if Eµppe  0q grows very fast. Eµ∆p is important in determining
the agency cost, and when it increases slowly over µ, this means the agency cost is not
very responsive to the change of information. All else equal, Eµ∆p increases faster if there
is stronger complementary between state and effort.
The total cost of implement high effort, cEµppe1qEµ∆p is composed of two parts, Eµppe  1q,
the frequency of good outcome, and cEµ∆p , the cost to incentive worker or the agency cost.
When µ increases, a good outcome is more likely to happen and therefore compensation
is more likely to happen. At the same time, cEµ∆p will decrease as µ increases. Therefore,
whether the total cost increases or decreases will depends on which force is dominating.
If cEµ∆p decreases very slowly, which happens when the complementary between state and
effort is low, the total cost will go up if µ increases. And this could lead to the value of
implementing the high effort to decrease when µ decreases, if the value of high effort is
relatively small compared to the cost of implementing it.
Although V pe  1, µq can be non-monotonic over µ, V pµq is always increasing over
µ. This is because that first of all, V pe  0, µq is increasing over µ; second, whenever
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V pe  1, µq is decreasing over µ, it is strictly smaller than V pe  0, µq. 13 Therefore, we
can focus on the ranges of V pe  1, µq that is increasing in µ.
I also find that V pe  1, µq is concave if ppe, θq is log-supermodular and convex if
ppe, θq is log-submodular. The total expected revenue from implementing high effort,
EµpyH  yLq, is linear in µ. The total expected cost cEµppe1qEµ∆p equals to Eµppe  1q times
c
Eµ∆p . Eµppe  1q is also linear in µ while
c
Eµ∆p is convex in µ. For the total cost to be
convex and thus the value function to be concave, cEµ∆p ’s second-order derivative has to
be large enough compared to its first-order derivative, which is equivalent to high enough
complemenrtarity in our model.
Now we can characterize how many intersections points V pe  0, µq and V pe  1, µq
can possibly have.
Lemma 3.3. • If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq  pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then V pe  1, µq either has no
intersection with V pe  0, µq, or cross V pe  0, µq from below for once.
• If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then V pe  1, µq either has no intersection with
V pe  0, µq, or cross V pe  0, µq from below for once.
• If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq   pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then V pe  1, µq can either has no intersection
with V pe  0, µq, cross V pe  0, µq from below or above for once, or cross V pe  0, µq
first from below and then from above.
There are multiple cases that could happen when V pe  1, µq is convex. However,
under those different cases the implied optimal experiment turns out to be the same. We
will show in the next section why it is the case. Formal results about some properties of
V pe  1, µq when it is convex can be found in the appendix.
What really matters is that when V pe  1, µq is concave, it can only cross V pe  0, µq
for at most once and it must cross V pe  0, µq from below. V pe  1, µq is higher than
V pe  0, µq if the expected benefit of switching from low effort to high effort, Eµ∆ppyH 
yLq, is higher than the expected cost Eµppe  1q cEµ∆p . When state and effort are highly
complementary, if µ increases, Eµ∆p would grow in fast speed and hence the ratio of
benefit/cost would also be increasing.
Now we can characterize the value function of the Principal when the V pe  1, µq is
weakly concave, which happens when pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¥ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq :
Proposition 3.1. If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¥ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then V pe  1, µq is strictly increas-
ing and weakly concave. Moreover,
• if yH  yL ¤ cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 |µ1, V pµq  V pe  0, µq.
13This is because that V pe  1, µq is decreasing over µ only if yH  yL  cEµ∆p   0. However, then
V pe  1, µq  Eµppe  1q

yH  yL 
c
Eµ∆p
	
 yL   Eµppe  0q

yH  yL 
c
Eµ∆p
	
 yL   yL   Eµppe 
0q pyH  yLq   yL  V pe  0, µq.
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• if yH  yL ¥ cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 µ0, V pµq  V pe  1, µq.
• if cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 |µ1   yHyL  
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2 µ0
, then there exist a µ¯ P p0, 1q that yHyL 
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2 µµ¯
, and V pµq  V pe  0, µq if µ ¤ µ¯ and V pµq  V pe  1, µq if µ ¡ µ¯.
(a) Always implement low effort (b) Always implement high effort
(c) High effort if and only if good state is likely
Figure 3.5: V pµq  max tV pe  1, µq, V pe  0, µqu, when V pe  1, µq is concave: different
scenarios
3.5 Optimal Experiment
We have solved the optimal contract that the principal would provide given any posterior µ,
and his value from offering this optimal contract. Now we can solve the optimal experiment
by solving the optimal distribution of posteriors that can be generated by some experiment.
The optimal experiment problem:
max
µG,µB ,τ
τV pµGq   p1 τqV pµBq
s.t.
0 ¤ µG, µB, τ ¤ 1
τµG   p1 τqµB  µ0
First, some definitions about the informativeness/precision of an experiment:
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Definition 3.3.
• An experiment is partial obfuscating if there exist posteriors µs, µt, and Probpµsq ¡
0, Probpµtq ¡ 0, such that
– µs P p0, 1q
– µt  µs
• An experiment provides no information if for any posteriors µs, µt, such that
Probpµsq ¡ 0, Probpµsq ¡ 0, µs  µt  µ0
• An experiment is fully revealing if for any posterior µs such that Probpµsq ¡ 0,
Probpµsq must be either 0 or 1.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) showed that the optimal experiment is fully revealing
if the value function of the sender is globally strictly convex and the optimal experiment
is providing no information if sender’s value function is globally strictly concave.
Lemma 3.4. • If yH  yL ¤ minµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 , V pµq  V pe  0, µq, then any
experiment would be weakly optimal.
• If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¤ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq and yH  yL ¡ minµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 , then any opti-
mal experiment must be fully revealing.
• If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq and yH  yL ¥ cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 µ0, then any optimal
experiment must provide no information.
Because the maximum of two convex functions must be a convex function, when V pe 
1, µq is convex then fully revealing must be weakly optimal for the Principal.
This lemma leaves only one case: pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, and cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 |µ1
 
yH  yL  
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2 µ0
. From previous lemmas, this means that V pe  1, µq crosses
V pe  0, µq at some µ¯ P p0, 1q from below.
Again, following Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), to solve the optimal experiment, we
just need to find the convex hull of the graph pµ, V pµqq.
Proposition 3.2. Assume that yH  yL ¡ minµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 , then:
1. If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¤ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then the optimal distribution of posteriors is
tτpµGq  µ0, τpµBq  1 µ0, µB  0, µG  1u, and the probability high effort is imple-
mented is
Probpe  1q  1pV pe  1, µ  1q ¥ V pe  0, µ  1qqµ0
 1pV pe  1, µ  0q ¥ V pe  0, µ  0qqp1 µ0q
The optimal value of the principal is V˜ pµ0q  µ0V pµ  1q   p1 µ0qV pµ  0q.
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2. If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, and yH  yL ¥ cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 µ0
, then the optimal
distribution of posteriors is tτpµGq P r0, 1s , τpµBq  1 τpµGq, µB  µG  µ0u.
Probpe  1q  1
The optimal value of the principal is V˜ pµ0q  V pµ0q.
3. If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq and cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 |µ1
  yHyL  
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2 µ0
, then
there exist µ˜ P r0, 1s, such that µ˜ P argmaxµ
V pe1,µqV pe0,0q
µ0 , and the optimal distribution
of posterior is as follows:
tτ, µu 
$&
%
!
τpµGq 
µ0
µ˜ , τpµBq  1 τpµGq, µB  0, µG  µ˜
)
, if µ0 ¤ µ˜
tτpµGq P r0, 1s , τpµBq  1 τpµGq, µB  µG  µ0u , if µ0 ¡ µ˜
µ˜  min
 
µ˜I , 1
(
, in which µ˜I is solved by
ppp1, Bq  pp0, BqqpyH  yLq  

cEµppe1q
Eµ∆p  
cppp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqq
pEµ∆pq2
	
|µµ˜I
 0.
Probpe  1q  min
!
µ0
µ˜ , 1
)
.
The optimal value of the principal,
V˜ pµ0q  1pµ0 ¤ µ˜q
!
V pe  0, µ  0q   V pe1,µ˜qV pe0,µ0qµ0 pµ0  0q
)
  1pµ0 ¡ µ˜qV pe  1, µ0q.
(a) Partial Obfuscation (b) Fully Revealing
Figure 3.6: Optimal Experiment when V pe  1, µq is concave
When V pe  1, µq is concave, if the principal would like to, or is forced to implement
high effort, then his optimal experiment will reveal no information. Similarly, because
V pe  0, µq is weakly concave, revealing no information is also weakly optimal if the
principal chooses to always implement low effort. However, if the effort he would like to
prefer depends on the state, an optimal experiment could actually be fully revealing or
partial obfuscation, even when both V pe  1, µq and V pe  0, µq are concave.
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3.6 Comparative Static Analysis
We can now look at how various variables of interest are affected by parameters in the
model.
Variables that may be of interest:
• µG and µB, posteriors under different signal realization and ‘quality of information’
14
• The probability of agent exerting high effort, Probpe  1q
And parameters in the model: yL, yH  yL, c, µ0, ppe, θq.
There are multiple ways we can look at how the change of ppe, θq affects variable affect
variables of interest. One way could be looking at keeping other cases the same, how a
change of ppe, θq at a particular pe, θq can affect the variables of interest.
A more interesting way could be looking at what happens if the production process
becomes ‘noisier’. Here we will look at an incomplete order that one production technology
is ’noisier than’ another production technology, with the following definition:
Definition 3.4. A production function tp˜pe, θqupe,θqPtp0,0q,p1,0q,p0,1q,p1,1qu is noisier than an-
other tppe, θqupe,θqPtp0,0q,p1,0q,p0,1q,p1,1qu if p˜pe, θq  appe, θq p1bqp1ppe, θqq, 12   a, b   1.
This incomplete order, noisier than, is defined similarly as the classical concept of
Blackwell informativeness: the likelihood function of the more noisy production function
can be written as a linear transformation of the less noisy production function.
Given our assumptions, the order of tppe, θqupe,θqPtp0,0q,p1,0q,p0,1q,p1,1qu is preserved by
tp˜pe, θqupe,θqPtp0,0q,p1,0q,p0,1q,p1,1qu: p˜pe, θq   p˜pe1, θ1q iff ppe, θq   ppe1, θ1q. However, being
noisier means the production function is less response to the change of pe, θq and reflects
more about randomness: for any pe, θq and pe1, θ1q, |p˜pe, θq p˜pe1, θ1q|  pa b1q|ppe, θq
ppe1, θ1q|   |ppe, θq  ppe1, θ1q|.
Proposition 3.3. If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq and cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 |µ1
  yH  yL  
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2 µ0
, then under the optimal experiment,
• µG is weakly decreasing in yH  yL
• µG is weakly increasing in c
• µG is weakly higher if the production process becomes noisier.
• Probpe  1q is weakly increasing in µ0
14Formally, we can define the quality of information as reduction of uncertainty using measures like
information entropy. However, notice that in our model, besides the case that any experiment is weakly
optimal, in general under optimal experiment µB  0. Therefore, we can just focus on the changes of µG
instead.
107
• Probpe  1q is weakly increasing in yH  yL
• Probpe  1q is weakly decreasing in c
• Probpe  1q is weakly lower if the production process becomes noisier.
From previous results, when would information quality be the highest? Information
quality would be the highest first when complementarity between information and effort
is weak, i.e., when pp1,Gqpp0,Gq ¤
pp1,Bq
pp0,Bq . When complementarity between information and
effort is strong, i.e., when pp1,Gqpp0,Gq ¡
pp1,Bq
pp0,Bq , information quality would be higher when the
benefit/cost ratio of effort is small, and the production process is noisier.
Especially, partial obfuscation happens when information is important, the benefit/cost
ratio of effort is intermediately and the production process is intermediately noisier, and
the prior probability of a state being good is not very high.
3.7 Extensions
3.7.1 More General Signal Space
I assumed before that the signal space S equals to the state space Θ. This assumption
turns out to be innocuous. In this part, I will always assume that |S| ¥ |Θ|.
First, it is obvious that as long as |S|  |Θ|, it does not matter whether S  Θ or not.
We can always find a one-to-one relationship between elements of S and elements of Θ
and changing the signal space from S to Θ is merely relabelling.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show in their online appendix that in their model,
they can restrict the state space to |S|  min t|Θ|, |A|u without any loss of generality.
Different from Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), in our model, it is not enough to require
|S| ¥ |A|. This is due to the fact that the principal would first offer a contract before
the agent chooses its action, and can always implement high or low effort if it wants to.
The value of offering a contract for the Principal would thus depend on the probability
distribution of outcomes and the compensation needed, which are both functions of the
distribution of the state. Therefore, the value of offering a contract for the Principal is a
function of the distribution of Θ but not the action. However, there proof on why |S|  |Θ|
is sufficient 15 can still be directly applied to our case so we will not provide a proof here.
3.7.2 Timing of Offering Contract
I assumed that the principal first designs the experiment and then offers a contract after
observing the realization of the experiment. Would it be different if the principal can
already offer a contract before the result of the experiment is realized ?16
15See Proposition 4 of their online appendix, “Bayesian Persuasion Web Appendix”.
16I assume here that there is no contract incompleteness and when the principal writes down a contract,
the terms of that contract can depend on all observable variables.
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The answer is no. The intuition is: regardless of the timing of offering contract in this
model, there is no information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. There-
fore, offering a contract after the experiment has realized will not give the principal any
additional information advantage over the agent. After the experiment outcome is real-
ized, the principal just chooses the optimal contract only based on the public information
generated by the experiment.
If the principal chooses a contract before an experiment is realized, he could make
the terms of the contract completely depending on the realization of the signal. Under
each realization, he will always choose the ex-post optimal contract, based on all available
information conditional on that realization of the signal. Given that he already chooses
the ex-post optimal contract for each scenario ex-ante, even if we allow renegotiation, the
result would be completely the same.
If the principal chooses the contract before the realization of signal, the contract he
can offer is in general in the form of twHpsq, wLpsqusPtG,Bu. Then given any experiment
tµG, µB, τu, the optimal contract problem is thus:
max
twHpsq,wLpsq,epsqusPtG,Bu
τ rEµGppepGqqpyH  wHpGqq   p1 EµGppepGqqqpyL  wLpGqqs
  p1 τq rEµBppepBqqpyH  wHpBqq   p1 EµBppepBqqqpyL  wLpBqqs
s.t.
EµsppepsqqwHpsq   p1 EµsppepsqqqwLpsq  cpepsqq ¥ 0, s  G,B
epsq P argmax
e
EµsppeqwHpsq   p1 EµsppeqqwLpsq  cpeq, s  G,B
wHpsq, wLpsq ¥ 0, s  G,B
Given any distribution of posterior generated by the experiment, µG, µB, τ , the terms
of the contract if the experiment outcome is ’Good’, twHpGq, wLpGq, epGqu, will have no
effect on the principal’s payoff function and the constraints when s  B (and vice versa).
Therefore, we could solve two cases separately. However, the results would then be exactly
the same as the case that the principal chooses the optimal contract only after s is realized.
Another interesting question is whether the order between writing a contract and
designing an experiment matters.17 The answer is no. That is simply because for a
function fpx, yq, if maxpx,yq fpx, yq ,maxy fpx, yq for any x, and maxx fpx, yq for any y all
exists, then maxpx,yq fpx, yq  maxx maxy fpx, yq  maxy maxx fpx, yq.
In summary, the results of this chapter are robust to the timing of the Principal offering
contract and designing experiment.
17Again, this is based on the assumption that experiment outcome is contractible.
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3.7.3 Good State Being Substitute to High Effort
I have assumed that good state is complementary with high effort, i.e., that pp1, Gq 
pp0, Gq ¡ pp1, Bq  pp0, Bq. What if good state is actually substitute to high effort, i.e.,
that pp1, Gq  pp0, Gq   pp1, Bq  pp0, Bq? 18
In this session, we will assume that a good state is actually a substitute for a high
effort, while everything else is the same. 19
First, given any distribution, the optimal way to implement low effort is still wL 
wH  0. The principal’s value of implementing low effort is V pe  0, µq  Eµppe 
0q pyH  yLq   yL.
To implement high effort, the optimal contract is still wHpe  1q  cEµ∆p , w

Lpe 
1q  0. What is different here is that now wHpe  1q will increase with µ. The principal’s
value of implementing high effort is V pe  1, µq  Eµppe  1q

yH  yL 
c
Eµ∆p
	
  yL.
We can then show that V pe  0, µq is increasing and linear in µ.
V pe  1, µq can be increasing or decreasing in µ and is always concave in µ. Also,
yHyL
c 
Eµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2 is decreasing over µ, so V pe  1, µq either has no intersection with
V pe  0q, or crosses V pe  0, µq from above for at most once.
We can now establish the optimal experiment when good state and high effort are
substitutes:
Corollary 3.1. • If yHyLc ¤ Eµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 |µ0, then V pµq  V pe  0, µq for any µ, and
any experiment would be weakly optimal.
• If yHyLc ¥ Eµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 |µ1„ then V pµq  V pe  1, µq for any µ, and any optimal ex-
periment must provide no additional information compared to the prior distribution.
• If Eµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 |µ0  
yHyL
c  
Eµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2 |µ1, then there exist
˜˜µ P r0, 1s, such that ˜˜µ P
argmaxµ
V pe1,µqV pe0,µ1q
1µ , and the optimal distribution of posterior is as follows:
tτ, µu 
$&
%
!
τpµGq  1 τpµBq, τpµBq  1µ01µ˜ , µB  ˜˜µ, µG  1
)
, if µ0 ¥ ˜˜µ
tτpµGq  1 τpµBq, τpµBq P r0, 1s , µB  µG  µ0u , if µ0   ˜˜µ
Probpe  1q  min
!
1µ0
1µ˜ , 1
)
.
The optimal value of the principal,
V˜ pµ0q  1pµ0 ¥ ˜˜µq
!
V pe  0, µ  1q   V pe1,µ˜qV pe0,µ1q1µ p1 µ0q
)
  1pµ0   ˜˜µqV pe  1, µ0q.
18If pp1, Gq  pp0, Gq  pp1, Bq  pp0, Bq, i.e., that state and effort are independent, then the result is
trivial: either any experiment is weakly optimal, or the optimal experiment is fully revealing.
19For example, I still assume that: 1) higher effort increases the probability of high outcome; 2) better
state increases the probability of a high outcome.
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Figure 3.7: Optimal Experiment When State and Effort are Substitutes: an Example
Figure 3.7 provides an example that if state and effort are substitutes, the optimal
experiment can also lead to partial obfuscation. The difference is that now a good signal
is fully revealing, while when effort and state are complementary, a bad signal is fully
revealing. This corollary provides us with a necessary condition to judge the complemen-
tarity between effort and state in this environment: when we find the principal designs a
partially obfuscating experiment, then we can determine the level of complementarity by
looking which signal is fully revealing. If the good signal is fully revealing then the effort
and state must be substitutes; if the bad signal is fully revealing, then effort and state
must be complementary (actually highly complementary).
3.7.4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we will look at how individual-rational information disclosure and effort
provision are different from social optimal levels. We will consider utilitarian social welfare
function. The social welfare function, W is defined as the expected sum of the Principal
and agent’s welfare:
W  EθEeEy|θ,e tV pe, θ, y, wq   Upe, θ, y, wqu  EθEeEy|θ,e ty  w   w  cpequ
 EθEeEy|θ,e ty  cpequ  EθEe tyL   Probpy  yH |θ, eqpyH  yLq  cpequ
 yL   EθEe tppθ, eqpyH  yLq  cpequ
The social welfare maximizing level of effort is simple:
eOpθq P max
tepθquθPtG,Bu
tyL   EθEe tppθ, eqpyH  yLq  cpequu
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eOpθq 
$&
%1, if ∆ppθqpyH  yLq ¥ c0, if ∆ppθqpyH  yLq   c
It is socially optimal to implement effort as long as the expected social gain from high
effort is higher than its cost, i.e., that ∆ppθqpyH  yLq ¡ c. Also, because a wage is purely
a transfer between principal and agent, the only thing that matters for social welfare is
the probability of high effort being implemented in each state.
The Equilibrium social welfare:
WEq
 EθEµ|θEy|θ,epµ,twpy,µquqV pepµ, twpy, µquq, θ, y, wpy, µqq
  Upepµ, twpy, µquq, θ, y, wpy, µqq
 EθEµ|θEy|θ,epµ,twpy,µquq ty  wpy, µq   wpy, µq  cpepµ, twpy, µquqqu
 EθEµ|θEy|θ,epµ,twpy,µquq ty  cpepµ, twpy, µquqqu
 yL   EθEµ|θ tppθ, pepµ, twpy, µquqqpyH  yLq  cppepµ, twpy, µquqqu
There is efficiency loss from social optimal as long as the equilibrium probability of high
effort being implemented under each state is different from the social optimal probability
of high effort being implemented under each state, and the efficiency losses under different
states do not cancel out. There are three different cases:
Case I: ∆ppθqpyH  yLq ¥ c for both θ P tG,Bu. Then it is socially efficient to
always implement high effort. Therefore, unless Probpe  1q  ProbpeSO  1q  1,
there is under-provision of effort in equilibrium. From previous analysis, we know that
Probpe  1q  1 if and only if V pe  1, µq ¡ V pe  0, µq for both µ  0, 1, which is a
stricter condition than ∆ppθqpyH  yLq ¥ c due to agency friction.
Case II: ∆ppθ  GqpyH  yLq ¥ c ¥ ∆ppθ  BqpyH  yLq. It is thus socially optimal
to implement effort when the state is good but not when the state is bad. In this case,
in equilibrium, there could be either under-provision or over-provision of effort. There is
under-provision of effort if and only if V pe  1, µq   V pe  0, µq for both µ  0, 1, and
over-provision of effort if and only if V pe  1, µq is concave, V pe  1, µq ¡ V pe  0, µq for
µ  1, and µ˜   1. Therefore, there can be over-provision when: 1) effort and state are
complementary enough; 2)implementing high effort is privately beneficial when the state
is good but not when the state is bad; 3) the principal will choose partial obfuscation.
Case III: ∆ppθqpyH  yLq   c for both θ P tG,Bu. It is never efficient to implement
high effort. In this case high effort will never be implemented anyway, so there is no
efficiency loss.
A more interesting comparison would be between equilibrium experiments and con-
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strained social optimal experiments. Here constrained social optimal experiment means
the experiment(s) that maximizes the social welfare, taking as given that effort is un-
observable, and the principal and the agent optimally choose what contract to offer and
whether to accept the contract.
Hidden effort could be an inherent feature in this environment and it may be hard
to change this feature. However, information quality is different: the precision of the
public experiment is chosen by the principal, and regulations on the precision of the
experiment are feasible: for example, transparency requirements in government public
reports, disclosure rule that requires enough details in a financial report, or rules that
state the minimum precision. Comparing the constrained social optimal experiment and
the equilibrium experiment may thus provide us with policy implications over transparency
issues.
Definition 3.5. An experiment,
 
piCSOps|θq
(
sPtG,Bu, is called constrained socially optimal
experiment if 
piCSOps|θq
(
sPtG,Bu P argmaxtpips|θqusPtG,Bu
°
θ1PtG,Bu Probpθ  θ
1q
°
sPtG,Bu pi
SOps|θ1qWˆ psq.
Wˆ psq  yL   Eθ|sEe tppθ, epsqqpyH  yLq  cpequ, in which wHpsq, wLpsq, epsq are
defined as:
twHpsq, w

Lpsq, e
psqu P
max
twHpsq,wLpsq,epsqu
EµsppepsqqpyH  wHq   p1 EµsppepsqqqpyL  wLq
s.t.
EµsppepsqqwHpsq   p1 EµsppepsqqqwLpsq  cpepsqq ¥ 0
epsq P argmax
e
EµsppeqwHpsq   p1 EµsppeqqwLpsq  cpeq
wHpsq, wLpsq ¥ 0
twHpsq, w

Lpsq, e
psqu is exactly the optimal contract we solved in the previous section
of ‘Optimal Contract’(Section 4).
Now we will compare the effort levels under equilibrium and the constrained social
optimal. Denote the effort level of e under constrained social optimal as eCSO.
Proposition 3.4. If ∆ppθqpyH  yLq ¥ c for both θ P tG,Bu, then:
If yH  yL ¤ minµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 , then V pe  1, µq ¤ V pe  0, µq for any
µ P r0, 1s, and any experiment will be both constrained social optimal and indi-
vidually optimal for the principal, and in general ProbpeCSO  1q  Probpe 
1q  0. 20
20Due to our tie-breaking rule, in the case that yH  yL  minµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 , define µmin 
argminµPr0,1s
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2
, then ProbpeCSO  1q can be greater than 0 if the experiment put positive weights
on µmin. Otherwise ProbpeCSO  1q  0. Moreover, there is no strict social welfare gain to implement
high effort anyway.
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If yH  yL ¥ maxµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 , then V pe  1, µq ¥ V pe  0, µq for any µ P
r0, 1s, and any experiment will be constrained social optimal, and ProbpeCSO 
1q  Probpe  1q  1.
If yH  yL P

minµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 ,maxµPr0,1s
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2
	
, and pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¤
pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then ProbpeCSO  1q ¥ Probpe  1q.
If yH  yL P

minµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 ,maxµPr0,1s
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2
	
, and pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡
pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then ProbpeCSO  1q  min
!
µ0
µ¯ , 1
)
¥ Probpe  1q  min
!
µ0
µ˜ , 1
)
.
The constrained socially optimal experiment is:
 
τCSO, µCSO
(

$&
%
!
τpµBq  1 τpµGq, τpµGq  µ0µ¯ , µB  0, µG  µ¯
)
, if µ0 ¤ µ¯
tτpµBq  1 τpµGq, τpµGq P r0, 1s , µB  µG  µ0u , if µ0 ¡ µ¯
, in which µ¯ is the level of µ such that V pe  1, µ¯q  V pe  0, µ¯q.
If ∆ppθ  GqpyH  yLq ¥ c ¥ ∆ppθ  BqpyH  yLq, then:
If yH  yL ¤ minµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 , then V pe  1, µq ¤ V pe  0, µq, and any
experiment will be both constrained social optimal and individually optimal for
the principal, and in general ProbpeCSO  1q  Probpe  1q  0.
If yH  yL P

minµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 ,maxµPr0,1s
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2
	
, and pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡
pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then the constrained socially optimal experiment is fully reveal-
ing. ProbpeCSO  1q  µ0 ¤ Probpe  1q  min
!
µ0
µ˜ , 1
)
.
If yH  yL P

minµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 ,maxµPr0,1s
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2
	
, and pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¤
pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then both the constrained socially optimal experiment and the
principal’s optimal experiment are fully revealing. ProbpeCSO  1q  Probpe 
1q  µ0.
If ∆ppθqpyH  yLq   c, then V pe  1, µq   V pe  0, µq for any µ P r0, 1s, and any
experiment will be both constrained socially optimal and individually optimal for the
principal, and in general ProbpeCSO  1q  Probpe  1q  0.
Proposition 3.4 shows that when implementing high effort is constrained social optimal
regardless of the state, in equilibrium high effort could be under-provided. If implementing
high effort is constrained social optimal when the state is good but not when the state is
bad, in equilibrium high effort could be over-provided. Those under-provision and over-
provision happen only if the principal’s preferred effort level depends on the posterior µ:
if the principal would like to implement either high or low effort regardless of the state,
then any experiment would be weakly optimal because it cannot affect the probability of
high effort being implemented.
Moreover, Proposition 3.4 shows that constrained social optimal experiment can either
reveal more or less information than the principal’s optimal experiment. This means
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more transparency is not always social welfare improving, and we should be cautious
before promoting regulations on transparency. Figure 3.8 provides two examples. We
know from Proposition 3.4 that µCSOB  0 in both cases, while µCSOG can be different in
those two cases. Case (a) shows an example that constrained social optimal experiment
reveals less information than the equilibrium experiment. When effort and state are highly
complementary, and it is socially optimal to implement high effort in both states, but the
principal would only like to implement high effort when the state is good due to agency
problem, less transparency could actually improve social welfare. In this scenario, agency
problem makes it costly for the principal to implement high effort under bad state, and
less transparent information eases the friction of agency problem by providing good news
more frequently.
Case (b) shows an example that constrained social optimal experiment reveals more
information than the equilibrium experiment. Again, effort and state are highly comple-
mentary. Now it is both constrained social optimal and individual rational for the principal
to implement high effort in good state but not in bad state. To minimize the distortion-
s, the constrained social optimal experiment will be fully revealing, while we know from
previous results that equilibrium experiment could be partial obfuscation, which provides
less information than a fully-revealing experiment.
Therefore, mandatory transparency regulation will only be social welfare improving
under some scenarios and can sometimes reduce social welfare.
(a) Implementing High Effort Social Optimal Un-
der Both States
(b) Implementing High Effort Social Optimal Un-
der Good State But Not Bad State
Figure 3.8: Constrained Social Optimal Experiment: two Examples
Another interesting comparison could be between constrained social optimal experi-
ment and the situation when there is no information design. When there is no information
design, the only information available to both players is the prior µ0, so the principal will
choose to implement high effort iff V pe  1, µ0q ¥ V pe  0, µ0q. Again, if it is always
optimal for the principle to implement high or low effort regardless of the state, then any
experiment would lead to exactly same level of social welfare.
Now let us look at the case that yH  yL P

minµPr0,1s cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 ,maxµPr0,1s
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2
	
,
and pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq. Under this case, if there is no information design, the
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principal will exert low effort with probability 1 if µ0 P p0, µ¯q and exert high effort with
probability 1 if µ0 P rµ¯, 1q. Now consider two sub-cases: (1) ∆ppθqpyH  yLq ¥ c for both
θ P tG,Bu; (2) ∆ppθ  GqpyH  yLq ¥ c ¥ ∆ppθ  BqpyH  yLq.
In the first case, under the constrained social optimal experiment, ProbpeCSO  1q 
min
!
µ0
µ¯ , 1
)
, which is greater than the probability of high effort being implemented when
µ0 P p0, µ¯q. In the second case, ProbpeCSO  1q  µ0 which can be higher or lower
than the probability of high effort being implemented under no information, depending
on whether µ0 is greater than µ¯. So in summary, compared to constrained social optimal,
under no information design we can also have under-provision or over-provision of high
effort.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter considers a principal-agent hidden-effort model, where the principal can
also affect the information environment the agent faces by designing a public experiment.
Information is relevant in the sense that good state increases the effectiveness of the agent’s
effort in generating high outcomes. More optimistic news about the future will thus reduce
the compensation that the agent requires to exert effort and make implementing high effort
less costly.
I show that the concavity of the principal’s value function of implementing high effort
depends on the level of complementarity between state and effort. The value function is
concave when the probability of high output is log-supermodular in state and effort, which
means state and effort are complementary enough, and convex otherwise. The concavity
of that value function will affect the optimal experiment: if the value function is convex,
the optimal experiment is generally full revealing; while if the value function is concave,
then the optimal experiment can also be no information revealed or partial obfuscation. I
then explore the situations for the optimal experiment to be fully revealing, revealing no
information, or partial obfuscation.
I then show that relaxing some assumptions I made in the baseline model such as
focusing on direct experiment or the particular timing of the model I have assumed will
not lead to losses of generality. I then consider what happens if state and effort are actually
substitutes. Last, I show that in the welfare analysis part that forcing the principal to
disclosure high-quality information can be sometimes welfare-reducing. This requires us
to be cautious when considering transparency policies.
This chapter suggests some possible directions for future research: first, I assume in
this chapter that the principal designs a public experiment. It would be natural to consider
the alternative scenario of the principal designing a private experiment and compare the
differences. Second, I show that whether the principal offers a contract before or after
the experiment outcome is realized has no impact. This is based on the assumption
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that experiment outcomes are contractible ex-ante. If the experiment outcome is not
contractible, the results could be quite different. Third, both the principal and the agent
can have some private information besides the public experiment. Last, the principal could
face multiple agents at the same time. A model similar to the framework in this chapter
but with multiple agents could help us better understand how public information affect
agents’ incentive to exert effort and collaborate.
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Appendix A
Proofs and Further Results of
Chapter 1
The foreign government’s optimal strategy
The foreign government’s optimal choice is simple:
based on the information available to the foreign government (level of ψ, the public
signal s) in Period 3, denote its posterior belief that the general public of home country
is protesting as µpψ, sq. Then by Bayes’ Rule,
µpψ, s  Sq ProbpaG  P |ψ, s  Sq 
ProbpaG  P, s  S|ψq
Probps  S|ψq

$&
%
ProbpaGP,sNP |ψq
ProbpsNP |ψq  0, if S  NP
ProbpaGP |ψq
ProbpaGP |ψq ProbpaGNP,aNP |ψq ,if S  P
The previous result comes from the signal structure of s:
Probps  P |aG, aN , ψ, θq 
$&
%1, if aG  P or aN  P0, otherwise
The optimization problem of the foreign government:
max
aF PtC,NCu
IpaF  Cqtµpψ, squF pP,Cq   p1 µpψ, sqquF pNP,Cqu 
IpaF  NCqtµpψ, squF pP,NCq   p1 µpψ, sqquF pNP,NCqu
The optimal solution is simple:
aF  NC, if
tµpψ, squF pP,NCq   p1 µpψ, sqquF pNP,NCqu ¡ tµpψ, squF pP,Cq   p1 µpψ, sqquF pNP,Cqu;
aF  C, otherwise.
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This just means that:
aF 
$&
%NC, if µpψ, sq   µ¯C, if µpψ, sq ¥ µ¯
in which µ¯ P p0, 1q, the threshold of doubt for foreign government, is defined as the level
of µ such that the foreign government is indifferent between conceding or not: µ¯ruF pP,Cq
uF pP,NCqs  p1 µ¯qruF pNP,NCq  uF pNP,Cqs.
From the signal structure, s  NP means neither group is protesting so the general
public is not protesting for sure.
Therefore, when s  NP , aF  NC, since µpψ,NP q  0   µ¯.
When s  P , aF  C if and only if µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯.
The foreign government will never concede if there is no protest. Moreover, it will
concede after seeing a protest, if and only if it thinks protest is an informative enough
signal.
the Nationalist and the Public’s Best Response
In the baseline model, the decision problems for the nationalist and the public are straight-
forward. Their actions depend only on ψ and θ, and there is no strategic interaction
between them.
For i=N,G, the optimization problem is:
max
aiPtP,NP u
Ipai  P qtwipψqθ  cu,
in which wipψq  w0   w1iψ.
The optimal strategy of player i, i  N,G is: ai  P, iff θ ¥ θˆipψq, in which θˆipψq 
c
w0 w1iψ .
θˆi decreases with ψ, and the tuple of both types’ cut-off levels, pθˆN pψq, θˆGpψqq are
function of ψ in the following way:
pθˆN pψq, θˆGpψqq  p
c
w0   w1Nψ
,
c
w0   w1Gψ
q
Because w0 is the same among the two groups and w1N ¡ w1G, θˆN ¤ θˆG for any ψ.
The interim ex-ante expected probability of protest (after ψ is chosen but before θ is
realized) for group i is Hipψq  ProbpPlayer i protestsq  Probpθ ¥ θˆiq, and HN pψq ¥
HGpψq.
Hipψq decreases with ψ, and the tuple of both types’ ex-ante probabilities of protesting,
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Figure A.1: Nationalist and General Public’s Best Responses
pHN pψq, HGpψqq are increasing functions of ψ:
pHN pψq, HGpψqq  p
θ¯  cw0 w1Nψ
θ¯
,
θ¯  cw0 w1Gψ
θ¯
q
From last section we know: µpψ, P q  HGpψqHN pψq .
And µpψ, P q is a function of ψ:
µpψ, P q 
θ¯  cw0 w1Gψ
θ¯  cw0 w1Nψ
We show that there is an inverse-U shaped relationship between the level of hostility, ψ,
and the posterior of the foreign government when observing a protest, µpψ, P q. This means
that for µ¯ large enough, there exists two levels of ψ, ψˆL and ψˆR, such that µpψˆL, P q 
µpψˆR, P q  µ¯. Moreover, µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯ if and only if ψ P

0, ψˆL

Y

ψˆR, ψ¯

Mathematically, the reason of inverse-U shaped we observe here comes from the elas-
ticity of HN pψq,
H 1N pψq
HN pψq , single-crosses the elasticity of HGpψq,
H 1Gpψq
HGpψq . Roughly speaking,
when ψ is small, HN pψq is growing much faster than HGpψq, and the levels of HN pψq and
HGpψq are both small. Thus H 1N pψq is substantially larger than H 1Gpψq, while the differ-
ence between HN pψq and HGpψq is small. When ψ becomes large, HN pψq and HGpψq are
both growing very slowly so H 1N pψq is very near to H 1Gpψq, while the difference between
HN pψq and HGpψq are also small but still in larger magnitude.
Intuitively, when the ψ is low so there is not much manipulation of protests, the
opponent knows that the nationalist and the public are both unlikely to be on the street,
and their differences over protest probabilities are low. Thus when the opponent observes
a protest, he knows that with high probability both groups are protesting. When ψ is
very high, the opponent knows the nationalist is almost always protesting on the street.
However, since ψ is very high, the general public is also very likely to be protesting, so
in this case the difference over protest probabilities are also low. In the case that ψ is
120
at intermediate level, HN pψq is much larger than HGpψq. There would be many protests
of only nationalist, and this would make foreign government less sure that general public
supports a protest when it observe one.
Figure A.2: Foreign Government’s posterior when observing Protest, as function of ψ
The home government’s general optimization problem
The home government’s optimization problem, in the most general form, is:
Definition A.1 (General Optimization Problem).
max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
¸
aG
¸
aN
¸
S
¸
aF
rProbpaF  aF |ψ, SqProbps  S|ψ, aG, aN q
ProbpaG  aG, a

N  aN |ψquHpa

G, a

F qs
ai , i  N,G,F is the optimal strategy of player i.
However, this problem can be substantially simplified: In the canonical model, Probps 
S|ψ, aG, aN q, ProbpaF  aF |ψ, Sq, and ProbpaG  aG, aN  aN |ψq are all degenerate due
to our model setting and tie-breaking rules.
In the baseline model the general optimization problem becomes:
max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
HGpψquHpP, a

F pψ, P qq   rHN pψq HGpψqsuHpNP, a

F pψ, P qq
  r1HN pψqsuHpNP, aF pψ,NP qq
, in which aF pψ,NP q  NC, and aF pψ, P q  C iff µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯.
It can be show that it is never optimal to choose some level of ψ such that aF pψ, P q 
NC (We know already that aF pψ,NP q  NC).
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Definition A.2 (Simplified Optimization Problem).
max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
HGpψquHpP,Cq   rHN pψq HGpψqsuHpNP,Cq
  r1HN pψqsuHpNP,NCq
s.t. µpψ, P q 
HGpψq
HN pψq
¥ µ¯
Lemma A.1. 1. Denote ψS as the optimal solution to the Simplified Optimization
Problem. ψS exists.
2. Denote ψ as the optimal solution to the General Optimization Problem. ψ exists.
ψS  ψ.
3. aF pψ, s  P q  C
Proof. Define EuHpψq  HGpψquHpP,Cq   rHN pψq HGpψqsuHpNP,Cq
 r1HN pψqsuHpNP,NCq, the expected utility the home government can get from choose
ψ, assuming the other players will make sequentially rational decisions.
1)For the simplified Optimization Problem:
The objective function is continuous. The set of ψ that satisfies the constraint is non-
empty and is a finite union of disjoint compact intervals. Therefore, the optimal solution
and optimal value to this question both exist.
2) and 3): We prove 2) and 3) by showing that ψS is the unique solution to the general
optimization problem.
Suppose the contrary is true. Then there exists a level ψ ¡ 0 such that aF pψ, s 
P q  NC and EuHpψq ¥ EuHpψSq.
Then H’s payoff is
EuHpψq  HGpψquHpP,NCq rHN pψqHGpψqsuHpNP,NCq r1HN pψqsuHpNP,NCq.
If deviating to ψ1  0, µpψ  0, s  P q  1 ¥ µ¯ for any µ¯,
and H’s payoff is
EuHpψ
1q  HGp0quHpP,Cq   rHN p0q HGp0qsuHpNP,Cq   r1HN p0qsuHpNP,NCq ¡
HGp0quHpP,NCq   rHN p0q HGp0qsuHpNP,NCq   r1HN p0qsuHpNP,NCq ¡
HGpψquHpP,NCq rHN pψqHGpψqsuHpNP,NCq r1HN pψqsuHpNP,NCq  EuHpψq
However, by definition, EuHpψSq ¥ EuHpψ1q. Therefore, EuHpψSq ¡ EuHpψq.
Contradiction. Therefore, the opposite statement is correct.
The intuition of this proof is as follows: the potential benefits of a higher ψ are: 1)
more concessions; 2) keeping the signal (Protest) informative enough. At the same time,
the cost of higher ψ is a higher probability of bad states.
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When aF pψ, P q  NC, a positive ψ has no benefit but only cost. The home government
can always improve by reducing ψ which reduces the cost. Therefore a level of ψ such
that aF pψ, P q  NC can never be optimal.
Therefore we can solve for ψ just by solving the simplified optimization problem.
Definition A.3. Define c˜  c{θ¯.
Now let us look at the posterior of foreign government when observing a protest,
µpψ, P q:
Lemma A.2. 1 µpψ, P q is quasi-convex; it is decreasing if 0 ¤ ψ ¤ w0?w1Nw1G
b
w0c˜
w0
and increasing if ψ ¡ w0?w1Nw1G
b
w0c˜
w0
.
2 Define ψˆ  w0?w1Nw1G
b
θ¯w0c
θ¯w0
.
Then µpψˆ, P q  minψPr0, 8q µpψ, P q  w1Gw1N

1 
b
w1N
w1G
b
w0c˜
w0
1 
b
w1G
w1N
b
w0c˜
w0
2
.
2.1 If ψ¯ ¡ w0?w1Nw1G
b
w0c˜
w0
,
2.1.1 If µ¯ P

0, µpψˆ, P q

, then for any ψ P r0, ψ¯s, µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯;
2.1.2 If µ¯ P pµpψˆ, P q, µpψ¯, P qq, there exist two levels of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯q and ψˆRpµ¯q,
0   ψˆLpµ¯q   ψˆRpµ¯q   ψ¯, such that µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯.
Moreover, for any ψr0, ψ¯s, µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯ iff ψ P r0, ψˆLpµ¯qs Y rψˆRpµ¯q, ψ¯s
2.1.3 For any µ¯ P
 
µpψ¯, P q, 1

, there exists a level of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯q, 0   ψˆLpµ¯q   ψ¯,
such that µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µ¯. Moreover, for any ψr0, ψ¯s, µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯ iff ψ P
r0, ψˆLpµ¯qs
2.1.4
ψˆLpµ¯q 


w1N pw0 c˜1µ¯ q w1Gpw0 
c˜µ¯
1µ¯ q


c
p

w1N pw0 c˜1µ¯ q w1Gpw0 
c˜µ¯
1µ¯ q

q24w1Gw1Nw0pw0c˜q
2w1Gw1N
ψˆRpµ¯q 


w1N pw0 c˜1µ¯ q w1Gpw0 
c˜µ¯
1µ¯ q

 
c
p

w1N pw0 c˜1µ¯ q w1Gpw0 
c˜µ¯
1µ¯ q

q24w1Gw1Nw0pw0c˜q
2w1Gw1N
2.2 If ψ¯ ¤ w0?w1Nw1G
b
w0c˜
w0
,
2.2.1 For any µ¯ P
 
0, µpψ¯, P q

, then for any ψ P r0, ψ¯s, µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯;
2.2.2 For any µ¯ P
 
µpψ¯, P q, 1

, there exists a level of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯q, 0   ψˆLpµ¯q   ψ¯,
such that µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µ¯. Moreover, for any ψr0, ψ¯s, µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯ iff ψ P
r0, ψˆLpµ¯qs
2.2.3
ψˆLpµ¯q 


w1N pw0 c˜1µ¯ q w1Gpw0 
c˜µ¯
1µ¯ q


c
p

w1N pw0 c˜1µ¯ q w1Gpw0 
c˜µ¯
1µ¯ q

q24w1Gw1Nw0pw0c˜q
2w1Gw1N
Proof. 1) µpψ, P q  HGpψqHN pψq
then Bµpψ,P qBψ 
HGpψq
HN pψq
 BHGpψq
Bψ
HGpψq 
BHN pψq
Bψ
HN pψq

123
 HGpψqHN pψq

c˜w1G
pw0 w1Gψq2
w0 w1Gψ
pw0c˜q w1Gψ 
c˜w1N
pw0 w1Nψq2
w0 w1Nψ
pw0c˜q w1Nψ

 HGpψqHN pψq

c˜w1G
pw0 w1Gψqrpw0c˜q w1Gψs 
c˜w1N
pw0 w1Nψqrpw0c˜q w1Nψs

Therefore, Bµpψ,P qBψ ¥ 0 iff ψ ¥
w0?
w1Nw1G
b
θ¯w0c
θ¯w0
2) ψˆLpµ¯q and ψˆRpµ¯q are two solutions (if those solutions exist) to µpψ, P q  µ¯.
This is equivalent to: w1Gw1Nψ2 

w1N pw0 
c˜
1µ¯q   w1Gpw0  
c˜µ¯
1µ¯q

ψ w0pw0 c˜q  0
Therefore,
ψˆLpµ¯q 


w1N pw0 c˜1µ¯ q w1Gpw0 
c˜µ¯
1µ¯ q


c
p

w1N pw0 c˜1µ¯ q w1Gpw0 
c˜µ¯
1µ¯ q

q24w1Gw1Nw0pw0c˜q
2w1Gw1N
and
ψˆRpµ¯q 


w1N pw0 c˜1µ¯ q w1Gpw0 
c˜µ¯
1µ¯ q

 
c
p

w1N pw0 c˜1µ¯ q w1Gpw0 
c˜µ¯
1µ¯ q

q24w1Gw1Nw0pw0c˜q
2w1Gw1N .
The other conclusions of this lemma are obvious implications of 1) and 2).
Now let’s look at the objective function:
OBpψq HGpψqruHpP,Cq  uHpNP,Cqs  HN pψqruHpNP,Cq  uHpNP,NCqs
  uHpNP,NCq
It is also the expected utility of the home government for choosing hostility ψ, if the
foreign government’s best response is aF pψ, P q  C.
Now we can provide some basic characterizations of the objective function:
Definition A.4. tH  uHpNP,Cq  uHpNP,NCq
τH  uHpNP,Cq  uHpP,Cq
tH
τH
 uHpNP,CquHpNP,NCquHpNP,CquHpP,Cq
Lemma A.3. 1 The objective function OBpψq is quasi-concave on the interval r0, ψ¯s.
There exists a unique maximum point of the objective function on that interval. De-
note ψI as the maximum point of the objective function on r0, ψ¯s: ψI  argmaxr0,ψsOBpψq.
Then:
1.1 If tHτH ¤
w1G
w1N
, the objective function is decreasing on r0, ψ¯s and ψI  0.
1.2 If tHτH ¥
w1G
w1N
pw0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2, the objective function is increasing on r0, ψ¯s and ψI 
ψ¯.
1.3 If tHτH P p
w1G
w1N
, w1Gw1N p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2q, ψI  w0?w1Nw1G
b
w1N
w1G
b
tH
τH
1b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
. The objection
function is increasing over ψ on r0, w0?w1Nw1G
b
w1N
w1G
b
tH
τH
1b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
s and decreasing over
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ψ on

w0?
w1Nw1G
b
w1N
w1G
b
tH
τH
1b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
, ψ¯
ﬀ
. Moreover, ψI  w0?w1Nw1G
b
w1N
w1G
b
tH
τH
1b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
is
strictly increasing over tHτH .
2 the utility of the home government at ψˆLpµ¯q, EuHpψˆLpµ¯qq, is greater or equal to the
its utility at ψˆRpµ¯q,EuHpψˆRpµ¯qq,if and only if tHτH ¤ µ¯.
Proof. 1) BOBpψqBψ 
BHN pψq
Bψ tH 
BHGpψq
Bψ τH 
cw1N
pw0 w1Nψq2 tH 
cw1G
pw0 w1Gψq2 τH
 cw1Gpw0 w1Nψq2

tH
τH
w1N
w1G
 pw0 w1Nψq
2
pw0 w1Gψq2

.
tH
τH
w1N
w1G
 pw0 w1Nψq
2
pw0 w1Gψq2

is decreasing over ψ.
Therefore, either 1) BOBpψqBψ ¡ 0 for any ψ P r0, ψ¯s; 2)
BOBpψq
Bψ   0 for any ψ P r0, ψ¯s; or 3)
BOBpψq
Bψ is first positive and then negative.
2)
EuHpψˆRpµ¯qq
 HGpψˆRpµ¯qqruHpP,Cq  uHpNP,Cqs  HN pψˆRpµ¯qqruHpNP,Cq  uHpNP,NCqs
  uHpNP,NCq
 HN pψˆRpµ¯qqτHr
tH
τH

HGpψˆRpµ¯qq
HN pψˆRpµ¯qq
s   uHpNP,NCq
 HN pψˆRpµ¯qqτHr
tH
τH
 µ¯s   uHpNP,NCq
, because µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  HGpψˆRpµ¯qqHN pψˆRpµ¯qq  µ¯.
Similarly,
EuHpψˆLpµ¯qq  HN pψˆLpµ¯qqτHr
tH
τH
 µ¯s   uHpNP,NCq
Because HN pψˆRpµ¯qq ¥ HN pψˆLpµ¯qq,
EuHpψˆRpµ¯qq ¥ EuHpψˆLpµ¯qq iff tHτH  µ¯ ¥ 0.
So if tHτH is small enough, ψ
I will be constrained to the left boundary 0; when tHτH
becomes large enough, ψI starts to strictly increase over tHτH , until
tH
τH
becomes so high
that ψI hits the right boundary ψ¯.
The second part of the lemma says that if the home government is forced to choose
between ψˆLpµ¯q and ψˆRpµ¯q, it will strictly prefer ψˆLpµ¯q iff tHτH   µ¯, i.e., that the relative
benefit/cost ratio is smaller than the threshold of doubt.
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Lemma A.2 and A.3 immediately imply Lemma 1.1.
Now we are ready to characterize the optimal and feasible level of ψ.
125
Proposition A.1. 1. Suppose ψ¯ ¥ w0?w1Nw1G
b
w0c˜
w0
. Then:
1.1 If tHτH ¤
w1G
w1N
, then ψ=ψI  0 for any µ¯ P p0, 1q;
1.2 If tHτH ¥
w1G
w1N
pw0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2, then
– Ifµ¯ P
 
0, µpψ¯, P q

, then ψ=ψI  ψ¯
– Ifµ¯ P
 
µpψ¯, P q, 1

, then there exists ψˆLpµ¯q, such that:
∗ µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µ¯
∗ ψ  ψˆLpµ¯q
1.3 If tHτH P p
w1G
w1N
, w1Gw1N p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2q There exist a cut-off level µ1 P p0, 1q, such that:
– If µ¯ P p0, µ1s , then ψ=ψI
– If µ¯ P
 
µ1, µpψ¯, P q

, then there exist ψˆLpµ¯q and ψˆRpµ¯q, such that:
∗ µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯
∗
ψ 
$&
% ψˆL, if
tH
τH
¤ µ¯
ψˆR, if tHτH ¡ µ¯
– Ifµ¯ P
 
µpψ¯, P q, 1

, then there exists ψˆLpµ¯q, such that:
∗ µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µ¯
∗ ψ  ψˆLpµ¯q
2. Suppose ψ¯   w0?w1Nw1G
b
w0c˜
w0
. Then there exist a cut-off level µ2 P p0, 1q, such that:
2.1 If tHτH ¤
w1G
w1N
, then ψ=ψI  0 for any µ¯ P p0, 1q;
2.2 If tHτH ¥
w1G
w1N
pw0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2, then
– Ifµ¯ P
 
0, µpψ¯, P q

, then ψ=ψI  µ¯
– Ifµ¯ P
 
µpψ¯, P q, 1

, then there exists ψˆLpµ¯q, such that:
∗ µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µ¯
∗ ψ  ψˆLpµ¯q
2.3 If tHτH P p
w1G
w1N
, w1Gw1N p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2q, then there exists a cut-off level µ2 P p0, 1q, such that:
– If µ¯ P p0, µ2s , then ψ=ψI
– Ifµ¯ P pµ2, 1q, then there exists ψˆLpµ¯q, such that:
∗ µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µ¯
∗ ψ  ψˆLpµ¯q
Proof. Proposition A.1 is obvious given Lemma A.1, A.2, A.3 and the fact that the set
ψˆLpµ¯q, ψˆLpµ¯q
	
is larger when µ¯ is larger. When µ¯ is small this set is null set, and when
µ¯ converges to 1 this set will converge to p0, 1q.
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Proof of Proposition 1.1. Proposition 1.1 is an immediate implication of Proposition
A.1.
Characterisation of optimal level of ψ
We will first look at the effects of marginal changes of the parameters on the ideal point.
Then, we will look at how marginal changes of parameters affect ψˆLpµ¯q and ψˆLpµ¯q respec-
tively.
Lemma A.4.
• ψˆL is marginally:
– increasing in θ¯ ;
– decreasing in w1N ;
– increasing in w1G;
– increasing in w0
– decreasing of c;
– independent of the utility function of the sender;
– decreasing in µ¯, the threshold of doubt;
• the signs of ψˆR over the respective parameters are exactly the opposite to the signs
of ψˆL.
Proof. For any fixed ψ, it is obvious that µpψ, P q is:
• decreasing in c
• increasing in θ¯
• increasing in w0
• decreasing in w1N
• increasing in w1G
Also, Bµpψ,P qBψ |ψψˆL   0 and
Bµpψ,P q
Bψ |ψψˆR ¡ 0 because of the quasi-convexity of µpψ, P q
over ψ.
By Implicit Function Theorem the results follow through.
Lemma A.5.
ψI , is marginally:
– independent of θ¯ ;
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– if tHτH ¥ 1, ψ
I is weakly decreasing in w1N ; if tHτH   1, ψ
I is weakly decreasing in
w1N if
b
w1N
w1G
¡
b
τH
tH
 
b
τHtH
tH
and weakly increasing in w1N if 1  
b
w1N
w1G
 b
τH
tH
 
b
τHtH
tH
– if tHτH ¤ 1, ψ
I is weakly decreasing in w1G; if tHτH ¡ 1, ψ
I is weakly decreasing
in w1G if
b
w1N
w1G
¡
b
tH
τH
 
b
tHτH
τH
and weakly increasing in w1G if
b
w1N
w1G
 b
tH
τH
 
b
tHτH
τH
– increasing in w0;
– independent of c;
– increasing in tHτH , the benefit/cost ratio;
– independent of the pay-off function of the foreign government.
Proof. It is obvious that ψI is:
• independent over θ¯ and c
• (weakly) increasing over w0
• (weakly) increasing in tHτH
• independent of the pay-off function of the foreign government
Moreover, If 1  
b
w1N
w1G
  max
!b
tH
τH
,
b
τH
tH
)
, ψI  0. For the interior cases,
BψI
B?w1N  
w0
b
tH
τH
w1N
?
w1Gp
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
q2
b
w1N
w1G

b
τH
tH
	2
 

1 τHtH
	
BψI
B?w1G  
w0
b
tH
τH
w1G
?
w1N p
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
q2
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
	2
 

1 tHτH
	
Now given that we know how ψI , ψˆL and ψˆR change as different parameters change,
and how ψ depends on ψI , ψˆL and ψˆR, we’ll look at how ψ transits between ψI , ψˆL and
ψˆR when parameters change. After then, we can give a complete characterization about
how ψ changes as different parameters change.
Lemma A.6. µpψI , P q is:
• continuously weakly decreasing over w1N P pw1G, 8q, and µpψI , P q P p θw0cθw0 , 1q
• continuously weakly increasing over w1G P p0, w1N q, and µpψI , P q P p θw0cθw0 , 1q
• continuously weakly increasing over w0 P
 
c{θ¯, 8

, and
µpψI , P q P

w1Gw1N
1 
b
w1N
w1G


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G


1 
b
w1G
w1N


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G


, 1

;
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• continuously weakly decreasing over c P p0, θ¯w0q, and
µpψI , P q P

w1Gw1N
1 
b
w1N
w1G


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G


1 
b
w1G
w1N


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G


, 1

;
• continuously weakly increasing over θ¯ P

c
w0
, 8
	
, and
µpψI , P q P

w1Gw1N
1 
b
w1N
w1G


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G


1 
b
w1G
w1N


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G


, 1

;
• continuously weakly decreasing over tHτH when 0 ¤
tH
τH
  µpψˆ, P q and increasing over
tH
τH
when tHτH ¡ µpψˆ, P q, µpψ
I , P q P

µpψˆ, P q, 1

Proof. We will show the case when ψI is interior. The cases when ψI is zero or ψ¯ are
trivial.
ψI  w0?w1Nw1G
b
w1N
w1G
b
tH
τH
1b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
,
Therefore HGpψIq  1 c˜w0 w1GψI  1
c˜
w0 w1G w0?w1Nw1G
c
w1N
w1G
c
tH
τH
1
c
w1N
w1G

c
tH
τH

1 c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
w1N
w1G

b
w1G
w1N
 1 c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
w1G
w1N
pw1N
w1G
1q
and HN pψIq  1 c˜w0 w1NψI  1
c˜
w0 w1N w0?w1Nw1G
c
w1N
w1G
c
tH
τH
1
c
w1N
w1G

c
tH
τH
 1 c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
tH
τH
pw1N
w1G
1q
Therefore,
µpψIq 
HGpψ
Iq
HN pψIq

1 c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
w1G
w1N
pw1N
w1G
1q
1 c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
tH
τH
pw1N
w1G
1q
, which is obviously decreasing over c˜w0 .
c˜
w0
is increasing over c, and decreasing over w0
and θ¯.
Therefore µpψI , P q is decreasing over c, and increasing over w0 and θ¯.
For tHτH :µpψ, P q is independent over
tH
τH
. ψI is weakly increasing over tHτH . Also, µpψ, P q
is decreasing over ψ when ψ   ψˆ and increasing over ψ when ψ ¡ ψˆ.
For the interior case, ψI   ψˆ if and only if
w0?
w1Nw1G
b
w1N
w1G
b
tH
τH
1b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
  w0?w1Nw1G
b
w0c˜
w0
,
if and only if tHτH  
w1G
w1N

1 
b
w1N
w1G
b
w0c˜
w0
1 
b
w1G
w1N
b
w0c˜
w0
2
 µpψˆ, P q. Also, from previous analy-
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sis, ψI is interior solution if and only if w1Gw1N  
tH
τH
  w1Gw1N p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2, and w1Gw1N  
w1G
w1N

1 
b
w1N
w1G
b
w0c˜
w0
1 
b
w1G
w1N
b
w0c˜
w0
2
 µpψˆ, P q, and µpψˆ, P q ¤ µpψ¯, P q  w1Gw1N p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ qp
w0c
w1G
 ψ¯
w0c
w1N
 ψ¯ q  
w1G
w1N
pw0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2 when ψ¯ ¡ ψˆ.
For w1N and w1G: when tHτH   1,
µpψI , P q 
HGpψ
Iq
HN pψIq

1 c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
w1G
w1N
pw1N
w1G
1q
1 c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
tH
τH
pw1N
w1G
1q

1
b
tH
τH
b
w1N
w1G
1 c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
tH
τH
pw1N
w1G
1q
 
c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
dµpψI , P q
d
b
w1N
w1G




b
tH
τH
1  c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
tH
τH
p
w1N
w1G
1q
 
c
tH
τH
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬂ
1 
b
tH
τH
b
w1N
w1G
1  c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
tH
τH
p
w1N
w1G
1q
2
B

1  c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
tH
τH
p
w1N
w1G
1q

B
b
w1N
w1G


b
tH
τH
HN pψIq

 c˜
w0
b
τH
tH
w1N
w1G
 1
ﬁ
ﬂ

r
c
w1N
w1G

c
tH
τH
s 
w1N
w1G
2
b
tH
τH
b
w1N
w1G
 1
w1N
w1G
1
1  c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
tH
τH
p
w1N
w1G
1q
b
tH
τH
b
w1N
w1G
 1b
tH
τH
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬂ

r
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
s 
w1N
w1G
2
c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
 1
w1N
w1G
1
1 c˜
w0
c
w1N
w1G

c
tH
τHc
tH
τH
pw1Nw1G 1q
b
tH
τH
b
w1N
w1G
1b
tH
τH
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬂ is decreasing over c˜w0 ,
and

r
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
s 
w1N
w1G
2
c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
 1
w1N
w1G
1
1 c˜
w0
c
w1N
w1G

c
tH
τHc
tH
τH
pw1Nw1G 1q
b
tH
τH
b
w1N
w1G
1b
tH
τH
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬂ | c˜w01 
b
tH
τH

b
w1G
w1N
¡ 0 at
interior cases.
Therefore,

r
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
s 
w1N
w1G
2
c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
 1
w1N
w1G
1
1 c˜
w0
c
w1N
w1G

c
tH
τHc
tH
τH
pw1Nw1G 1q
b
tH
τH
b
w1N
w1G
1b
tH
τH
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬂ is always positive and
dµpψIq
d
b
w1N
w1G
is always negative.
When tHτH ¥ 1,
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
r
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
s 
w1N
w1G
2
c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
 1
w1N
w1G
1
1 c˜
w0
c
w1N
w1G

c
tH
τHc
tH
τH
pw1Nw1G 1q
b
tH
τH
b
w1N
w1G
1b
tH
τH
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬂ is always positive using the same ar-
gument and dµpψ
I ,P q
d
b
w1N
w1G
  0.
When ψI is either 0 or ψ¯, µpψI , P q is increasing in w1G and decreasing in w1N . More-
over,there is no discontinuous jump of µpψI , P q with respect to w1G or w1N .
From this lemma we know that if we are interested in the transition of ψ between
unconstrained case (ψI , information constraint not binding) and constrained case (ψˆL
or ψˆR, information constraint binding), the transition would happen at most once with
respect to various parameters.
Therefore if we draw a graph of ψI , ψˆL and ψˆR with respect to various parameters,
there is at most one intersection between 1) ψI and 2) ψˆL or ψˆR.
Proof of Corollary 1.1. From Lemma A.4, we know that ψˆL is increasing in w1G and
ψˆR is decreasing in w1G. Also, Lemma A.5 shows that ψI is decreasing over w1G if tHτH   1.
By lemma A.6, µpψI , P q is increasing over w1G, and there exists at most one intersec-
tion point between µpψI , P q (as a function of w1G) and µ¯. For appropriate levels of µ¯,
therefore, µpψI , P q   µ¯ for w1G being small, µpψI , P q ¡ µ¯ for w1G being larger.
If ψI intersects with ψˆL, then it is obvious that ψ  min
!
ψI , ψˆL
)
will first increase
over w1G when it’s small, and then decrease over w1G when it’s larger (due to the fact
that ψI decreases over w1G when tHτH   1).
If ψI intersects with ψˆR, then when w1G is very small, ψˆL   ψI   ψ¯   ψˆR, ψ  ψˆL
and increases over w1G. When w1G is larger, ψ equals to ψI or ψˆR and will decrease over
w1G.
Now we can give a complete characterization of ψ:
Proposition A.2.
• θ¯:
– if µ¯ P

0, w1Gw1N

, then for any level of θ¯ P p cw0 , 8q, µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯ for any
ψ P r0, ψ¯s. ψ  ψI is independent of θ¯.
– if µ¯ P

w1Gw1N , w1Gw1N
1 
b
w1N
w1G


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G


1 
b
w1G
w1N


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G


ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ, then there exists a cutoff level ˆ¯θ,
such that for θ¯ ¤ ˆ¯θ, there exist two levels of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯, θ¯q and ψˆRpµ¯, θ¯q, 0  
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ψˆLpµ¯, θ¯q   ψˆRpµ¯, θ¯q, such that µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯. ψ  ψI is
independent of θ¯.
– if µ¯ P

w1Gw1N
1 
b
w1N
w1G


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G


1 
b
w1G
w1N


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G


, µpψ¯, P q
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ, then there exists a cutoff level
ˆ¯θ, such that for θ¯ ¤ ˆ¯θ, there exist two levels of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯, θ¯q and ψˆRpµ¯, θ¯q,
0   ψˆLpµ¯, θ¯q   ψˆRpµ¯, θ¯q, such that µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯. Then
there exists a level of ˜¯θ, such that
ψ 
$'''&
'''%
ψI , if θ¯ ¥ ˜¯θ
ψˆLpµ¯, P q, if θ¯   ˜¯θ and tHτH ¤ µ¯
ψˆRpµ¯, P q, if θ¯   ˜¯θ and tHτH ¡ µ¯
If tHτH ¤ µ¯, ψ
 is increasing over θ¯ if θ¯   ˜¯θ and flat over θ¯ ¥ ˜¯θ ; If tHτH ¡ µ¯, ψ

is decreasing over θ¯ if θ¯   ˜¯θ and flat over θ¯ ¥ ˜¯θ.
• c:
– if µ¯ P

0, w1Gw1N

, then for any level of c P p0, θ¯w0q, µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯ for any ψ P r0, ψ¯s.
ψ  ψI is independent of c.
– if µ¯ P

w1Gw1N , w1Gw1N
1 
b
w1N
w1G


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
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
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c
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τH
c
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1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G


ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ, then there exists a cut-off level cˆ,
such that for c ¥ cˆ, there exist two levels of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯, cq and ψˆRpµ¯, cq, 0  
ψˆLpµ¯, cq   ψˆRpµ¯, cq, such that µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯. ψ  ψI is
independent of c.
– if µ¯ P

w1Gw1N
1 
b
w1N
w1G


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G
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w1G
w1N

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c
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τH
c
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1
c
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τH

c
w1N
w1G


, µpψ¯, P q
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ, then there exists a cutoff level
cˆ, such that for c ¥ cˆ, there exist two levels of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯, cq and ψˆRpµ¯, cq, 0  
ψˆLpµ¯, cq   ψˆRpµ¯, cq, such that µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯. Then there
exists a level of ˜¯θ, such that
ψ 
$'''&
'''%
ψI , if c ¤ cˆ
ψˆLpµ¯, P q, if c ¡ cˆ and tHτH ¤ µ¯
ψˆRpµ¯, P q, if c ¡ cˆ and tHτH ¡ µ¯
If tHτH ¤ µ¯, ψ
 is decreasing over c if c ¡ cˆ and flat over c if c ¤ cˆ ; If tHτH ¡ µ¯,
ψ is increasing over c if c ¡ cˆ and flat over c ¤ cˆ.
• w0:
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– if µ¯ P

0, w1Gw1N

, then for any level of w0 P p cθ¯ , 8q, µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯ for any
ψ P r0, ψ¯s. ψ  ψI is increasing over w0.
– if µ¯ P

w1Gw1N , w1Gw1N
1 
b
w1N
w1G


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G
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
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c
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1
c
tH
τH

c
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ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ, then there exists a cutoff level wˆ0,
such that for w0 ¤ wˆ0, there exist two levels of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯, w0q and ψˆRpµ¯, w0q,
0   ψˆLpµ¯, w0q   ψˆRpµ¯, w0q, such that µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯. ψ 
ψI is increasing over w0.
– if µ¯ P

w1Gw1N
1 
b
w1N
w1G


c
tH
τH
c
w1N
w1G
1
c
tH
τH

c
w1N
w1G
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b
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
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c
tH
τH
c
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c
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τH

c
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w1G


, µpψ¯, P q
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ, then there exists a cutoff level wˆ0,
such that for w0 ¤ wˆ0, there exist two levels of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯, w0q and ψˆRpµ¯, w0q,
0   ψˆLpµ¯, w0q   ψˆRpµ¯, w0q, such that µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯. Then
there exists a level of w˜0, such that
ψ 
$'''&
'''%
ψI , if w0 ¥ w˜0
ψˆLpµ¯, P q, if w0   w˜0 and tHτH ¤ µ¯
ψˆRpµ¯, P q, if w0   w˜0 and tHτH ¡ µ¯
If tHτH ¤ µ¯, ψ
 is increasing over w0; If tHτH ¡ µ¯, ψ
 is decreasing over w0 if
w0   w˜0 and increasing w0 if w0 ¥ w˜0.
• w1N :
– if µ¯ P

0, θ¯w0c
θ¯w0

, then for any level of w1N P pw1G, 8q,µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯ for any
ψ P r0, ψ¯s. ψ  ψI .
∗ if tHτH ¥ 1, ψ is decreasing in w1N ;
∗ if tHτH   1, ψ is decreasing in w1N if
b
w1N
w1G
¡
b
τH
tH
 
b
τHtH
tH
and in-
creasing in w1N if 1  
b
w1N
w1G
 
b
τH
tH
 
b
τHtH
tH
– if µ¯ P

θ¯w0c
θ¯w0
, µpψ¯, P q
	
, then exist a level of ˆw1N such that for any w1N ¥ ˆw1N ,
there exist two levels of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯, w1N q and ψˆRpµ¯, w1N q, 0   ψˆLpµ¯, w1N q  
ψˆRpµ¯, w1N q, such that µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯. Then there exists a
level of ˜w1N P r ˆw1N , 8q, such that
ψ 
$'''&
'''%
ψI , if w1N ¤ ˜w1N
ψˆLpµ¯, P q, if w1N ¡ ˜w1N and tHτH ¤ µ¯
ψˆRpµ¯, P q, if w1N ¡ ˜w1N and tHτH ¡ µ¯
∗ if tHτH ¥ 1, then ψ is decreasing in w1N if w1N P pw1G, ˜w1N q and increasing
in w1N if w1N P p ˜w1N , 8q
133
∗ if tHτH   1, then there exist a cut-off level ˜¯µ P p
θ¯w0c
θ¯w0
, 1q, and for any µ¯ a
level of t¯HτH pµ¯q P p0, 1q such that:
· if µ¯ P

θ¯w0c
θ¯w0
, ˜¯µ

, then t¯HτH pµ¯q ¤ µ¯. Moreover:
(1) if tHτH P

0, t¯HτH

, ψ is increasing over w1N if w1N P pw1G, ˜w1N q and
decreasing over w1N if w1N P p ˜w1N , 8q
(2) if tHτH P

t¯H
τH
, µ¯

, then ψ is increasing over w1N if w1N P pw1G,
b
τH
tH
 b
τHtH
tH
q and decreasing over w1N if w1N P p
b
τH
tH
 
b
τHtH
tH
, 8q
(3) if tHτH P pµ¯, 1q, then ψ
 is increasing over w1N if w1N P pw1G,
b
τH
tH
 b
τHtH
tH
q and decreasing over w1N if w1N P p
b
τH
tH
 
b
τHtH
tH
, ˜w1N q and
then increasing over w1N if w1N P p ˜w1N , 8q
· if µ¯ P

θ¯w0c
θ¯w0
, ˜¯µ

, then t¯HτH pµ¯q ¡ µ¯. Moreover:
(1) if tHτH P p0, µ¯s, ψ
 is increasing over w1N for w1N P pw1G, ˜w1N q and
decreasing over w1N if w1N P p ˜w1N , 8q
(2) if tHτH P

µ¯, t¯HτH

, then ψ is increasing over w1N for w1N P pw1G, 8q
(3) if tHτH P pµ¯, 1q, then ψ
 is increasing over w1N if w1N P pw1G,
b
τH
tH
 b
τHtH
tH
q and decreasing over w1N if w1N P p
b
τH
tH
 
b
τHtH
tH
, ˜w1N q and
then increasing over w1N if w1N P p ˜w1N , 8q
• w1G:
– if µ¯ P

0, θ¯w0c
θ¯w0

, then for any level of w1G P p0, w1N q,µpψ, P q ¥ µ¯ for any
ψ P r0, ψ¯s. ψ  ψI .
∗ if tHτH ¤ 1, ψ is decreasing in w1G;
∗ if tHτH ¡ 1, ψ is decreasing in w1G if
b
w1N
w1G
¡
b
tH
τH
 
b
tHτH
τH
and in-
creasing in w1G if
b
w1N
w1G
 
b
tH
τH
 
b
tHτH
τH
– if µ¯ P

θ¯w0c
θ¯w0
, µpψ¯, P q
	
, then exist a level of ˆw1G such that for any w1G ¤ ˆw1G,
there exist two levels of ψ, ψˆLpµ¯, w1Gq and ψˆRpµ¯, w1Gq, 0   ψˆLpµ¯, w1Gq  
ψˆRpµ¯, w1Gq, such that µpψˆLpµ¯q, P q  µpψˆRpµ¯q, P q  µ¯. Then there exists a
level of ˜w1G P p0, ˆw1Gs, such that
ψ 
$'''&
'''%
ψI , if w1G ¥ ˜w1G
ψˆLpµ¯, P q, if w1G   ˜w1G and tHτH ¤ µ¯
ψˆRpµ¯, P q, if w1G   ˜w1G and tHτH ¡ µ¯
∗ if tHτH P p0, µ¯s, then ψ is increasing in w1G if w1G P p0, ˜w1Gq and decreasing
in w1G if w1G P p ˜w1G, w1N q
∗ if tHτH P pµ¯, 1s , then ψ is decreasing in w1G for w1G P p0, w1N q
∗ if tHτH P p1, 8q, then there exist a cut-off point
t¯H
τH
such that:
· if tHτH ¥
t¯H
τH
, then ψ is decreasing over w1G if w1G P p0, ˜w1Gq and
increasing in w1G if w1G P p ˜w1G, w1N q
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· if tHτH  
t¯H
τH
, then ψ is decreasing over w1G if w1G P p0,
b
tH
τH
 b
tH
τH
 1q and increasing in w1G if w1G P p
b
tH
τH
 
b
tH
τH
 1, w1N q
• µ¯:
– if µ¯ P

0, µpψˆ, P q

, ψ  ψI is independent of µ¯.
– if µ¯ P pµpψˆ, P q, µpψ¯, P qq, there exist a level of cutoff point ˜¯µ such that:
ψ 
$'''&
'''%
ψI , if µ¯ ¤ ˜¯µ
ψˆLpµ¯, P q, if µ¯ ¡ ˜¯µ and tHτH ¤ µ¯
ψˆRpµ¯, P q, if µ¯ ¡ ˜¯µ and tHτH ¡ µ¯
∗ if tHτH P p0, µ¯s, ψ is flat over µ¯ if µ¯ ¤ ˜¯µ and decreasing over µ¯ if µ¯ ¡ ˜¯µ
∗ if tHτH P pµ¯, 8q, ψ is flat over µ¯ if µ¯ ¤ ˜¯µ and increasing over µ¯ if µ¯ ¡ ˜¯µ
• tHτH
– if µ¯ P p0, µpµˆqs, ψ  ψI . ψ is weakly increasing over tHτH
– if µ¯ P

µpµˆq, µpψˆ, P q

, then there exists two cut-off points, tˆHτH 1 and
tˆH
τH 2 such
that
ψ 
$'''''''&
'''''''%
ψI , if tHτH P

0, tˆHτH 1

ψˆLpµ¯, P q, if tHτH P

tˆH
τH 1, µ¯

ψˆRpµ¯, P q, if tHτH P

µ¯, tˆHτH 2
	
ψI , if tHτH P

tˆH
τH 2, 8

ψ is increasing over tHτH if
tH
τH
P

0, tˆHτH 1

Y

tˆH
τH 2, 8

, flat over tHτH if

tˆH
τH 1, µ¯

and

µ¯, tˆHτH 2
	
. There is discrete jump at the point tHτH  µ¯
Proof. Proposition A.2 is a natural implication of previous lemmas and proposition A.1.
Comparative Static Analysis for HNpψq and HGpψq
We have looked at the comparative static analysis of ψ, i.e., the home government’s
optimal effort of driving up tension. However, the government has no obvious reason to
reveal its effort and it could be hard or impossible to measurezobserve its effort. A variable
that are easier to observe could be HN pψq, the probability of a protest.
Also HN pψq and HGpψq would be interesting for their own sake: HN pψq is the prob-
ability of nationalist protest and also the probability of home government receiving a
concession. HGpψq is the probability of general public protest and also the probability of
a real crisis.
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We can similarly look at how HN pψq and HGpψq change according to the parameters:
First, some intermediate results:
Lemma A.7. • HN pψIq, HGpψIq
HN pψ
Iq 
$'''''&
'''''%
1 c˜w0 , if
tH
τH
¤ w1Gw1N
1 c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
tH
τH
rw1N
w1G
1s
, if tHτH P p
w1G
w1N
, w1Gw1N p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2q
1 c˜
w0 w1N ψ¯ , if
tH
τH
¥ w1Gw1N p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2
HGpψ
Iq 
$'''''&
'''''%
1 c˜w0 , if
tH
τH
¤ w1Gw1N
1 c˜w0
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τHb
w1N
w1G

b
w1G
w1N
, if tHτH P p
w1G
w1N
, w1Gw1N p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2q
1 c˜
w0 w1Gψˆ , if
tH
τH
¥ w1Gw1N p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2
– HN pψIq and HGpψIq are increasing over w0 and θ¯, and decreasing over c
– If tHτH   1, then HN pψ
Iq is increasing over
b
w1N
w1G
; If tHτH ¡ 1 HN pψ
Iq is de-
creasing over
b
w1N
w1G
if
b
w1N
w1G
 
b
tH
τH
 
b
tHτH
τH
and increasing over
b
w1N
w1G
ifb
w1N
w1G
¡
b
tH
τH
 
b
tHτH
τH
;
– If tHτH ¡ 1, HGpψ
Iq is decreasing over
b
w1N
w1G
; If tHτH ¤ 1, HGpψ
Iq is decreasing
over
b
w1N
w1G
if
b
w1N
w1G
¡ 1b
τH
tH

c
τHtH
tH
, and increasing over
b
w1N
w1G
if
b
w1N
w1G
 
1b
τH
tH

c
τHtH
tH
,
– HN pψIq and HGpψIq are weakly increasing over tHτH
– HN pψIq and HGpψIq are independent over µ¯
• HN pψˆLpµ¯qq,HGpψˆLpµ¯qq
– HN pψˆLpµ¯qq and HGpψˆLpµ¯qq decrease over w1Nw1G
– HN pψˆLpµ¯qq and HGpψˆLpµ¯qq increase over θ¯
– HN pψˆLpµ¯qq and HGpψˆLpµ¯qq increase over w0
– HN pψˆLpµ¯qq and HGpψˆLpµ¯qq decrease over c
– HN pψˆLpµ¯qq and HGpψˆLpµ¯qq are independent of tHτH
– HN pψˆLpµ¯qq and HGpψˆLpµ¯qq are decreasing over µ¯
• HN pψˆRpµ¯qq,HGpψˆRpµ¯qq
– HN pψˆRpµ¯qq and HGpψˆRpµ¯qq increase over w1Nw1G
– HN pψˆRpµ¯qq and HGpψˆRpµ¯qq decrease over θ¯
– HN pψˆRpµ¯qq and HGpψˆRpµ¯qq decrease over w0
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– HN pψˆRpµ¯qq and HGpψˆRpµ¯qq increase over c
– HN pψˆRpµ¯qq and HGpψˆRpµ¯qq are independent of tHτH
– HN pψˆRpµ¯qq and HGpψˆRpµ¯qq are increasing over µ¯
Proof. If ψI is interior solution, then BHGpψ
Iq
B
b
w1N
w1G

c˜
b
tH
τH
w0p
b
w1N
w1G

b
w1G
w1N
q2

p
b
w1G
w1N

b
τH
tH
q2   1 τHtH

BHN pψIq
B
b
w1N
w1G
 c˜
w0p
b
w1N
w1G

b
w1G
w1N
q2

p
b
w1N
w1G

b
tH
τH
q2   1 tHτH

Results about HN pψˆLpµqq,HN pψˆRpµqq,HGpψˆLpµqq,HGpψˆRpµqq are straightforward due
to the Implicit Function Theorem and µpψ, P q  HGpψqHN pψq . We can express µpψ, P q as
function of HN pψq or function of HGpψq, and then because µpHN pψˆLpµqq, P q  µ¯, we
can get the comparative statics of HN pψˆLpµqq by the Implicit Function Theorem (and
similarly for HGpψˆLpµqq, HN pψˆRpµqq, HGpψˆRpµqq).
Corollary A.1.
• If tHτH ¤ µ¯, HN pψq and HGpψq are
– increasing in w0 and θ¯ and decreasing in c
– first increasing and then decreasing over w1NW1G
• If tHτH ¡ µ¯,
– HN pψq and HGpψq are:
∗ first decreasing and then increasing over θ¯
∗ first decreasing and then increasing over w0
∗ first decreasing and then increasing over c
– If tHτH P pµ¯, 1s, HN pψ
q is increasing over w1Nw1G , and HGpψ
q is increasing and
then decreasing and then increasing again over w1Nw1G
– if tHτH ¡ 1, HN pψ
q and HGpψq are first decreasing and then increasing over
w1N
w1G
• HN pψq and HGpψq are weakly increasing over tHτH . HN pψq and HGpψq both jump
discontinuously over tHτH at point
tH
τH
 µ¯
• µ¯:
– if tHτH is small, HN pψ
q and HGpψq are first constant over µ¯ and then decreas-
ing over µ¯;
– if tHτH is in intermediate range, HN pψ
q and HGpψq are first constant over µ¯
,then increasing over µ¯, and then decreasing over µ¯
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– if tHτH is large enough, HN pψ
q and HGpψq are first constant over µ¯ and then
increasing over µ¯
Proof. Corollary A.1 is a direct implication from Lemma A.7 and Proposition A.2.
So the probability of protest, HN pψq, and the probability of crisis, HGpψq, have
similar patterns as the equilibrium level of hostility, ψ.
Home Government’s Equilibrium Utility
Lemma A.8.
UHpψ
Iq is:
– increasing in w1N ;
– decreasing in w1G;
– increasing in c if tHτH P p0,
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q and decreasing in c if
tH
τH
P pw0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ , 8q
– decreasing in w0 if tHτH P p0, p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2q and increasing in w0 if
tH
τH
P ppw0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2, 8q
– decreasing in θ¯ if tHτH P p0,
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q and increasing in θ¯ if
tH
τH
P pw0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ , 8q;
Proof.
UHpψ
Iq  max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
HGpψquHpP,Cq 
rHN pψq HGpψqsuHpNP,Cq   r1HN pψqsuHpNP,NCq
By Envelope Theorem, for parameter θ, dUHpψ
Iq
dθ 
BUHpψIq
Bθ . The results are then proved
by taking partial derivative over each parameter.
Lemma A.9. If tHτH   µ¯, UHpψˆLq is:
– increasing in w1N ;
– decreasing in w1G;
– increasing in c;
– decreasing in w0;
– decrease in θ¯
If tHτH ¥ µ¯, UHpψˆLq is:
– (weakly) decreasing in w1N ;
– (weakly) increasing in w1G;
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– (weakly) decreasing in c;
– (weakly) increasing in w0;
– (weakly) increasing in θ¯
The sign of UHpψˆLq over those parameters are reversed.
Proof. For ψ  ψˆL, HGpψqHN pψq  µ¯, and uHpψq  HN pψqtH  HGpψqτH   uHpNP,NCq 
HN pψqtH  µ¯HN pψqτH   uHpNP,NCq  HN pψqτH

tH
τH
 µ¯

  uHpNP,NCq 
1
µ¯HGpψqτH

tH
τH
 µ¯

  uHpNP,NCq. By Lemma A.7, the results are proved.
Proposition A.3. If tHτH ¤ µ¯, UHpψ
q is:
∗ increasing in w1N ;
∗ decreasing in w1G;
∗ increasing in c ;
∗ decreasing in w0
∗ decreasing in θ¯
∗ weakly decreasing in µ¯
If tHτH ¡ µ¯, UHpψ
q is:
∗ single-peaked over some interior level of w1G;
∗ Increasing or single-peaked over w1N ;
∗ If tHτH P p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ , 8q,decreasing over c; If
tH
τH
P pµ¯, w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q, increasing
or single-peaked over c;
∗ If tHτH P p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ , 8q,increasing over θ¯; If
tH
τH
P pµ¯, w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q, decreasing
or single-peaked over θ¯;
∗ If tHτH P pp
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2, 8q, increasing over w0, if tHτH P pµ¯, p
w0 w1N ψ¯
w0 w1Gψ¯ q
2q,
decreasing or single-peaked over w0
Proof of Proposition A.3. When ψ is interior solution, which means ψ  ψI , uHpψIq
is increasing in w1N and decreasing in w1G by Lemma A.8.
By Lemma A.3, EuHpψˆLpµ¯qq ¤ EuHpψˆRpµ¯qq,if and only if tHτH ¤ µ¯.
The results follow naturally from Lemma A.8,Lemma A.9 and proposition A.2.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Proposition A.3 immediately implies Proposition 1.2.
Proof of Corollary 1.2. 1) First result follows directly from Lemma 1.2. Because uHpψq
under any ψ such that pHN pψqHGpψqHGpψq q ¡ p
1µ¯
µ¯ qp
λH
λL
q will be strictly dominated by uHpψq
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under ψ that pHN pψqHGpψqHGpψq q  p
1µ¯
µ¯ qp
λH
λL
q. Therefore, for a level of ψ to be optimal, it must
be the case that pHN pψqHGpψqHGpψq q ¤ p
1µ¯
µ¯ qp
λH
λL
q. This is equivalent to: HGpψqHN pψq ¥
1
1 p 1µ¯
µ¯
qpλH
λL
q .
2) 1
1 λH
λL
1µ¯
µ¯
, the effective threshold of doubt, is increasing over λLλH . The space of ψ
that makes protest informative will thus shrink and this would (weakly) decrease the home
government’s equilibrium utility.
3) when λLλH Ñ8,
1
1 λH
λL
1µ¯
µ¯
converges to 1. For any finite ψ¯, HGpψ¯q
HN pψ¯q ¤
1
1 λH
λL
1µ¯
µ¯
for λLλH
large enough. Therefore, the only set of ψ where protest is informative enough is r0, ψˆLs.
ψˆL decreases over λLλH and will converge to zero as
λL
λH
Ñ8.
Proof of Proposition 1.3. Given the posterior µ, the foreign government’s payoff if
conceding: µuF pP,Cq   p1 µquF pNP,Cq
his payoff if not conceding: µp1 qquF pP,NCq   rµq   p1 µqsuF pNP,NCq
The level of µ that the foreign government is indifferent between conceding or not, µ¯,
is: µ¯uF pP,Cq   p1 µ¯quF pNP,Cq  µ¯p1 qquF pP,NCq   rµ¯q   p1 µ¯qsuF pNP,NCq
µ¯ ruF pP,Cq  quF pP,NCq  p1 qquF pNP,NCqs
 p1 µ¯q ruF pNP,NCq  uF pNP,Cqs
µ¯  uF pNP,NCquF pP,NCqruF pP,Cqp1qquF pP,NCqquF pNP,NCqs ruF pNP,NCquF pP,NCqs
µ¯ ¡ 0 because uF pNP,NCq  uF pP,NCq ¡ 0 and
ruF pP,Cq  p1 qquF pP,NCq  quF pNP,NCqs   ruF pNP,NCq  uF pP,NCqs
¥ ruF pP,CquF pNP,NCqs  ruF pNP,NCquF pP,NCqs  uF pP,CquF pP,NCq ¡ 0.
µ¯ increases over q because ruF pP,Cqp1qquF pP,NCqquF pNP,NCqs ruF pNP,NCq
uF pP,NCqs decreases over q, since uF pNP,NCq ¡ uF pP,NCq
µ¯|q0 P p0, 1q and µ¯|q1 ¡ 1. Because µ¯ is continuous over q, when q is near enough to
µ, µ¯ must be greater than 1.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.
Part I: the home government’s ideal optimal propaganda:
DefineOBpψq  HGpψquHpP,Cq pHN pψqHGpψqquHpNP,Cq pp1HN pψqquHpNP,Cq 
p1 pqp1HN pψqquHpNP,NCq.
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max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
HGpψquHpP,Cq   pHN pψq HGpψqquHpNP,Cq
  pp1HN pψqquHpNP,Cq   p1 pqp1HN pψqquHpNP,NCq
 max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
HGpψq ruHpP,Cq  uHpNP,Cqs
  pp  p1 pqHN pψqq ruHpNP,Cq  uHpNP,NCqs   uHpNP,NCq
 max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
pp  p1 pqHN pψqq ruHpNP,Cq  uHpNP,NCqs
HGpψq ruHpNP,Cq  uHpP,Cqs   uHpNP,NCq
 max
ψPr0,ψ¯s
pp  p1 pqHN pψqqtH HGpψqτH   uHpNP,NCq
Define ψ˜I as the level of ψ that maximizes the new objective function (without the
informativeness constraint). Define t˜H  p1 pqtH .
Taking F.O.C.:
p1 pqtHH 1N pψq  τHH 1Gpψq  0
ðñ t˜HH
1
N pψq  τHH
1
Gpψq  0
ψ˜I is just the ψI in the baseline model with tH now replaced by t˜H .
By Envelope theorem, OBpψ˜Iq is increasing over p because uHpNP,Cq ¡ uHpNP,NCq.1
Part II: We now look at the informativeness constraint.
When the foreign government observes a protest, his posterior belief that this protest
comes from the general public:
µpψ, s˜  P q  ProbpaG  P |ψ, s˜  P q 
HGpψq
HGpψq pHN pψqHGpψqq pp1HN pψqq , where the
pp1HN pψqq part comes from the fake protests.
The foreign government will only concede iff:
HGpψq
HGpψq pHN pψqHGpψqq pp1HN pψqq ¥ µ¯
The home government’s objective function: HGpψquHpP,Cq pHN pψqHGpψqquHpNP,Cq 
pp1HN pψqquHpNP,Cq   p1 pqp1HN pψqquHpNP,NCq
HGpψq
HGpψq   pHN pψq HGpψqq   pp1HN pψqq
¥ µ¯
ðñ
HGpψq
p  p1 pqHN pψq
¥ µ¯
µpψ, P q  HGpψqp p1pqHN pψq
1In the boundary cases, uHpψ˜Iq is also increasing over p because uHpNP,Cq ¡ uHpNP,NCq.
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then Bµpψ,P qBψ 
HGpψq
p p1pqHN pψq

BHGpψq
Bψ
HGpψq 
Bpp p1pqHN pψqq
Bψ
pp p1pqHN pψqq
ﬀ
 HGpψqp p1pqHN pψq

c˜w1G
pw0 w1Gψq2
w0 w1Gψ
pw0c˜q w1Gψ 
c˜w1N
pw0 w1Nψq2
w0 w1Nψ
p 11pw0c˜q  11pw1Nψ

 HGpψqp p1pqHN pψq

c˜w1G
pw0 w1Gψqrpw0c˜q w1Gψs 
c˜w1N
pw0 w1Nψq

p 11pw0c˜q  11pw1Nψ

ﬀ
 HGpψqp p1pqHN pψq

c˜
p w0
w1G
 ψqrpw0c˜q w1Gψs 
c˜
p w0
w1N
 ψq

p 11pw0c˜q  11pw1Nψ

ﬀ
Bµpψ, P q
Bψ
¥ 0
ðñ p
w0
w1G
  ψq rpw0  c˜q   w1Gψs ¤ p
w0
w1N
  ψq

p
1
1 pw0  c˜q  
1
1 pw1Nψ

ðñ p
1
1 pw1N  w1Gqψ
2   2w0
p
1 pψ  

w0p
w0
1p  c˜q
w1N

w0pw0  cq
w1G
ﬀ
¥ 0
1
1pw1N  w1G ¥ w1N  w1G ¡ 0,
function p 11pw1N  w1Gqψ2   2w0
p
1pψ  

w0p w01pc˜q
w1N
 w0pw0cqw1G

is convex and reaches
its minimum at ψ  2 p
1
1pw1Nw1Gq
2w0 p1pψ
. Therefore, it is growing on the interval r0, 8q.
Thus p 11pw1N  w1Gqψ2   2w0
p
1pψ  

w0p w01pc˜q
w1N
 w0pw0cqw1G

 0 can have at most
one solution on the interval r0, 8q.
If that solution exist, then µpψ, P q is first decreasing and then increasing over ψ. For
appropriate levels of µ¯, again there exist levels of ψ, ψˆL and ψˆR, such that 0   ψˆL   ψˆR,
and µpψˆL, P q  µpψˆR, P q  µ¯
Similar as before, we can easily show that:
1) BψˆRBp ¡ 0 and
BψˆL
Bp   0
2) uHpψˆRq increases over p if tHτH ¡ µ¯ and decreases over p if
tH
τH
¡ µ¯
3) uHpψˆLq decreases over p if tHτH ¡ µ¯ and increases over p if
tH
τH
¡ µ¯
4) uHpψˆRq ¥ uHpψˆLq iff tHτH ¥ µ¯
Moreover, as p goes to 1, eventually only ψˆR can exist but not ψˆL.
This is because
"
p 11pw1N  w1Gqψ
2   2w0 p1pψ  

w0p w01pc˜q
w1N
 w0pw0cqw1G
*
ψ0
¡ 0
when p is close enough to 1.
We can define the optimal solution to the home government’s problem,ψ, in the
revised game same as before:
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ψ P argmax
ψPr0,ψ¯s
HGpψquHpP,Cq   pHN pψq HGpψqquHpNP,Cq
  pp1HN pψqquHpNP,Cq   p1 pqp1HN pψqquHpNP,NCq
s.t. HGpψq
HGpψq   pHN pψq HGpψqq   pp1HN pψqq
¥ µ¯
Similar as before, we know that:
ψ 
$'''&
'''%
ψI , if ψI R

ψˆL, ψˆR
	
ψˆLpµ¯, P q, if ψI P

ψˆL, ψˆR
	
and tHτH   µ¯
ψˆRpµ¯, P q, if if ψI P

ψˆL, ψˆR
	
and tHτH ¥ µ¯
Part III: Now we can show that the graph of ψIppq cannot intersect with both the graph
of ψˆLppq and the graph of ψˆRppq: When tHτH ¡ µ¯, ψ
Ippq cannot intersect with ψˆLppq; When
tH
τH
  µ¯, ψIppq cannot intersect with ψˆRppq.
Suppose not.
First, it is obvious that OBpψ, pq is continuous over ψ and p. Also, it is obvious that
ψIppq, ψˆLppq, and ψˆRppq are continuous over p.
Then when tHτH ¡ µ¯, there exist a level of pˆ such that ψ
Ippq and ψˆLppq intersects,
so ψIppˆq  ψˆLppˆq. Hence uHpψIppqq  uHpψˆLppqq. Because it is a intersection point,
moving from pˆ a little bit either to the left or right, we must have ψˆRppq ¡ ψIppq ¡ ψˆLppq.
Without any loss of generality, let’s assume it is the right side.
Then pick p  pˆ  ,  ¡ 0, for any δ ¡ 0, for  small enough we have |ψˆLppqψIppˆq| 
|ψˆLppq  ψˆLppˆq|   δ. Then for any h ¡ 0, for small enough δ and small enough  we have
|uHpψˆLppq, pq  uHpψ
Ippˆq, pˆq|   h, which means, uHpψˆLppq, pq ¡ uHpψIppˆq, pˆq  h.
However, uHpψˆLppq, pq  uHpψˆRppq, pqp tHτHµ¯qpHN pψˆRppqqHN pψˆLppqqq. Therefore,
uHpψˆRppq, pq ¡ uHpψ
Ippˆq, pˆq  h  p tHτH  µ¯qpHN pψˆRppqq HN pψˆLppqqq
Also, for any j ¡ 0, we can pick  to be very small so |uHpψˆRppq, pquHpψˆRppˆq, pˆq|   j,
and hence uHpψˆRppˆq, pˆq ¡ uHpψˆRppq, pq  j.
However, then uHpψˆRppˆq, pˆq ¡ uHpψIppˆq, pˆqhj p tHτHµ¯qpHN pψˆRppqqHN pψˆLppqqq ¡
uHpψ
Ippˆq, pˆq if we pick h and j small enough. This leads to contradiction because
uHpψ
Ippˆq, pˆq ¥ uHpψ, pˆq for any other ψ by definition.
Therefore, ψIppˆq and ψˆLppq cannot have intersection points if tHτH ¡ µ¯. The other part
of the assertion is proved using exactly the same method.
Part IV: we know that ψˆRppq is increasing over p and when p goes to 1, ψˆRppq
converges to
c
1µ¯w0
w1G
. Therefore, if ψ¯ ¥
c
1µ¯w0
w1G
, the upper-bound of ψ has no effort.
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If ψ¯  
c
1µ¯w0
w1G
, From part III, we know that if tHτH ¥ µ¯, for ψ ¤ ψ¯, ψ
ppq 
max
!
ψIppq, ψˆRppq
)
. The maximal of two continuous functions must be continuous so
ψppq is continuous over p. Because uHpψIppq, pq and uHpψˆRppq, pq are both increasing over
p, inside each region of ψ where there is no switching between ψ and ψˆL, uHpψppq, pq is
increasing. Also, because both uHpψ, pq and ψppq are continuous,uHpψppq, pq is continu-
ous. Therefore, there is no discrete jump and uHpψppq, pq is increasing. At the point of p
that ψ¯  ψˆRppq, for any p1 ¡ p, ψ¯   ψˆRpp1q. Therefore, the home government has to either
choose ψpp1q  ψˆLpp1q (if it exists) or ψpp1q  0 (if ψˆLpp1q doesn’t exist). There is a dis-
continuous downwards jump of utility in either case, and uHpψpp2q, p2q ¤ uHpψpp1q, p1q
for p2 ¡ p1. Therefore, uHppq is maximized at the point of that ψ¯  ψˆRppq.
If tHτH   µ¯, from part III we know that for ψ ¤ ψ¯, ψ
  min
!
ψI , ψˆL
)
. Without loss of
generality, assume that ψˆLppq   µ¯ for any p. Both ψI and ψˆL are continuously decreasing
over p, so ψ  min
!
ψI , ψˆL
)
is also continuously decreasing over p. Because uHpψIppq, pq
and uHpψˆLppq, pq are both increasing over p (if tHτH   µ¯), therefore, inside each region of
ψ where there is no switching, uHpψppq, pq is increasing. Also, because both uHpψ, pq
and ψppq are continuous,uHpψppq, pq is continuous. Therefore, there is no discrete jump
and uHpψppq, pq is increasing. At the point of p such that ψˆLppq  0, for p1  p   ,
either ψˆRpp1q ¥ ψ¯ or ψˆRpp1q   ψ¯. In the first scenario, ψ  0 and uHp0, pq for p ¥ p1
is constant over p. In the second scenario, uHpψppq, pq  max
!
uHp0, pq, uHpψˆRppq, pq
)
which is weakly decreasing over p for p ¥ p1, because uHp0, pq for p ¥ p1 is constant over
p, and uHpψˆRppq, pq is decreasing over p when tHτH   µ¯.
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Appendix B
Proofs and Further Results of
Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Suppose that the investment bank trades x when the state
is G, and z when the state is B. He incurs additional cost of capital if he further acquires
shares in the secondary market (i.e., either x ¡ 0 or z ¡ 0). Also, recall that u  p1βqφ.
State Liquidity Shocks v˜ Probability xPI xIB y
(I). G Yes VH µsγ u x yI  u  x
(II). G No VH µsp1 γq 0 x yII  x
(III). B Yes VL p1 µsqγ u z yIII  u  z
(IV). B No VL p1 µsqp1 γq 0 z yIV  z
To camouflage as liquidity traders, the investment bank has to design his trading
strategy such that two of the above four scenarios have the same aggregate order flows.
This gives four possibilities: yI= yIII (i.e. u  x  u  z), yI  yIV (i.e. u  x  z),
yII  yIII (i.e. x  u   z) or yII  yIV (i.e. x  z). Note that the first and the last
coincide. Hence we investigate the following three cases: 1. x  z, 2. z  u  x, and 3.
z  u  x.
Case 1. x  z:
State Liquidity Shocks Probability xPI xIB y P1
(I). G Yes µsγ u x u  x µsγ∆Vµsγ p1µsqγ   VL
(II). G No µsp1 γq 0 x x µsp1γq∆Vµsp1γq p1µsqp1γq   VL
(III). B Yes p1 µsqγ u x u  x µsγ∆Vµsγ p1µsqγ   VL
(IV). B No p1 µsqp1 γq 0 x x µsp1γq∆Vµsp1γq p1µsqp1γq   VL
It is easy to see that P1  µs∆V   VL since the net order flows are only indicative
of whether or not there is liquidity shock, but reveals no information concerning the
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underlying state due to the investment bank’s consistent trading strategy regardless of
his private information. So the market maker will set a price to the intrinsic value of the
security conditional on the posterior belief µs. The investment bank’s expected payoff
from this trading strategy is
EsrΠ1s  rVH  pµs∆V   VLqsrµsγ   µsp1 γqsx
 rVL  pµs∆V   VLqsrp1 µsqγ   p1 µsqp1 γqsx 1tx¡0u rpµs∆V   VLqx
 1tx¡0u rpµs∆V   VLqx
¤ 0.
Case 2. z  u  x:
State Liquidity Shocks Probability xPI xIB y P1
(I). G Yes µsγ u x u  x µsγ∆Vµsγ p1µsqp1γq   VL
(II). G No µsp1 γq 0 x x VH
(III). B Yes p1 µsqγ u u  x 2u  x VL
(IV). B No p1 µsqp1 γq 0 u  x u  x µsγ∆Vµsγ p1µsqp1γq   VL
The investment bank’s expected trading profits from this trading strategy are
EsrΠ2s 

VH 
µsγ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
 VL


µsγx
 

VL 
µsγ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
 VL


p1 µsqp1 γqpu  xq
1tx¡0u rx

µsγ
µsγ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
  VL   µsp1 γqVH

1tu x¡0u rpu  xq

p1 µsqγVL   p1 µsqp1 γq

µsγ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
  VL



µsγp1 µsqp1 γq∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
 u 1tx¡0u rx

µsγ
µsγ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
  VL   µsp1 γqVH

1tu x¡0u rpu  xq

p1 µsqγVL   p1 µsqp1 γq

µsγ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
  VL


¤
µsγp1 µsqp1 γq∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
 u.
In this case, it is optimal to set x  0 and z  u such that the investment bank can
achieve the maximal expected trading profits µsγp1µsqp1γq∆Vµsγ p1µsqp1γq u while do not incur addi-
tional cost of capital from acquiring shares in the secondary market. It is an informed sales
equilibrium where the investment bank only sell his stake when his private information is
unfavorable. Moreover, such trading strategy is sequentially rational as well.
Finally, we consider Case 3. (z  u  x):
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State Liquidity Shocks Probability xPI xIB y P1
(I). G Yes µsγ u x u  x VH
(II). G No µsp1 γq 0 x x µsp1γq∆Vµsp1γq p1µsqγ   VL
(III). B Yes p1 µsqγ u u  x x µsp1γq∆Vµsp1γq p1µsqγ   VL
(IV). B No p1 µsqp1 γq 0 u  x u  x VL
His relevant expected trading profits are
EsrΠ3s 

VH 
µsp1 γq∆V
µsp1 γq   p1 µsqγ
 VL

µsp1 γqx
 

VL 
µsp1 γq∆V
µsp1 γq   p1 µsqγ
 VL

p1 µsqγx
1tx¡0u rx

µsγVH   µsp1 γq

µsp1 γq∆V
µsp1 γq   p1 µsqγ
  VL


1tx u¡0u rpx  uq

p1 µsqγ

µsp1 γq∆V
µsp1 γq   p1 µsqp1 γq
  VL


  p1 µsqγVL

¤ 1tx¡0u rx

µsγVH   µsp1 γq

µsp1 γq∆V
µsp1 γq   p1 µsqγ
  VL


1tx u¡0u rpx  uq

p1 µsqγ

µsp1 γq∆V
µsp1 γq   p1 µsqp1 γq
  VL


  p1 µsqγVL

¤ 0.
This strategy is obviously suboptimal.
In sum, the investment bank’s optimal trading strategy is xIB  0 in state G and
xIB  u in state B. This gives the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2.1. 
Proof of Lemma 2.2.
U1IBp
φ
1  φ, µsq 
φ
1  φ

pµs∆V   VLq  p1  rqP0p
φ
1  φ, µsq

 
1
1  φ 
p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq

φ
1  φ 

rpµs∆V   VLq   p1  rq 
µsp1 µsqγp1 γqφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq

 
1
1  φ 
µsp1 µsqγp1 γqφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq

φ
1  φ  trEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P u  
1
1  φ ∆P
 
rφ
1  φ  Esrv˜s  

1  rφ1  φ


∆P.
Note that
B Esrv˜s
Bµs

Bpµs∆V   VLq
Bµs
 ∆V, B
2 Esrv˜s
Bµ2s
 0,
147
and
B∆P
Bµs

B
Bµs

µsp1 µsqγp1 γqφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq


 γp1 γqφ∆V  p1 2γqµ
2
s  2p1 γqµs   p1 γq
rµsγ   p1 µsqp1 γqs2
.
Moreover,
B2 ∆P
Bµ2s
 γp1 γqφ∆V  2γp1 γq
rµsγ   p1 µsqp1 γqs3
  0.
Therefore
BU1IB
Bµs
 
rφ∆V
1  φ  

1  rφ1  φ



γp1 γqφ∆V rp1 2γqµ2s  2p1 γqµs   p1 γqs
rµsγ   p1 µsqp1 γqs2
,
and
B2 U1IB
Bµ2s


1  rφ1  φ




B2 ∆P
Bµ2s


  0,
i.e. U1IB is concave and BU1IB{Bµs is decreasing in µs P p0, 1q.
To ensure that the interior optimum is attained at some µ P p0, 1q, the following must
be satisfied:
BU1IB
Bµs

µs0
 
rφ∆V
1  φ  

1  rφ1  φ


γφ∆V ¡ 0;
BU1IB
Bµs

µs1
 
rφ∆V
1  φ 

1  rφ1  φ


p1 γqφ∆V   0.
The first implies that r   γp1 φq1γφ while the second is always satisfied. Then BU1IB{Bµs  0
when µs  µ. Also, for µs P r0, µq, BU1IB{Bµs ¡ 0 yet BU1IB{Bµs   0 for µs P pµ, 1s.
Therefore, U1IB is single-peaked and has a hump shape on r0, 1s.
Since from above we know that
U1IBp
φ
1  φ, µsq  
rφ
1  φ  pµs∆V   VLq  

1  rφ1  φ



p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
,
it is obvious that there always exists a set of µs P p0, 1q such that U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq ¡ 0 as
long as r is not too large. In particular, we impose that for µs  12 , U1IBp
φ
1 φ ,
1
2q ¡ 0. This
implies r   γp1γqp1 φq∆V∆Vγp1γqφ∆V 2VL . Therefore, 0   r   mint
γp1 φq
1γφ ,
γp1γqp1 φq∆V
∆Vγp1γqφ∆V 2VL u, i.e.
r P p0, γp1γqp1 φq∆V∆Vγp1γqφ∆V 2VL q.
In the meantime, U1IBp
φ
1 φ , 0q  
φrVL
1 φ   0 and U1IBp
φ
1 φ , 1q  
φrp∆V VLq
1 φ   0.
Hence there must be a pair of tµ, µu with 0   µ   12   µ   1 such that U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µq 
U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µq  0. In addition, U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq ¡ 0 if µs P pµ, µq, and U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq   0 if
µs P r0, µq Y pµ, 1s.
Last but not least, it follows naturally that BU1IB{Bµs ¡ 0 at µs  µ but BU1IB{Bµs   0
at µs  µ, an important observation that will be useful to calculate the comparative static
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analysis of the optimal disclosure later. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4. When β P r φ1 φ , 1q, there will be discount in the issue price.
Also,
U1IBpβ, µsq  βtrEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P u   p1 βq∆P.
Note that
trEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P u ∆P  rpEsrv˜s ∆P q
 r

VL   µs∆V 
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γqp1 γφq
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq

  0.
Hence to maximize U1IBpβ, µsq, we want p1βq to be as large as possible. This is achieved
by choosing the smallest β  φ1 φ such that informed trading is still feasible. Also, it is
easy to see that U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq ¡ U
1
IBp1, µsq for all µs P p0, 1q. So in equilibrium, stake
φ
1 φ strictly dominates stake 1. Moreover, we know that for β  0, U1IBp0, µsq  0,
and for β  1, U1IBp1, µsq   0. So β  0 strictly dominates β  1. To characterize the
investment bank’s optimal retention at posterior belief µs, it suffices to compare U1IBp0, µsq
with U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq. From Lemma 2.2, it follows that the investment bank’s optimal stake
is
β 
$&
%
φ
1 φ if µs P pµ, µq,
0 if µs P r0, µs Y rµ, 1s.
His equilibrium payoff is
Uˆ1IBpµsq 
$&
%
U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq if µs P pµ, µq,
0 if µs P r0, µs Y rµ, 1s.

Proof of Proposition 2.5. From Proposition 2.4 we know that the investment bank will
hold a positive stake φ1 φ only when µs P pµ, µq. So for this set of posterior beliefs, there
will be informed trading by the bank and thus an adverse selection discount in the issue
price. The issuer’s expected proceeds are
U1Epµsq  µs∆V   VL 
µsp1 µsqγp1 γqφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
At any other posterior belief, the investment bank retains zero stake and cannot engage
in informed trading. The issue price will just be the intrinsic value of the security, i.e.
U1Epµsq  µs∆V   VL.

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Proof of Proposition 2.6. At any prior belief µ0 P r0, µs Y rµ, 1s, a sender-preferred
equilibrium prescribes that the investment bank should not retain any shares. In this
case, the issue price will be the expected value of the cash flows from the security with
no discount. Thus the issuer does not benefit from persuasion and the optimal disclosure
system should be completely uninformative, i.e piG  piB P p0, 1q, yielding posteriors
µ`  µh  µ0.
At prior belief µ0 P pµ, µq, the investment bank holds a strictly positive stake, and
there will be a discounted associated with the issue price. The issuer’s expected payoff
under any Bayesian plausible posteriors µh and µ` is
EpirU1Epµsqs  Epir1tµ0Pr0,µsYrµ,1su  pµs∆V   VLq   1tµ0Ppµ,µqupµs∆V   VL ∆P qs
 Prµhs  r1tµhPr0,µsYrµ,1su  pµh∆V   VLq   1tµhPpµ,µqupµh∆V   VL ∆P qs
 Prµ`s  r1tµ`Pr0,µsYrµ,1su  pµ`∆V   VLq   1tµ`Ppµ,µqupµ`∆V   VL ∆P qs
¤ Ppµhqpµh∆V   VLq   Ppµ`qpµ`∆V   VLq,
where the last inequality is satisfied with if µ` P r0, µs, µh P rµ, 1s and Ppµhqµh Ppµ`q  µ0.
Hence the least informative optimal disclosure yields posteriors µ`  µ and µh  µ. In
this case Uˆ1Epµ0q  maxEpirU1Epµsqs  µ0∆V   VL. Using Bayes’ theorem, simple algebra
gives piB 
p1µqpµ0µq
p1µ0qpµµq and piG 
µpµ0µq
µ0pµµq . 
Proof of Proposition 2.7. Recall that µ and µ are two roots to the equation U1IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq 
0. Write explicitly,
U1IBp
φ
1  φ, µsq 
φ
1  φ 

rpµs∆V   VLq   p1  rq 
µsp1 µsqγp1 γqφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq

 
1
1  φ 
µsp1 µsqγp1 γqφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
 0.
Multiply both sides by 1 φφ , and define
F pµs, θq 
1  φ
φ
 U1IBp
φ
1  φ, µsq
 rpµs∆V   VLq   r1  p1  rqφs 
µsp1 µsqγp1 γq∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
,
where θ P tVL, ∆VL , r, φu. By the implicit function theorem, at µs  µ or µ,
BF
Bµs

Bµs
Bθ
 
BF
Bθ
 0.
This gives
sign

Bµs
Bθ


 sign

BF
Bµs

BF
Bθ


.
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Next we calculate F pµs, θq’s partial derivatives with respect to different θ P tVL, η, r, φu:
BF
BVL
 r   0;
BF
Br
 VL  µs∆V

1 p1 µsqp1 γqγφ
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq

  0;
BF
Bφ
 p1  rq  µsp1 µsqγp1 γq∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
¡ 0.
Define η  ∆VVL , and
f 
F
∆V  rpµs∆V  
1
η
q   r1  p1  rqφs  µsp1 µsqγp1 γq
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.
So
Bf
Bη

r
η2
¡ 0 ñ BF
Bη

r∆V
η2
¡ 0.
Moreover, in the proof of Lemma 2.2 we have shown that BFBµs ¡ 0 at µs  µ but
BF
Bµs   0
at µs  µ. Consequently, we have (1)
Bµ
BVL ¡ 0 and
Bµ
BVL   0; (2)
Bµ
Bη   0 and
Bµ
Bη ¡ 0; (3)
Bµ
Br ¡ 0 and
Bµ
Br   0; (4)
Bµ
Bφ   0 and
Bµ
Bφ ¡ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.8. If the investment bank chooses to underwrite and his planned
retention is βˆ, we can write his expected payoff as
U2IBpβˆ, µsq  Ap1 ψ, µsq   p1 qBpβˆ, µsq  rp1 ψq   p1 qβˆs  rrEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P s
 rψ   p1 qp1 βˆqs ∆P.
Recall from the proof of Proposition 2.4 that rEsrv˜s p1  rq∆P   ∆P , thus we want βˆ
to be as small as possible yet such stake still allows the underwriter to engage in informed
trading if demand shock does not happen. The optimal planned retention is βˆ  φ1 φ , the
stake that is just enough for the bank to camouflage as liquidity traders. 
Proof of Lemma 2.3. The proof resembles that of Lemma 2.2. Specifically, the equation
now becomes
U2IBp
φ
1  φ, µsq  rp1 ψq   p1 qβˆsrrEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P s   rψ   p1 qp1 βˆqs∆P
 0.
B2 U2IB
Bµ2s   0 because
B2 ∆P
Bµ2s   0. So U
2
IB is concave in µs. To ensure that the interior
optimum is attained at some µ P p0, 1q, the following must be satisfied:
BU2IB
Bµs

µs0
 Kr∆V   rp1  rqK   p1Kqsγφ∆V ¡ 0;
BU2IB
Bµs

µs1
 Kr∆V  rp1  rqK   p1Kqsp1 γqφ∆V   0,
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where K  p1  ψq   p1  qp φ1 φq and 1 K  ψ   p1  qp
1
1 φq. The first inequality
implies
r  
γφp1  φq
rp1  φqp1 ψq  φp1 qsp1 γφq ,
while the second is always satisfied.
Some simple algebra reveals that U2IBp
φ
1 φ , 0q   0 and U2IBp
φ
1 φ , 1q   0. Moreover, we
need U2IBp
φ
1 φ ,
1
2q ¡ 0. This implies
r  
γφp1  φqp1 γq∆V
rp1  φqp1 ψq  φp1 qsr∆V  γφp1 γq∆V   2VLs
.
Therefore, r   min
!
γφp1 φq
rp1 φqp1ψq φp1qsp1γφq ,
γφp1 φqp1γq∆V
rp1 φqp1ψq φp1qsr∆Vγφp1γq∆V 2VLs
)
, i.e.
r   γφp1 φqp1γq∆Vrp1 φqp1ψq φp1qsr∆Vγφp1γq∆V 2VLs . Note that both U
1
IB and U2IB are convex com-
binations of two ingredients rEsrv˜s   p1   rq∆P and ∆P with the latter strictly larger
than the former. It is easy to see that U1IB puts more weight on ∆P and thus less weight
on rEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P than U2IB. Hence U1IB ¡ U2IB, @µs P r0, 1s.
With the same logic used in the proof of Lemma 2.2, it follows naturally:
1. There exists a pair tµ, µu with 0   µ   µ   12   µ   µ   1 such that
U2IBp
φ
1 φ , µ
q  U2IBp
φ
1 φ , µ
q  0.
2. U2IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq ¡ 0 if µs P pµ, µq, and U˜IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq   0 if µs P r0, µq or µs P pµ, 1s.

Proof of Proposition 2.9 and Proposition 2.10. It follows naturally from Propo-
sition 2.8 and Lemma 2.3 that at T  1, the investment bank will agree to underwrite
if his planned retention φ1 φ gives him a non-negative expected payoff. So he chooses to
underwrite if µs P rµ, µs, and not underwrite otherwise. The issuer is only able to issue
the security when µs P rµ, µs, and get an expected payoff of Esrv˜s ∆P . 
Proof of Proposition 2.11. The optimal information design depends on the prior µ0.
1. First we investigate the optimal system when prior µ0 P r0, µq. In this case the
investment bank does not underwrite if no additional information is disclosed. Con-
sider any two arbitrary posteriors µ` and µh with 0 ¤ µ` ¤ µ0 ¤ µh ¤ 1 and
Prs  `sµ`   Prs  hsµh  µ0. To maximize her expected proceeds, the issuer will
set µ`  0 to have the maximal Prs  hsµh which is µ0. Also, the issuer will set
a µh P rµ, µs so that the investment bank is willing to underwrite. Her expected
payoff is therefore Prs  hsP0pµhq  µ0P0pµhqµh . Recall that
U2IBp
φ
1  φ, µsq  KrrEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P s   p1Kq∆P  rKP0pµsq  ∆P pµsq,
where K  p1 ψq   p1 qp φ1 φq, and ∆P pµsq means ∆P is a function of µs.
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At µs  µ or µ, U2IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq  0. This implies
rKP0pµsq  ∆P pµsq  0
ñ
P0pµsq
µs

∆P pµsq
rKµs

p1 µsqγp1 γqφ∆V
rKrµsγ   p1 µsqp1 γqs
.
The last term is decreasing in µs P rµ, µs. Since µ   µ, we have
P0pµq
µ ¡
P0pµq
µ .
Moreover, at µs P rµ, µs, U2IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq ¥ 0. This implies
rKP0pµsq  ∆P pµsq ¥ 0
ñ
P0pµsq
µs
¤
∆P pµsq
rKµs
¤
∆P pµq
rKµ

P0pµq
µ
.
Therefore, the optimal system will induce two posteriors µ`  0 and µh  µ. The
relevant precision parameters are piB 
µ0p1µq
µp1µ0q and piG  1.
2. Second, we derive the optimal system when µ0 P pµ, 1s. Consider any two arbitrary
posteriors µ` and µh with 0 ¤ µ` ¤ µ0 ¤ µh ¤ 1 and Prs  `sµ`   Prs  hsµh  µ0.
To maximize her expected proceeds, the issuer will set µh  1. This ensures that
for any fixed µ`, the probability of achieving this posterior Prs  `s  µhµ0µhµl will be
maximized, i.e. the probability of underwriting will be the highest. Her expected
payoff is therefore Prs  `sP0pµ`q  1µ01µ`  P0pµ`q. Since both
1µ0
1µ` and P0pµ`q are
increasing in µ`, it is optimal to set µ`  µ. Hence the optimal system yields two
posteriors µ`  µ and µh  1. This gives piB  µ0µ

µ0p1µq and piG  0.
3. Third, when µ0  µ or µ, the investment bank is break-even by underwriting the
deal. In this case, a completely uninformative disclosure system is optimal. It has
piG  piB P p0, 1q, yielding posteriors µ`  µh  µ0.
4. Finally, we find the optimal system when µ0 P pµ, µq. Since ∆P pµsq is concave in
µs, P0pµsq  Esrv˜s ∆P is convex and increases in µs. First consider any arbitrary
posteriors µ` and µh such that µ ¤ µ` ¤ µ0 ¤ µh ¤ µ.
In order for the two pairs of posteriors tµ, µu and tµ`, µhu to be Bayesian plausible,
they should satisfy
µ0  λµ
   p1 λqµ,
µ0  λ¯µ`   p1 λ¯qµh.
Moreover, we can write
µ`  λ`µ
   p1 λ`qµ,
µh  λhµ
   p1 λhqµ.
Here λ, λ`, λh, and λ¯ all lie in r0, 1s.
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So we have
µ0  λ¯rλ`µ
   p1 λ`qµs   p1 λ¯qrλhµ   p1 λhqµs
 rλ¯λ`   p1 λ¯qλhsµ   rλ¯p1 λ`q   p1 λ¯qp1 λhqsµ
 λµ   p1 λqµ.
By Jensen’s inequality,
U2Ep
φ
1  φ, µ0q  P0pµ0q
¤ λ¯P0pµ`q   p1 λ¯qP0pµhq
¤ λ¯rλ`P0pµ
q   p1 λ`qP0pµqs   p1 λ¯qrλhP0pµq   p1 λhqP0pµqs
 rλ¯λ`   p1 λ¯qλhsP0pµq   rλ¯p1 λ`q   p1 λ¯qp1 λhqsP0pµq
 λP0pµ
q   p1 λqP0pµq
 Uˆ2Epµ0q,
where λ  µ
µ0
µµ  Prs  `s. The issuer achieves expected payoff Uˆ
2
Epµ0q by setting
µ`  µ
 and µh  µ.
We further consider two other possibilities. If we set µ`  0, then the issuer’s
expected payoff upon observing s  ` is zero. Her expected payoff is thus µ0µh 
P0pµhq   P0pµhq. Since P0pµsq is convex in µs, we have P0pµhq ¤ λP0pµq   p1 
λqP0pµq  Uˆ2Epµ0q. Hence
µ0
µh
 P0pµhq   P0pµhq ¤ Uˆ
2
Epµ0q, rendering this strategy
suboptimal. If we set µh  1, under this system, the issuer’s expected payoff is
1µ0
1µ`  P0pµ`q   P0pµ0q   Uˆ
2
Epµ0q because P0pµsq is convex and increasing in µs.
Again, such system is not optimal too.
In sum, the optimal system will induce two posteriors µ`  µ and µh  µ. By
Bayes’ theorem, piG 
µpµ0µq
µ0pµµq and piB 
p1µqpµ0µq
p1µ0qpµµq . 
Proof of Proposition 2.12. Recall that if the investment bank chooses to underwrite
and his planned retention is φ1 φ , then
U2IBp
φ
1  φ, µsq  r

p1 ψq   p1 q φ1  φ

pµs∆V   VLq
 
"
1  r

p1 ψq   p1 q φ1  φ
*

p1 µsqµsp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
Define Gpµs, θ1q  U2IBp
φ
1 φ , µsq  0 where θ1 P t, ψ, VL,
∆V
VL
, r, φu. By the implicit
function theorem, at µs  µ or µ,
BG
Bµs

Bµs
Bθ1
 
BG
Bθ1
 0.
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Like before,
sign

Bµs
Bθ1


 sign

BG
Bµs

BG
Bθ1


.
Moreover,
BG
B
 r

p1 ψq  φ1  φ

pEsrv˜s ∆P q   0;
BG
Bψ
 rpEsrv˜s ∆P q ¡ 0;
BG
BVL
 r

p1 ψq   p1 q φ1  φ

  0;
BG
Br
 

p1 ψq   p1 q φ1  φ

pEsrv˜s ∆P q   0.
Multiply Gpµs, φq by p1  φq we obtain
g1pµs, φq  p1  φqGpµs, φq  rK1 Esrv˜s   t1  rK1u∆P  0,
where K1  p1 ψqp1  φq   p1 qφ. This implies
Esrv˜s 
p1  rK1q∆P
rK1
.
Note that
BK1
Bφ
 1 ψ  K1  p1 ψq
φ
.
Therefore,
Bg1
Bφ
 r 
K1  p1 ψq
φ

p1  rK1q∆P
rK1
 r 
K1  p1 ψq
φ
∆P   p1  rK1q 
∆P
φ

∆P
φ

"
rrK1  p1 ψqs 
1
rK1
  p1  rK1q
*

∆P
φ


p1 ψq
K1
  rK1

¡ 0.
We then divide g1pµs, φq by ∆V , and obtain
g2  rK1pµs  
1
η
q   p1  rK1q 
µsp1 µsqγp1 γq
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
,
where η  ∆VVL . So
Bg2
Bη

rK1
η2
¡ 0.
Recall from the proof of Lemma 2.3, we know that BU2IB{Bµs ¡ 0 at µs  µ yet
BU2IB{Bµs   0 at µs  µ. Hence at µs  µ, BG{Bµs ¡ 0, Bg1{Bµs ¡ 0, and Bg2{Bµs ¡ 0.
Meanwhile at µs  µ, BG{Bµs   0, Bg1{Bµs   0, and Bg2{Bµs   0.
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Accordingly, by the implicit function theorem, (1) Bµ

B ¡ 0 and
Bµ
B   0; (2)
Bµ
Bψ   0
and Bµ

Bψ ¡ 0; (3)
Bµ
BVL ¡ 0 and
Bµ
BVL   0; (4) Recall that η 
∆V
VL
, then Bµ

Bη   0 and
Bµ
Bη ¡ 0;
(5) Bµ

Br ¡ 0 and
Bµ
Br   0; (6)
Bµ
Bφ   0 and
Bµ
Bφ ¡ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.13. If there is no demand uncertainty, the investment bank
chooses his optimal retention β to maximize his expected payoff:
U3IBpβ, µsq  βtrEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P u   p1 βq∆P.
Because we know that trEsrv˜s   p1   rq∆P u   ∆P , it is optimal to choose the largest
possible p1βq. Since the underwrite can sell the security short in the secondary market,
he no longer has to retain any share in the primary market. Thus he chooses the optimal
βpµsq  0, and his maximal expected payoff is just
Uˆ3IBpµsq  U
3
IBp0, µsq 
µsp1 µsqγp1 γqφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
.

Proof of Proposition 2.14. Given the investment bank’s best response in the primary
market, the issuer’s expected payoff conditional on posterior belief is
U3Epµsq  pµs∆V q 
µsp1 µsqγp1 γqφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
 P0pµsq.
As we have shown before, this function is convex in µs P r0, 1s. For any posteriors µ` and
µh that are Bayesian plausible,
U3Epµ0q ¤ Prs  `sP0pµ`q   Prs  hsP0pµhq
¤ Prs  `sP0p0q   Prs  hsP0p1q.
The last inequality follows form the convexity of the function, and it holds with strict
inequality if µ0 P p0, 1q. Therefore, the optimal system generates a low posterior µ`  0
and a high posterior µh  1. The system is fully informative in that piG  1 and piB  0.

Proof of Lemma 2.4. If the investment bank agrees to underwrite and chooses a planed
retention βˆ  0, his expected payoff is
U4IBpβˆ  0, µsq  tp1 ψqrEsrv˜s  p1  rqpEsrv˜s ∆P qs   ψ∆P u   p1 q∆P
 p1 ψqtrEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P u   rψ   p1 qs∆P
 p1 ψqrEsrv˜s   rp1  rqp1 ψq   ψ   p1 qs∆P
¡ U2IBpβˆ 
φ
1  φ, µsq.
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The last inequality holds because when demand shock does not happen and there is short
sale constraint, the underwriter has to retain a positive stake to engage in informed trading,
which incurs cost of capital and undermines the informed trading profits.
It is easy to see that U4IBpβˆ  0, µsq is concave in µs because of the concavity of ∆P .
Like in the proofs of Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3, to ensure its optimum appears at some
µ P p0, 1q, we require
BU4IB
Bµs

µs0
 p1 ψqr∆V   rp1  rqp1 ψq   ψ   p1 qsγφ∆V ¡ 0;
BU4IB
Bµs

µs1
 p1 ψqr∆V  rp1  rqp1 ψq   ψ   p1 qsp1 γqφ∆V   0.
The first requires that r   γφp1ψqp1γφq , while the second always holds.
It’s easy to see that U4IBpβˆ  0, 0q   0 and U4IBpβˆ  0, 1q   0. We further re-
quire that U4IBpβˆ  0, 12q ¡ 0. This implies that r  
γp1γqφ∆V
p1ψqr∆Vγp1γqφ∆V 2VLs . So
r   mint γφp1ψqp1γφq ,
γp1γqφ∆V
p1ψqr∆Vγp1γqφ∆V 2VLsu, i.e. r  
γp1γqφ∆V
p1ψqr∆Vγp1γqφ∆V 2VLs .
As long as all of the above are satisfied, it follows naturally that:
1. There exists a pair tµ, µu with 0   µ   µ   12   µ   µ   1 such that
U4IBp0, µq  U4IBp0, µq  0.
2. U4IBp0, µsq ¡ 0 if µs P pµ, µq, and U˜IBp0, µsq   0 if µs P r0, µq or µs P pµ, 1s.

Proof of Proposition 2.15. From Proposition 2.13 we know that if demand shock
does not happen, it is optimal for the investment bank not to retain any share in the
primary market. If demand shock happens, he is forced to retain p1  ψq. Therefore, his
optimal planned retention should always be zero if the bank decides to underwrite. From
Lemma 2.4 we know that the investment bank will choose to underwrite only at posteriors
µs P rµ
, µs, otherwise he will withdraw from underwriting. This gives his expected
payoff
Uˆ4IBpµsq 
$&
%
U4IBpβˆ  0, µsq if µs P rµ, µs,
0 if µs P r0, µq Y pµ, 1s.

Proof of Proposition 2.16. Proposition 2.16 follows naturally from Proposition 2.15.

Proof of Proposition 2.17. Much of the proof resembles that of Proposition 2.11.
Likewise, we consider four cases respectively.
1. If µ0 P r0, µq, like part 1 of Proposition 2.11’s proof, it is optimal to set µ`  0
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and the issuer’s expected payoff is µ0P0pµhqµh . Define K2  p1 ψq, so
U4IBp0, µsq  rK2 Esrv˜s   p1  rK2q∆P ¥ 0
ñ rK2pEsrv˜s ∆P q ¤ ∆P
ñ
µ0P0pµsq
µs
¤
µ0∆P
rK2µs
.
The last holds with equality when µs  µ or µ. Since
∆P
µs

p1 µsqp1 γqγφ∆V
µsγ   p1 µsqp1 γq
which is decreasing in µs and achieves the maximum at µs  µ. Therefore it
is optimal for the issuer to set µh  µ so that she gets the highest expected
payoff µ0P0pµ
q
µ . In sum, the optimal system will induce two posteriors µ`  0 and
µh  µ
. The relevant precision parameters are piB 
µ0p1µq
µp1µ0q and piG  1.
2. If µ0 P pµ, 1s, with the same reasoning as part 2 of Proposition 2.11’s proof,
it is optimal to set µh  1. Her expected payoff is therefore Prs  `sP0pµ`q 
1µ0
1µ`  P0pµ`q. Since both
1µ0
1µ` and P0pµ`q are increasing in µ`, it is optimal to set
µ`  µ
. Hence the optimal system yields two posteriors µ`  µ and µh  1.
This gives piB  µ0µ

µ0p1µq and piG  0.
3. Third, when µ0  µ or µ, the investment bank is break-even by underwriting
the deal. In this case, a completely uninformative disclosure system is optimal. It
has piG  piB P p0, 1q, yielding posteriors µ`  µh  µ0.
4. Finally, we explore the cae when µ0 P pµ, µq. Using a similar argument as in part
3 of Proposition 2.11’s proof, we have µ`  µ and µh  µ due to the convexity of
U4IBp0, µsq in µs on rµ, µs. Again, setting either µ`  0 or µh  1 is suboptimal.
Hence the optimal system has piG 
µpµ0µq
µ0pµµq and piB 
p1µqpµ0µq
p1µ0qpµµq . 
Proof of Proposition 2.18. Note that µ and µ are two roots of the following
equation:
U4IBp0, µsq  rK2 Esrv˜s   p1  rK2q∆P  0.
Define
Jpµs, θ1q  rK2 Esrv˜s   p1  rK2q∆P,
where K2  p1 ψq and θ1 P t, ψ, VL, ∆VVL , r, φu. Some simple algebra gives
BJ
B
 rp1 ψqpEsrv˜s ∆P q   0;
BJ
Bψ
 rpEsrv˜s ∆P q ¡ 0;
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BJ
BVL
 rp1 ψq   0;
BJ
Br
 p1 ψqpEsrv˜s ∆P q   0;
BJ
Bφ
 r1  rp1 ψqs  ∆P
φ
¡ 0
Let j  J{∆V , we obtain
Bj
Bη

rp1 ψq
η2
¡ 0.
Moreover, from the proof of Lemma 2.4, at µs  µ, BJBµs ¡ 0, while at µs  µ
, BJBµs   0.
So by the implicit function theorem, we have (1) Bµ

B ¡ 0 and
Bµ
B   0; (2)
Bµ
Bψ   0
and Bµ

Bψ ¡ 0; (3)
Bµ
BVL ¡ 0 and
Bµ
BVL   0; (4) Recall that η 
∆V
VL
, then Bµ

Bη   0 and
Bµ
Bη ¡ 0; (5)
Bµ
Br ¡ 0 and
Bµ
Br   0; (6)
Bµ
Bφ   0 and
Bµ
Bφ ¡ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.19. Recall that i P t1, 2, 3, 4u represents one of the following
four scenarios: 1. (No Short Sale, No Demand Uncertainty), 2. (No Short Sale, Demand
Uncertainty), 3. (Short Sale, No Demand Uncertainty), and 4. (Short Sale, Demand
Uncertainty).
We have already shown that U1IBpβ 
φ
1 φ , µsq ¡ U
2
IBpβˆ 
φ
1 φ , µsq and 0   µ   µ  
1
2   µ
   µ   1, as well as U4IBpβˆ  0, µsq ¡ U2IBpβˆ 
φ
1 φ , µsq and 0   µ   µ  
1
2  
µ   µ   1. Thus it remains to compare U1IBpβ 
φ
1 φ , µsq and U4IBpβˆ  0, µsq to rank
the welfare of the investment banks. Recall that
U4IBpβˆ  0, µsq  tp1 ψqtEsrv˜s  p1  rqpEsrv˜s ∆P qu   ψ∆P u   p1 q∆P,
 p ψqtrEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P u   pψ  1 q∆P,
and
U1IBpβ 
φ
1  φ, µsq 
φ
1  φ  trEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P u  
1
1  φ ∆P.
Since we have shown that trEsrv˜s   p1  rq∆P u   ∆P, it is easy to see:
(1) If   ψ   φ1 φ , i.e.   
φ
p1ψqp1 φq , then U
1
IBpβ 
φ
1 φ , µsq   U
4
IBpβˆ  0, µsq, and
0   µ   µ   µ   12   µ   µ   µ   1. Note that the investment banks’
welfare is
WIBpiq 
» 1
0
Uˆ iIBpµ0q dµ0 
» µpiq
µpiq
U iIBp  , µ0q dµ0.
where µpiq and µpiq denote the relevant cut-offs in scenario i, and “  ” denotes the
investment banks’ relevant retention in U iIBp  , µsq. Hence we obtain the following
ranking:
WIBpSS,NDUq ¡WIBpSS,DUq ¡WIBpNSS,NDUq ¡WIBpNSS,DUq.
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(2) Similarly, if  ¡ φp1ψqp1 φq , then 0   µ   µ
   µ   12   µ
   µ   µ   1 and
WIBpSS,NDUq ¡WIBpNSS,NDUq ¡WIBpSS,DUq ¡WIBpNSS,DUq.
(3) Finally, if   φp1ψqp1 φq , then 0   µ  µ
   µ   12   µ
   µ  µ   1 and
WIBpSS,NDUq ¡WIBpNSS,NDUq WIBpSS,DUq ¡WIBpNSS,DUq.

Proof of Proposition 2.20. If the issuers do not disclose additional information, the
investment banks’ decisions to underwrite and the issuers’ expected payoffs will depend
directly on µ0. Also,
WEp1q 
» µ
0
pµ0∆V   VLq dµ0  
» µ
µ

pµ0∆V   VLq 
p1 µ0qµ0p1 γqγφ∆V
µ0γ   p1 µ0qp1 γq

dµ0
 
» 1
µ
pµ0∆V   VLq dµ0,
WEp2q 
» µ
0
0 dµ0  
» µ
µ

pµ0∆V   VLq 
p1 µ0qµ0p1 γqγφ∆V
µ0γ   p1 µ0qp1 γq

dµ0  
» 1
µ
0 dµ0,
WEp3q 
» 1
0

pµ0∆V   VLq 
p1 µ0qµ0p1 γqγφ∆V
µ0γ   p1 µ0qp1 γq

dµ0,
WEp4q 
» µ
0
0 dµ0  
» µ
µ

pµ0∆V   VLq 
p1 µ0qµ0p1 γqγφ∆V
µ0γ   p1 µ0qp1 γq

dµ0  
» 1
µ
0 dµ0.
Therefore, the ranking is as follow,
WEpNSS,NDUq ¡WEpSS,NDUq ¡WEpSS,DUq ¡WEpNSS,DUq.
We can write
P0pµq  pµ∆V   VLq 
p1 µqµp1 γqγφ∆V
µγ   p1 µqp1 γq ,
which is increasing in µ and does not exceed pµ∆V  VLq. Then if all of the issuers design
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Figure B.1: Welfare Comparison
their disclosure policies optimally, their welfare under four different scenarios are
WˆEp1q 
» 1
0
pµ0∆V   VLq dµ0,
WˆEp2q 
» µ
0
P0pµ
q 
µ0
µ
dµ0  
» µ
µ

P0pµ
q  
P0pµq  P0pµq
µ  µ
 pµ0  µ
q

dµ0
 
» 1
µ

P0pµ
q 
P0pµq
1 µ  pµ0  µ
q

dµ0,
WˆEp3q 
» 1
0
pµ0∆V   VLq dµ0,
WˆEp4q 
» µ
0
P0pµ
q 
µ0
µ
dµ0  
» µ
µ

P0pµ
q  
P0pµq  P0pµq
µ  µ
 pµ0  µ
q

dµ0
 
» 1
µ

P0pµ
q 
P0pµq
1 µ  pµ0  µ
q

dµ0.
It is easy to see that WˆEp1q  WˆEp3q, and both achieve the highest possible welfare.
It suffices to show that WˆEp4q ¡ WˆEp2q. Intuitively, this is because the graph of Uˆ2Epµq is
beneath that of Uˆ4Epµq for @µ P p0, 1q due to the convexity of P0pµq.
Next we formally show that indeed Uˆ4Epµ0q is piece-wise larger than Uˆ2Epµ0q for any
prior belief µ0 P p0, 1q. A graphical illustration is given in Figure B.1.
1. When µ0 P p0, µs, we have shown in the proofs of Proposition 2.11 and 2.17 that
because µ   µ, we have P0pµ
q
µ ¡
P0pµq
µ . Hence
P0pµqµ0
µ ¡
P0pµqµ0
µ , i.e.
Uˆ4Epµ0q ¡ Uˆ
2
Epµ0q.
2. When µ0 P pµ, µq, Uˆ4Epµ0q is a convex combination of P0pµq and P0pµq, which
is strictly larger than P0pµq due to convexity of P0pµq. Since Uˆ2Epµ0q 
P0pµqµ0
µ  
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P0pµq, we have Uˆ4Epµ0q ¡ Uˆ2Epµ0q.
3. When µ0 P rµ, µs, the convexity of P0pµq implies that the convex combination
of P0pµq and P0pµq strictly dominates the convex combination of P0pµq and
P0pµq. This implies Uˆ4Epµ0q ¡ Uˆ2Epµ0q.
4. When µ0 P pµ, µq, Uˆ2Epµ0q  P0pµq 
P0pµq
1µ  pµ0  µ
q   P0pµq. Also, P0pµq
is strictly smaller than the convex combination of P0pµq and P0pµq. Hence
Uˆ4Epµ0q ¡ Uˆ
2
Epµ0q.
5. When µ0 P rµ, 1q, we define
∆Upµ0q  Uˆ2Epµ0qUˆ4E  rpµ0q  P0pµq
P0pµq
1 µ pµ0µ
qsrP0pµq
P0pµq
1 µ pµ0µ
qs.
It is easy to see that B∆UBµ0 
P0pµq
1µ 
P0pµq
1µ ¡ 0 and ∆Upµ0q  0 if µ0  1. Hence
at µ0 P rµ, 1q, ∆Upµ0q   0, i.e. Uˆ4Epµ0q ¡ Uˆ2Epµ0q.
Therefore, it follows naturally that
WˆEpNSS,NDUq  WˆEpSS,NDUq ¡ WˆEpSS,DUq ¡ WˆEpNSS,DUq.

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Appendix C
Proofs and Further Results of
Chapter 3
Definitions and Notations
Here is a list of some definitions and notations used in Chapter 3:
• µ0: common prior probability that state is good
• µ¯: the level of posterior such that the principal is indifferent between implementing
high or low effort, i.e., V pe  1, µ¯q  V pe  0, µ¯q (when V pe  1, µ¯q and V pe  0, µ¯q
only have one intersection point)
• µ¯1 and µ¯2: the levels of posterior such that the principal is indifferent between
implementing high or low effort, i.e., 0   µ¯1   µ¯2   1 such that V pe  1, µ¯1qV pe 
0, µ¯1q  V pe  1, µ¯2q  V pe  0, µ¯2q  0 (when V pe  1, µ¯q and V pe  0, µ¯q have
two intersection points)
• µs  Probpθ  G|sq: (the principal’s and the agent’s) common posterior belief1
about the state, given the realization of experiment s
• µ˜: the posterior generated by the optimal experiment and the realization of the
experiment is “Good”, when:1) state and effort are compliments; 2) pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡
pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, 3) V pµq  V pe  0, µq for some µ and V pµq  V pe  1, µq for some
other µ
• µ˜I is solution to the equation that B
pV pe1,µqV pe0,0qq
pµ0q
Bµ  0.
• ˜˜µ: the posterior generated by the optimal experiment and the realization of the
experiment is “Bad”, when: 1)state and effort are substitutes; 2) V pµq  V pe  1, µq
for some µ, and V pµq  V pe  0, µq for some other µ.
1Due to common knowledge and information symmetry
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• µˆ: the a level of µ such that
Blog

Eµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2


Bµ |µµˆ  0 (if existing)
• V pµq: principal’s continuation value when the experiment has realized and lead to
a posterior µ
• V˜ pµq: principal’s value of the whole game
• ∆ppθq  pp1, θq  pp0, θq
• ∆∆p  ppp1, Gq  pp0, Gqq  ppp1, Bq  pp0, Bqq
• Eµppeq  pµqppe,Gq   p1 µqppe,Bq
• Eµ∆p  pµq∆ppGq   p1 µq∆ppBq
Formal Definition of the Game
Here I present a (slightly) more formal definition of the baseline model, mainly to formally
define Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in this chapter.
Player Set:
N  tP,A,Nu
As mentioned earlier, besides the Principal (P), the Agent (A), there is a pseudo-player
called Nature (N).
Action and Strategy Spaces:
Denote player i’s action space as Ai and strategy space as Σi.
AA  t0, 1u
AP  r0, 1s2

R 2
AN  tG,Bu

tG,Bu2

tyH , yLu
ΣA  ∆pAAq, ΣP  ∆pAP q
ΣN  ΣN1

ΣN2

ΣN3
ΣN1  tpσN1pGq, σN1pBqq|σN1pGq  µ0, σN1pBq  1 σN1pGqu
ΣN2 

θPG,B
 
pσN2|θpGq, σN2|θpBqq|σN2|θpGq  pipG|θq, σN2|θpBq  1 σN2|θpGq
(
ΣN3 
θPG,B

eP0,1
 
pσN3|θ,epyHq, σN3|θ,epyLqq|σN3|θ,epyHq  ppθ, eq, σN3|θ,epyLq  1 σN3|θ,epyHq
(
The agent chooses an effort of 0 or 1; the principal designs the experiment and the
performance contract. Individual randomization is allowed in this game. Nature chooses
the realization of the state and also later chooses the realization of the signal, based on the
experiment that the principal designed. It also chooses the realization of output, based
on the effort of the agent and the state.
Pay-off functions:
uP paA, aP , aN q  y  w, uApaA, aP , aN q  w  cpeq, cp0q  0, cp1q  c ¡ 0
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The payoff of nature is not defined.
Expected utility functions for P and A, EuP pσA, σP , σN q, EuApσA, σP , σN q, are defined
accordingly in the standard way.
Beliefs
Denote the public history at the beginning of period t as ht.
In this game, the only private information that matters for P’s and A’s decisions is
the realization of state, θ. This is the private information of Nature. Therefore, the only
beliefs that matters are µjpθ|htq, j  P,A. 2
Timeline
Period 1:
N choose θ
and
unobservable
for
P and A
Period 2:
P
publicly
chooses
tpips|θqu
Period 3:
N chooses s
according to
θ and tpips|θqu;
s
is observed
by
both players
Period 4:
P offers
a contract
twH , wLu
Period 5:
if accepted,
A chooses
effort e
Period 6:
N chooses
output
according to
e and θ
Period 7:
output
realized
and
wage
paid
The timeline of the baseline model under the formal definition is as follows:
Period 1: Nature chooses the state θ according to the prior probability, µ0.
Period 2: the principal publicly chooses a direct experiment tpips|θqu, s P tG,Bu.
Period 3: Nature chooses s according to tpips|θqu and its choice of θ. s is publicly
observable to both the principal and the agent.
Period 4: the principal offers a contract twH , wLu to the agent. If the agent rejects
the contract, the game ends and both players get an outside payoff of 0.
Period 5: if the contract is accepted, the agent chooses effort e that is unobservable to
the Principal.
Period 6: Nature chooses the output according to the state θ and effort e.
Period 7: output is realized and wage is paid to the agent according to the previously
agreed contract.
Restriction on beliefs: We have defined in Definition 3.1 that for any pσ, µq, µ is
reasonable if:
• µ is decided by σ according to Bayes’ Rule whenever possible;
• For any player j, j  i, its belief about player i at history ht, µjpθi|θj , htq, only
depends on previous history and player i’s action at period t, ait.
Given those restrictions, for j  P,A, µjph1q  µjph2q  µjph3q  µ0, µjph4q 
µjph5q  µs.
2Also, neither the principal nor the agent has any private information here.
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Especially, at the beginning of period 5 (after the principal offers a contract in period
4), since the principal does not know more about the state than the agent, his action
should not change the agent’s belief given any contract the principal offers.
Proofs and Additional Results
Proof of Lemma 3.1. 1) Implementing high effort: Because wh, wL ¥ 0, Eµppe 
1qwH   p1  Eµppe  1qqwL  c ¥ Eµppe  0qwH   p1  Eµppe  0qqwL ¥ 0. There-
fore, the IR constraint must be slack.
Because of the IC constraint, wH  wL ¥ cEµ∆p . Then it is trivial to show that IC
constraint and the Limited liability constraint of the low output must be binding at the
optimal.
2) Implementing low effort: again, it is easy to show that the IR constraint is slack.
By choosing wH  wL  0, the IC constraint is not violated and it minimizes the cost of
the Principal.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. 1) V pe  0, µq  pEµppe  0qqpyH  wHpe  0qq   p1  Eµppe 
0qqpyL  wLpe  0qq  pEµppe  0qqpyH  yLq   yL
BV pe0,µq
Bµ  ppp0, Gq  pp0, BqqpyH  yLq ¡ 0
B2V pe0,µq
Bµ2  0
2) V pe  1, µq  pEµppe  1qqpyH wHpe  1qq  p1Eµppe  1qqpyLwLpe  1qq 
pEµppe  1qqpyH  yL  cEµ∆pq   yL
BV pe1,µq
Bµ  ppp1, Gq  pp1, BqqpyH  yLq  
crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqs
pEµ∆pq2
B2V pe1,µq
Bµ2  p2q
crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqs∆∆p
pEµ∆pq3
If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq  pp1, Bqpp0, Gq  0, BV pe1,µqBµ ¡ 0 and
B2V pe1,µq
Bµ2  0; V pe  1, µq is
increasing and linear in µ.
If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq  pp1, Bqpp0, Gq ¡ 0, BV pe1,µqBµ ¡ 0 and
B2V pe1,µq
Bµ2   0; V pe  1, µq is
increasing and strictly concave in µ.
If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq  pp1, Bqpp0, Gq   0, B
2V pe1,µq
Bµ2 ¡ 0, V pe  1, µq is strictly convex in
µ.
BV pe1,µq
Bµ  ppp1, Gq  pp1, BqqpyH  yLq  
crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqs
pEµ∆pq2 .
• If ppp1, Gq  pp1, BqqpyH  yLq   crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,GqspEµ∆pq2 |µ0 ¥ 0, V pe  1, µq is
increasing in µ
• If ppp1, Gq  pp1, BqqpyH  yLq   crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,GqspEµ∆pq2 |µ1 ¤ 0, V pe  1, µq is
decreasing in µ
• If ppp1, Gq  pp1, BqqpyH  yLq   crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,GqspEµ∆pq2 |µ0   0   ppp1, Gq 
pp1, BqqpyH  yLq   crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,GqspEµ∆pq2 |µ1, then there exists a µˆ P p0, 1q, such
that V pe  1, µq is decreasing in µ for µ P r0, µˆq and increasing in µ for µ P pµˆ, 1s.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3. V pe  0, µq  pEµppe  0qqpyH  yLq   yL. V pe  1, µq 
Eµppe  1q

yH  yL 
c
Eµ∆p
	
  yL. ∆V pµq  V pe  1, µq  V pe  0, µq  Eµ∆ppyH 
yLq 
cEµppe1q
Eµ∆p
 Eµppe  1q

pyH  yLq 
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2

V pe  1, µq ¥ V pe  0, µq iff pyH  yLq  cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 ¥ 0
Case I: If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq  pp1, Bqpp0, Gq,
V pe  1, µq  pEµppe  1qqpyHyL cEµ∆pq yL  pEµppe  1qqpyHyLq
cpp1,Bq
pp1,Bqpp0,Bq 
yL
∆V pµq  V pe  1, µq  V pe  0, µq,
B∆V pµq
Bµ  ppp1, Gq  pp1, BqqpyH  yLq  ppp0, Gq  pp0, BqqpyH  yLq
 ∆∆ppyH  yLq ¡ 0
B2∆V pµq
Bµ2  0
Case II: If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, pyH  yLq cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 is increasing over µ.
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2 P

cpp1,Gq
ppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 ,
cpp1,Bq
ppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2

• If yH  yL ¥ cpp1,Bqppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2 , V pe  1q ¥ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, 1s
• If yH  yL   cpp1,Gqppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 , V pe  1q ¤ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, 1s
• If yH  yL P

cpp1,Gq
ppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 ,
cpp1,Bq
ppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2
	
,
there exist a cut-off point µ¯ P p0, 1q , ryH  yLs  cEµ¯ppe1qpEµ¯∆pq2 ,
such that V pe  1q ¤ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, µ¯s and V pe  1q ¡ V pe  0q for any
µ P pµ¯, 1s
Case III: If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq   pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then log

cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2
	
 logpcq logpEµppe 
1qq  2logpEµ∆pq
Blog

cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2


Bµ 
pp1,Gqpp1,Bq
Eµppe1q  2
∆∆p
Eµ∆p 
1
µ  pp1,Bq
pp1,Gqpp1,Bq
 2 1
µ  pp1,Bqpp0,Bq∆∆p
 1
µ  pp1,Bq
pp1,Gqpp1,Bq
	
µ  pp1,Bqpp0,Bq∆∆p
	
!
µ  pp1,Bqpp0,Bq∆∆p
	
 2

µ  pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq
	)
 1
µ  pp1,Bq
pp1,Gqpp1,Bq
	
µ  pp1,Bqpp0,Bq∆∆p
	
!
µ 

pp1,Bqpp0,Bq
∆∆p 
pp1,Bq
pp1,Gqpp1,Bq
	
 pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq
)
Therefore, if 1 

pp1,Bqpp0,Bq
∆∆p 
pp1,Bq
pp1,Gqpp1,Bq
	
 pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq ¥ 0, log

cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2
	
is
increasing for any level of µ P r0, 1s;
if

pp1,Bqpp0,Bq
∆∆p 
pp1,Bq
pp1,Gqpp1,Bq
	
 pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq ¤ 0, log

cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2
	
is decreasing for
any level of µ P r0, 1s;
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if1 

pp1,Bqpp0,Bq
∆∆p 
pp1,Bq
pp1,Gqpp1,Bq
	
 pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq   0  

pp1,Bqpp0,Bq
∆∆p 
pp1,Bq
pp1,Gqpp1,Bq
	

pp1,Bq
pp1,Gqpp1,Bq   0, log

cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2
	
is first increasing and then decreasing
Case III.1:
• If 1   pp1,Bqpp0,Bqpp1,Gqpp0,Gqpp1,Bq pp0,Bq  2 pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq ¡ 0,
Blog

Eµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2


Bµ ¡ 0 for any
µ P r0, 1s, cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 P

cpp1,Bq
ppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2 ,
cpp1,Gq
ppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2

• Then

pyH  yLq 
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2

is decreasing
– If yH  yL ¥ cpp1,Gqppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 , V pe  1q ¥ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, 1s
– If yH  yL ¤ cpp1,Bqppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2 , V pe  1q ¤ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, 1s
– If yH  yL P

cpp1,Bq
ppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2 ,
cpp1,Gq
ppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2
	
,
there exist a cut-off point µ¯ P p0, 1q , ryH  yLs  cEµ¯ppe1qpEµ¯∆pq2 ,
such that V pe  1q ¥ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, µ¯s and V pe  1q   V pe  0q for
any µ P pµ¯, 1s
• Case III.2: If pp1,Bqpp0,Bqpp1,Gqpp0,Gqpp1,Bq pp0,Bq  2 pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq   0,
Blog

Eµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2


Bµ   0 for
any µ P r0, 1s, then cEµppe1qpEµ∆pq2 P

cpp1,Gq
ppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 ,
cpp1,Bq
ppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2

• Then

pyH  yLq 
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2

is increasing
– If yH  yL ¥ cpp1,Bqppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2 , V pe  1q ¥ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, 1s
– If yH  yL ¤ cpp1,Gqppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 , V pe  1q ¤ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, 1s
– If yH  yL P

cpp1,Gq
ppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 ,
cpp1,Bq
ppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2
	
,
there exist a cut-off point µ¯ P p0, 1q , ryH  yLs  cEµ¯ppe1qpEµ¯∆pq2 ,
such that V pe  1q ¤ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, µ¯s and V pe  1q ¡ V pe  0q for
any µ P pµ¯, 1s
• Case III.3: If
1  pp1,Bqpp0,Bqpp1,Gqpp0,Gqpp1,Bq pp0,Bq  2
pp1,Bq
pp1,Gqpp1,Bq   0  
pp1,Bqpp0,Bq
pp1,Gqpp0,Gqpp1,Bq pp0,Bq
 2 pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq ,
then there exist a level of µ, µˆ, such that
Blog

Eµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2


Bµ |µµˆ  0, and
Blog

Eµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2


Bµ ¥
0 if µ ¤ µˆ and
Blog

Eµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2


Bµ   0 if µ ¡ µˆ,
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2 P

min
!
cpp1,Gq
ppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 ,
cpp1,Bq
ppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2
)
,
cEµˆppe1q
pEµˆ∆pq2

• Then

pyH  yLq 
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2

is first decreasing and then increasing
– If yH  yL ¥ cEµˆppe1qpEµˆ∆pq2 , V pe  1q ¥ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, 1s
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– If yH  yL ¤ min
!
cpp1,Gq
ppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 ,
cpp1,Bq
ppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2
)
, V pe  1q ¤ V pe  0q for
any µ P r0, 1s
– If
yHyL P

min
!
cpp1,Gq
ppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 ,
cpp1,Bq
ppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2
)
,max
!
cpp1,Gq
ppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 ,
cpp1,Bq
ppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2
)	
,
there exist a cut-off point µ¯ P p0, 1q , ryH  yLs  cEµ¯ppe1qpEµ¯∆pq2 ,
such that V pe  1q ¤ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, µ¯s and V pe  1q ¡ V pe  0q for
any µ P pµ¯, 1s
– If yH  yL P

max
!
cpp1,Gq
ppp1,Gqpp0,Gqq2 ,
cpp1,Bq
ppp1,Bqpp0,Bqq2
)
,
cEµˆppe1q
pEµˆ∆pq2
	
,
there exist two cut-off points µ¯1, µ¯2 P p0, 1q , µ¯1   µ¯2, ryH  yLs 
cEµ¯1ppe1q
pEµ¯1∆pq2 
cEµ¯2ppe1q
pEµ¯2∆pq2 ,
such that V pe  1q ¥ V pe  0q for any µ P r0, µ¯1s Y rµ¯2, 1s and V pe  1q  
V pe  0q for any µ P pµ¯1, µ¯2q
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Proposition 3.1 is obvious given the proof of lemma 3.3.
Corollary C.1. If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq   pp1, Bqpp0, Gq, then
• If 1   pp1,Bqpp0,Bqpp1,Gqpp0,Gqpp1,Bq pp0,Bq  2 pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq ¡ 0, then V pe  1, µq either has
no intersection with V pe  0, µq, or crosses V pe  0, µq for once from above;
• If pp1,Bqpp0,Bqpp1,Gqpp0,Gqpp1,Bq pp0,Bq  2 pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq   0, then V pe  1, µq either has no
intersection with V pe  0, µq, or crosses V pe  0, µq for once from below;
• If 1   pp1,Bqpp0,Bqpp1,Gqpp0,Gqpp1,Bq pp0,Bq  2 pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq   0   pp1,Bqpp0,Bqpp1,Gqpp0,Gqpp1,Bq pp0,Bq 
2 pp1,Bqpp1,Gqpp1,Bq , then V pe  1, µq can either has no intersection with V pe  0, µq,
cross V pe  0, µq from below or above for once, or cross V pe  0, µq first from below
and then from above.
Proof. The proof comes directly from the proof of Lemma 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. If V pµq  V pe  0, µq, it is obvious that EτV pµq  V pEτµq 
V pµ0q. Therefore, any experiment would lead to exactly same pay-off for the principle.
If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¤ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq and for V pµq  V pe  1, µq for some levels of µ,
then V pµq  max tV pe  0, µq, V pe  1, µqu is (weakly) convex because both V pe  0, µq
and V pe  1, µq are (weakly) convex. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) showed that when
the value function is convex, the optimal distribution of posterior is fully revealing.
If pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq and for V pµq  V pe  1, µq for any µ, then V pµq is
strictly concave. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) showed that when the value function is
concave, the optimal distribution of posterior reveals no information.
169
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Part 1 and Part 2 of Proposition 3.2 has been proved in
Lemma 3.4.
Part 3:
µ˜ P argmax
µ
V pe  1, µq  V pe  0, 0q
µ 0
P argmax
µ
log

V pe  1, µq  V pe  0, 0q
µ 0


F.O.C.: (neglecting the constraint µ P r0, 1s)
Blog

V pe1,µqV pe0,0q
µ0
	
Bµ
 0
V 1pe  1, µq  V 1pe  0, 0q
V pe  1, µq  V pe  0, 0q 
1
µ
 0

V 1pe  1, µq  V 1pe  0, 0q

µ  V pe  1, µq  V pe  0, 0q
ppp1, Gq  pp1, BqqpyH  yLq  
c rpp1, Gqpp0, Bq  pp1, Bqpp0, Gqs
pEµ∆pq2

µ
 µppp1, Gq  pp1, BqqpyH  yLq 
cEµppe  1q
Eµ∆p
  ppp1, Bq  pp0, BqqpyH  yLq
 ppp1, Bq  pp0, BqqpyH  yLq 
c rpp1, Gqpp0, Bq  pp1, Bqpp0, Gqs
pEµ∆pq2
µ 
cEµppe  1q
Eµ∆p

|µµ˜I
 0
 ppp1, Bq  pp0, BqqpyH  yLq  


cEµppe  1q
Eµ∆p

1
µ 
cEµppe  1q
Eµ∆p

|µµ˜I
 0
S.O.C.:
B2log

V pe1,µqV pe0,0q
µ0
	
Bµ2


ppp1, Bq  pp0, BqqpyH  yLq  


cEµppe  1q
Eµ∆p

1
µ 
cEµppe  1q
Eµ∆p

1



cEµppe  1q
Eµ∆p

1
 

cEµppe  1q
Eµ∆p

1
 


cEµppe  1q
Eµ∆p

2
µ   0
,when V pe  1, µq is concave.
ppp1, Bq  pp0, BqqpyH  yLq  

crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqs
pEµ∆pq2 µ 
cEµppe1q
Eµ∆p

µ0
  0 iff
pyH  yLq  
cEµppe1q
pEµ∆pq2 |µ0
However, this is impossible if V pe  1, µq is concave and
V pe  1, µq ¡ V pe  0, µq for at least some µ.
Therefore, ppp1, Bqpp0, BqqpyHyLq 

crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqs
pEµ∆pq2 µ 
cEµppe1q
Eµ∆p

µ0
¡
0.
Therefore, µ˜  min
 
µ˜I , 1
(
 argmaxµ log

V pe1,µqV pe0,0q
µ0
	
 argmaxµ

V pe1,µqV pe0,0q
µ0
	
.
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It is then easy to show that
tτ, µu 
$&
%
!
τpµGq 
µ0
µ˜ , τpµBq  1 τpµGq, µB  0, µG  µ˜
)
, if µ0 ¤ µ˜
tτpµGq P r0, 1s , τpµBq  1 τpµGq, µB  µG  µ0u , if µ0 ¡ µ˜
is indeed the distribution of posteriors under any optimal experiment:
Step 1: for any µ P p0, µ¯s, it is easy to show that for any τ1, τ2, µ1, µ2 such that
0 ¤ τ1, τ2, µ1, µ2 ¤ 1, µ1   µ   µ¯   µ2, τ1   τ2  1 and τ1µ1   τ2µ2  µ, we have V pµq ¤
τ1V pµ1q   τ2V pµ2q. This is because that V pµq  V pe  0, µq, V pµ1q  V pe  0, µ1q,
V pµ2q  V pe  1, µ2q ¡ V pe  0, µ2q, τ1V pµ1q   τ2V pµ2q ¡ τ1V pe  0, µ1q   τ2V pe 
0, µ2q  V pe  0, τ1µ1   τ2µ2q  V pe  0, µq  V pµq.
Step 2: following step 1, it can be show that for those µ, it is optimal to set µ1  0.
τ1µ1 p1 τ1qµ2  µ, therefore τ  µ2µµ2µ1 . τ1V pµ1q  τ2V pµ2q 
µ2µ
µ2µ1 pV pµ1qV pµ2qq 
V pµ2q
Take the derivative over µ1, then we have µ2µpµ2µ1q2 rV pµ1q
1pµ2  µ1q  p1qpV pµ1q  V pµ2qqs 
µ2µ
pµ2µ1q2 rV pµ1q
1pµ2  µ1q  pV pµ2q  V pµ1qs   0. Therefore it is optimal to set µ1  0
Step 3: after step 2, it is optimal to set µ2  µ˜. Given µ1  0, τ1V pµ1q   τ2V pµ2q 
µµ1
µ2µ1 pV pµ2q  V p0qq   V p0q 
µ
µ2
pV pµ2q  V p0qq   V p0q which is maximized at µ˜ as we
shown before.
Step 4: for any µ P pµ¯, µ˜s, it is straightforward to check that it is also optimal to set
µ1  0 and µ2  µ˜ using exactly the same approach as Step 2 and Step 3.
Step 5: for any µ P pµ˜, 1q, it is optimal to set µ1  µ2  µ. V pµq is above the line
connecting V p0q and V pµ2q, such that 0   µ˜   µ   µ2. It is easy to proof by the definition
of µ˜.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. From Proposition 3.2 we know if pp1, Gqpp0, Bq ¡ pp1, Bqpp0, Gq
and V pµq  V pe  0, µq for some µ and V pµq  V pe  1, µq for some other µ, µG 
max tµ˜, µ0u. Probpe  1q  min
!
µ0
µ˜ , 1
)
. It is obvious then both µG and Probpe  1q
are (weakly) increasing in µ0.
We know from previous proposition that µ˜  min
 
µ˜I , 1
(
, in which µ˜I is define as the
level of µ such thatppp1, Bqpp0, BqqpyHyLq 

crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqs
pEµ∆pq2 µ 
cEµppe1q
Eµ∆p

|µµ˜I

0.
By Implicit Function Theorem, µ˜I is strictly decreasing in yH  yL and strictly in-
creasing in c. Therefore, µG is weakly decreasing in yH  yL and weakly increasing in c.
Therefore, Probpe  1q is weakly increasing in yH  yL and weakly decreasing in c.
For two production functions,
tp˜pe, θqupe,θqPtp0,0q,p1,0q,p0,1q,p1,1qu and tppe, θqupe,θqPtp0,0q,p1,0q,p0,1q,p1,1qu, such that p˜pe, θq 
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appe, θq   p1 bqp1 ppe, θqq  pa  b 1qppe, θq   p1 bq, 1 ¡ a, b ¡ 12 ,
hence for any pe, θq and pe1, θ1q, p˜pe, θq  p˜pe1, θ1q  pa  b 1qpppe, θq  ppe1, θ1qq.
Therefore, p˜p1, Bq  p˜p0, Bq  pa  b 1qpppp1, Bq  pp0, Bqq,
Eµ∆p˜  µ rpp˜p1, Gq  p˜p0, Gqq  pp˜p1, Bq  p˜p0, Bqqs   pp˜p1, Bq  p˜p0, Bqq  pa   b 
1qEµ∆p,
Eµp˜pe  1q  µ rp˜p1, Gq  p˜p1, Bqs   p˜p1, Bq  pa   b  1qµ rpp1, Gq  pp1, Bqs   pa   b 
1qpp1, Bq   p1 bq  pa  b 1qEµp˜pe  1q   p1 bq,
p˜p1, Gqp˜p0, Bq  p˜p1, Bqp˜p0, Gq  ppa   b  1qpp1, Gq   p1  bqqppa   b  1qpp0, Bq   p1 
bqq  ppa  b 1qpp1, Bq   p1 bqqppa  b 1qpp0, Gq   p1 bqq
 pa   b  1q2ppp1, Gqpp0, Bq  pp1, Bqpp0, Gqq   pa   b  1qp1  bqpppp1, Gq  pp0, Gqq 
ppp1, Bq  pp0, Bqqq
Therefore, pp˜p1, Bq  p˜p0, BqqpyH  yLq  

crp˜p1,Gqp˜p0,Bqp˜p1,Bqp˜p0,Gqs
pEµ∆p˜q2 µ 
cEµp˜pe1q
Eµ∆p˜

 pa  b 1qpppp1, Bq  pp0, BqqpyH  yLq
 
crpa b1q2ppp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqq pa b1qp1bqpppp1,Gqpp0,Gqqppp1,Bqpp0,Bqqqs
ppa b1qEµ∆pq2 µ
 
cpa b1qEµp˜pe1q cp1bq
pa b1qEµ∆p
 pa  b 1qpppp1, Bq  pp0, BqqpyH  yLq   crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,GqspEµ∆pq2 µ 
cEµppe1q
Eµ∆p
  crp1bqpppp1,Gqpp0,Gqqppp1,Bqpp0,Bqqqspa b1qpEµ∆pq2 µ 
cp1bq
pa b1qEµ∆p
¡ ppp1, Bqpp0, BqqpyHyLq 

crpp1,Gqpp0,Bqpp1,Bqpp0,Gqs
pEµ∆pq2 µ 
cEµppe1q
Eµ∆p

for any µ P r0, 1s.
Therefore, using argument similar to Implicit Function Theorem, µ˜Iptp˜pe, θquq ¡
µ˜Iptppe, θquq. Therefore, µG is weakly higher and Probpe  1q is weakly lower if the
production process becomes noisier.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. Part 1 and 2 of this corollary are obvious given that V pe  0, µq
is linear in µ, and V pe  0, µq is strictly concave in µ.
Part 3:
Step 1: for any µ P pµ¯, 1s, it is easy to show that for τ1, τ2, µ1, µ2 such that 0 ¤
τ1, τ2, µ1, µ2 ¤ 1, µ1   µ   µ¯   µ2 and τ1µ1   τ2µ2  µ, we have V pµq ¤ τ1V pµ1q  
τ2V pµ2q.
This is because that V pµq  V pe  0, µq, V pµ2q  V pe  0, µ2q, V pµ1q  V pe 
1, µ1q ¡ V pe  0, µ1q, τ1V pµ1q   τ2V pµ2q ¡ τ1V pe  0, µ1q   τ2V pe  0, µ2q  V pe 
0, τ1µ1   τ2µ2q  V pe  0, µq  V pµq.
Step 2: following step 1, it can be show that for those µ, it is optimal to set µ2  1.
τ1V pµ1q   τ2V pµ2q 
µµ1
µ2µ1 pV pµ2q  V pµ1qq   V pµ1q which is increasing in µ2.
Step 3: for those µ, it is optimal to set µ1  µ˜   µ¯. Following step 2, τ1V pµ1q  
τ2V pµ2q 
µ2µ
µ2µ1 pV pµ1q  V pµ2qq   V pµ2q 
1µ
1µ1 pV pµ1q  V p1qq   V p1q. µ1  ˜˜µ is thus
the level that maximizes V pµ1qV p1q1µ1 
V pe1,µ1qV pe0,1q
1µ1 .
Step 4: for any µ P
  ˜˜µ, µ¯, it is either to check that it is also optimal to set µ2  1 and
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µ1  ˜˜µ using exactly the same approach as Step 2 and Step 3.
Step 5: for any µ P p0, µ˜q, it is optimal to set µ1  µ2  µ. V pµq is above the line
connecting V pµ1q and V p1q, such that 0   µ1   ˜˜µ   µ. It is easy to proof by the definition
of ˜˜µ.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Constrained Social Optimal Experiment:
Define τ tµ|θu 
°
µpsqµ pi ts|θu.
max
tτtµ|θuu
EθEµ|θEy|θ,epµ,twpy,µquq ty  cpepµ, twpy, µquqqu
 max
tτtµ|θuu
yL   EθEµ|θ tppθ, pepµ, twpy, µquqqpyH  yLq  cppepµ, twpy, µquqqu
 max
tτtµ|θuu
yL   EθEµ|θ
!
max
e
tppθ, eqpyH  yLq  cpequ ∆pθ, epµ, twpy, µquqq
)
 max
tτtµ|θuu
yL   Eθ max
e
tppθ, eqpyH  yLq  cpequ  EθEµ|θ t∆pθ, epµ, twpy, µquqqu
,in which ∆pθ, eq is the efficiency loss from not implementing the first-best effort, and it
is defined as:
∆pθ, eq  max
e
tppθ, eqpyH  yLq  cpequ  tppθ, eqpyH  yLq  cpequ
From the definition we know that ∆pθ, eq ¥ 0 Now consider three different cases:
Case I: if ∆ppθqpyH  yLq  c   0 for both θ P tG,Bu, it is socially inefficient to
implement high effort under both states. Then due to agency costs, it would not be
individually profitable to implement high effort under both state, i.e., V pe  1, µq   V pe 
0, µq for µ  0, 1. Therefore, from previous results we know V pe  1, µq   V pe  0, µq for
any µ, and V pµq  V pe  0, µq for any µ. Then high effort is never implemented in this
scenario, and any experiment is both constrained social optimal and individually rational.
Case II: if ∆ppθ  GqpyH  yLq ¥ c ¥ ∆ppθ  BqpyH  yLq, it is socially efficient to
implement high effort only in good state but not in bad state. Due to agency problem,
those are possible scenarios about the individual profitability of implementing effort:
II.1 V pe  1, µq   V pe  0, µq for both µ  0, 1
II.2 V pe  1, µ  0q   V pe  0, µ  0q, V pe  1, µ  1q   V pe  0, µ  1q, and
V pe  1, µ  1q is weakly convex
II.3 V pe  1, µ  0q   V pe  0, µ  0q, V pe  1, µ  1q   V pe  0, µ  1q, and
V pe  1, µ  1q is concave
Under Case II.1, from previous results we know V pe  1, µq   V pe  0, µq for any
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µ, and V pµq  V pe  0, µq for any µ. Then the high effort is never implemented in this
scenario, and any experiment is both constrained social optimal and individually rational.
Under Case II.2, first-best can be reached by having a full revealing signal, i.e.,
τ tµ  0|θ  Bu  1, τ tµ  1|θ  Gu  1. From previous results, we know that the e-
quilibrium experiment under Case II.2 is also fully revealing. High effort is implemented
if and only if the state is good.
Under Case II.3, first-best can be reached by having a full revealing signal, i.e.,
τ tµ  0|θ  Bu  1, τ tµ  1|θ  Gu  1. From previous results, we know that the equi-
librium experiment under Case II.2 is either full revealing or partial obfuscating. When
there is partial obfuscation, the bad signal is fully revealing but the good signal is not.
There will be over-implementing of high effort sometimes when the state is actually bad.
Case III: if ∆ppθ  GqpyH  yLq ¥ c for both θ P tG,Bu, it is socially efficient
to implement high effort under both cases. Due to agency problem, those are possible
scenarios about the individual profitability of implementing effort:
III.1 V pe  1, µq   V pe  0, µq for both µ  0, 1
III.2 V pe  1, µq ¡ V pe  0, µq for both µ  0, 1
III.3 V pe  1, µ  0q   V pe  0, µ  0q, V pe  1, µ  1q ¡ V pe  0, µ  1q, and
V pe  1, µ  1q is weakly convex
III.4 V pe  1, µ  0q ¡ V pe  0, µ  0q, V pe  1, µ  1q   V pe  0, µ  1q, and
V pe  1, µ  1q is strictly convex
III.5 V pe  1, µ  0q   V pe  0, µ  0q, V pe  1, µ  1q ¡ V pe  0, µ  1q, and
V pe  1, µ  1q is concave
Under Case III.1, from previous results we know V pe  1, µq   V pe  0, µq for any
µ, and V pµq  V pe  0, µq for any µ. Then the high effort is never implemented in this
scenario, and any experiment is both constrained social optimal and individually rational.
Under Case III.2, there are two possible sub-cases: 1) V pµq  V pe  1, µq for any
µ; 2) There exists two cut-off points, µ¯1 and µ¯2, such that 0   µ¯1   µ¯2   1, V pe 
1, µ¯1q  V pe  0, µ¯1q  V pe  1, µ¯2q  V pe  0, µ¯2q  0, and V pe  1, µq   V pe  0, µq if
µ¯1   µ   µ¯2.
In the first sub-case, high effort is always implemented in this scenario, and any ex-
periment is both constrained social optimal and individually rational.
In the second sub-case, this scenario is only possible if V pe  1, µq is convex: in this
scenario, first-best (always implementing high effort) can be implemented, for example, by
fully-revealing experiment. From previous results, we know the equilibrium experiment
under this scenario is a fully-revealing experiment, which also always implement high
effort. Therefore, there is no efficiency loss in this sub-case as well.
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Under Case III.3 and III.5, there exist a single cut-off point µ¯ P p0, 1q, such that
V pe  1, µq   V pe  0, µq for µ   µ¯, and V pe  1, µ  1q ¥ V pe  0, µ  1q for µ ¥ µ¯.
Therefore, if µ0 ¥ µ¯, high effort can be implemented with probability 1, for example, by
an experiment that provides no additional information.
If µ0   µ¯, the constrained social optimal experiment can be constructed in the following
way: pips  G|θ  Gq  1, pips  G|θ  Bq  µ0p1µ¯q1µ0 . It is then obvious that regardless of
V pe  1, µq being concave or convex, there is under-provision of high effort in equilibrium.
Under Case III.4, there exist a single cut-off point µ¯ P p0, 1q, such that V pe  1, µq  
V pe  0, µq for µ ¡ µ¯, and V pe  1, µ  1q ¥ V pe  0, µ  1q for µ ¤ µ¯. Therefore, if
µ0 ¤ µ¯, high effort can be implemented with probability 1, for example, by an experiment
that provides no additional information.
If µ0 ¡ µ¯, the constrained social optimal experiment can be constructed in the following
way: pips  B|θ  Bq  1, pips  B|θ  Gq  µ¯p1µ0qp1µ¯qµ0 . We know from previous
results, that equilibrium experiment is fully revealing, and probability of high effort being
implemented is smaller than the social optimal.
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